by John Calvin

Some may now expect me, as an additional favor, to provide more substantial evidence to back my claim that Augustine stands firmly on our side. This task, though not particularly difficult, is indeed extensive. Were I to gather every piece of evidence that would serve to bolster our position, I would find myself compiling a lengthy volume, perhaps requiring entire books. For what do the four books addressed to Boniface, the two to Prosper and Hilary, and the pair written to Valentinus contain? What does the work Nature and Grace or the The Perfection of Righteousness teach? What message is conveyed in the three books addressed to Marcellinus and in the numerous letters that match these books in number? These texts, without exception, present a clear and enduring exposition of our doctrine. But lest I be accused of relying solely on rhetoric, as my opponent [Pighius] does, I will endeavor to satisfy those who, though desirous of witnessing our agreement with Augustine, lack either the time or the means to peruse all these writings. I shall, therefore, offer a concise summary drawn from a few passages that will leave no room for doubt. I will particularly focus on those works to which Pighius ascribes the highest authority, so that when he is confounded, he cannot retreat to his usual defense, claiming that Augustine’s words were uttered in the heat of debate and should not be taken as his definitive teaching. Pighius himself admits that those writings composed after the dust of controversy had settled are the most reliable indicators of Augustine’s settled convictions. If I can demonstrate from these that Augustine is in agreement with us, then even my opponent must concede our victory.

Firstly, we assert that the human mind is stricken with blindness, rendering it incapable of arriving at the knowledge of the truth on its own; we also claim that the will of man is corrupted by sin, such that he cannot love God or obey His righteousness. These positions Pighius outrightly rejects. Let Augustine now step forth as our mediator. In his work The Predestination of the Saints, Augustine acknowledges that he once held the mistaken belief that it was within our power, upon hearing the gospel, to assent to it. However, he later recants, having been persuaded by Paul’s words, “What do you have that you have not received?” Consequently, he concludes that both the inception and the completion of faith are gifts from God, for we are not even capable of thinking anything good, let alone believing it. But Augustine, wishing to close every avenue to sophistry, adds that this gift is not universally dispensed but is given to some and withheld from others. And if the inquiry arises as to why some are given faith while others are not, Augustine does not hesitate to assert that this is due not to human will but to divine grace and predestination. But someone might object that God still demands faith from man. Augustine agrees, but he insists that even this faith is God’s gift, for at the same time that He commands us to believe, He also promises to work in us that very faith He requires.

The Misconception of Man’s Ability to Prepare for Grace

It is a common misconception among many that man, by his own effort, is able to prepare himself to receive the grace of God—a notion that Pighius ardently defends. Augustine, however, refutes this view with the apostle’s words: “What do you have that you have not received? And from whom did you receive it, if not from Him who distinguishes you from another to whom He has not given what He has given to you?” Augustine further illustrates this by citing the example of Paul: “Once alienated from the faith, which he vehemently opposed and persecuted, Paul was suddenly converted by grace, which proved more powerful than his resistance. Thus, he not only became willing to believe, despite his previous unwillingness, but also transformed from a persecutor into one willing to endure persecution for the faith.” Again, Augustine declares: “When God promises to make people act according to His commands, He does not remain silent about their merits, but rather about their evil deeds, demonstrating by this that He repays good for evil by causing them to perform good works thereafter.”

Moreover, Augustine points to the Mediator Himself as the clearest evidence of predestination and grace. “By what merit of its own,” he asks, “whether of faith or works, did the human nature in Christ attain the privilege of being the Mediator? Was it because its goodness preceded grace? Since I share the same human nature, why am I not the Son of God as He is? But Christ possessed that nature and status by grace alone. Why then is grace different where nature is the same? Let us understand that the source of grace lies in our Head. For He who made Christ, in whom we believe, also made us to believe in Christ; He who made Jesus, the author and finisher of our faith, also brings about the beginning and completion of faith in us.” Again, Augustine states: “Just as He chose us, so does He call us, according to His own will, lest we should boast of our own will in so great a benefit.” He further asserts: “Consider how mistaken they are who believe that asking, seeking, and knocking arise from ourselves, and not as something granted to us; who claim that grace follows upon our merit, which precedes it, when, in fact, it is divine bounty that enables us to ask, seek, and knock.”

The question is often posed whether the freedom to choose between good and evil naturally resides in man. Augustine responds (in Rebuke and Grace to Valentinus): “It must be acknowledged that we have free choice to do both good and evil. Yet, in doing evil, a person is free from righteousness and enslaved to sin, whereas in doing good, no one is free unless first set free by the Son of God. Thus, men are liberated from evil solely by the grace of God, without which they can do no good—whether in thought, will, love, or action. This means not only that grace shows them what is right, but also that it enables them to delight in doing what is right.” Augustine succinctly sums this up: “The human will does not attain grace through its freedom, but rather gains freedom through grace.” He had already stated in his first book to Valentinus: “There is always free will in us, but it is not always good. It is free from righteousness when it serves sin, and then it is evil; or it is free from sin when it serves righteousness, and then it is good. The grace of God is always good, and through it, a person is given a good will.”

The Misunderstanding of Human Autonomy in Receiving Grace

Some might argue that God merely offers illumination to the human mind, leaving it to man's discretion to accept or reject, and that He moves the will in such a manner that it remains within the individual's power to follow or to resist. But Augustine responds decisively: “If God is the one who causes our faith, performing a miraculous work in our hearts so that we believe, then why should we doubt His ability to complete what He has begun? And why should man claim the initial role, presuming it to be the basis for receiving the subsequent help from God?” Augustine further critiques this notion: “Not wishing to contradict the clear evidence that faith is a gift of God, yet desiring to attribute belief to himself, man attempts to strike a bargain with God. He takes part of his faith for himself, leaving the rest for God, and with greater arrogance, he claims the first part as his own doing and ascribes the latter to God.” Thus, Augustine yields no portion of faith to human agency but attributes it wholly to God.

Augustine clarifies this further: “What does it mean ‘to come to Christ,’ if not to believe in Christ? And this coming is granted by the Father. What is meant by, ‘Everyone who has heard the Father and learned from Him comes to me,’ except that no one hears and learns from the Father without coming to me? Therefore, if all who learn from the Father come to me, it follows that those who do not come have not learned.” He continues, “This grace, secretly bestowed on human hearts, is not received by any hard heart; it is given precisely to remove hardness of heart for the first time.” Augustine again emphasizes, “It is unthinkable that one who has learned from the Father should fail to come. But why, then, does He not teach everyone? If we say that it is because they do not wish to learn, the question arises: ‘Lord, do you not quicken us by turning our hearts?’ Or, if God does not turn the unwilling to be willing, why does the Church pray for its persecutors? When the Gospel is preached, some believe, and some do not. Those who believe, while hearing the preacher’s external words, are inwardly listening to the Father and learning from Him. But those who do not believe hear outwardly, but inwardly they neither hear nor learn—for faith is granted to the former but not to the latter. Christ declares this openly: ‘No one can come to me unless the Father draws him.’ Again, ‘No one can come to me unless it has been granted by my Father.’ To be drawn to Christ, to hear and learn from the Father, is nothing other than receiving the gift of faith. For Christ distinguishes not between those who hear and those who do not but between believers and unbelievers when He says: ‘No one comes to me unless it has been granted to him.’ Thus, faith, both in its inception and completion, is wholly the gift of God.”

Moreover, Augustine asserts, “God promised to accomplish His work, not to leave it to men. Even though men perform good works related to the worship of God, it is He who causes them to fulfill what He has commanded, not they who compel Him to fulfill His promises. Otherwise, the fulfillment of God's promises would depend on human power rather than on God’s sovereignty.” He continues, “When God says, ‘I will put the fear of me in their hearts,’ He means that the fear He implants will be so profound and steadfast that they will persevere in their adherence to Him.” Augustine further clarifies, “It is certain that we keep the commandments when we will to do so, but it is God who prepares our will, and thus we must seek from Him the desire to will with sufficient strength to obey. We indeed will when we will, but it is He who causes us to will the good. We act when we act, but it is He who, by empowering our will, causes us to act.” Finally, he concludes, “Would you dare claim that even when Christ prayed that Peter’s faith should not fail, it would have failed if Peter had wished it? As if Peter could desire anything contrary to what Christ had prayed for him! When Christ prayed that Peter’s faith would not fail, He was asking that Peter’s will be made free, strong, unshakeable, and constant to the utmost degree in his belief.”

Indeed, when Augustine undertakes the comparison between the first man and his descendants, he concludes this matter in such a decisive manner that Pighius ought either to fall silent or, if he persists in his murmuring, he will find nothing left to grasp upon. After recounting the original state of innocence, the fall, and the consequent punishment—namely, the wretched condemnation that befell our race—Augustine turns his attention to our restoration and declares thus: God the Father, in His gracious benevolence, esteemed the human nature of Christ, not on account of any merit of its own, worthy of such honor that a man, conceived in the womb of a virgin, should be called the Son of God. And in this way, “the human nature assumed by God allowed no motion of an evil will within itself. Likewise, through this Mediator, God demonstrated that He makes those whom He has redeemed by His blood, who were once evil, to be eternally good.” The first man did not possess that grace which would ensure he would never desire evil; rather, he had a grace that, if he had chosen to remain under its influence, would have prevented him from becoming evil. Without this grace, even with free will, he could not have done good; yet he could, by his free choice, abandon it.

Augustine continues: “The assistance provided was such that he could abandon it if he so wished, or remain under its guidance if he so desired, but it did not compel his will. This was the original grace granted to the first Adam, yet the grace given in the second Adam is far more powerful. For the first grace allowed one to possess righteousness if he willed it; the second does more—it even causes one to will, and to will with such fervor that, by the Spirit's will, he overcomes the flesh's desires which war against it. The first grace was indeed significant, but the second is so much greater that it would be insufficient merely to restore man's lost freedom. It is not enough for this grace to merely enable one to recognize or persist in good if he wills; rather, it must also cause him to will the good.”

Further, Augustine asserts: “God did not wish the saints to boast in their own powers even regarding perseverance in doing good but to glory in Him alone. He not only grants them aid like that given to the first man—without which they could not persevere even if they willed—but He also causes them to will. Thus, since perseverance depends both on the ability and the will to continue, both the power and the will to persevere are bestowed by God’s grace. Their wills are so inflamed by the Holy Spirit that they are able precisely because they will, and they will because God causes them to will. For if, in this life, where our weakness is so great, people were left to their own wills, even with the continuing aid of grace—without which they could not persevere—and if God did not cause them to will, their wills would falter amidst so many and great temptations, and they would not be able to persevere. Their weakness would betray them, and they would either lack the will to persevere or, through the weakness of will, would not will in such a manner as to be capable of it. Therefore, help has been provided to the frailty of the human will so that it is driven by divine grace, without any possibility of turning away or detaching itself, ensuring that, though weak, it neither fails nor is overcome by any opposition.”

Will Pighius still dare to exclaim and spew forth his venom against us for affirming that God effectually directs human wills? Yet we are but following Augustine! To write further on perseverance would be redundant, for Augustine everywhere joins the two together—effective desire and constancy in perseverance. Moreover, as I have not yet mentioned, he previously stated that “after the fall of the first man, God willed that it should belong to His grace alone that man should come to Him, and He willed that it should belong to His grace alone that man should not depart from Him.” In this, Augustine names both the beginning and the end. In both, he leaves not the slightest opening for human effort, while Pighius assigns to man the leading role.

One thing yet remains: that whatever grace is bestowed upon us until the very end of our lives is freely given, not as a recompense for our gratitude, as though by our good use of earlier favors we could merit further grace of ourselves. Augustine confirms this most clearly: “I have shown plainly that the grace to begin and to persevere to the end is not given according to our merits, but is granted according to His own most secret and at the same time most just, most kind, and most wise will, since those whom He has predestined, He also has called.”

What then shall Pighius now put forward to evade this, for escape is beyond his power? Will he allege that I have extracted mutilated and maimed statements that do not truly reflect Augustine’s mind? Yet such a charge would be refuted by anyone who examines the context. Or will he claim that I did not quote accurately? But I have transcribed the passages word for word. Perhaps he will accuse me of deliberately omitting what might contradict my position? But all that I have taken comes from just four books, and these not so lengthy as to be burdensome to read in their entirety. I could have amassed far more citations from various sources, but I refrained, partly to conserve space and partly to make it easy for readers to verify how faithfully and candidly I have expounded Augustine’s true thought. If anyone remains unsatisfied, let those four books be brought forward: the two addressed to Valentinus, namely, Grace and Free Choice and Rebuke and Grace; and the two addressed to Prosper and Hilary, namely, The Predestination of the Saints and The Gift of Perseverance. Let judgment be made between us on the basis of these works, for I am willing to let the entire controversy be settled by them, and I do not fear that this will harm our cause in the least. Or will he suggest that Augustine, in the heat of controversy, was driven beyond proper bounds, thus compromising his reliability? Yet these are the very books to which Pighius himself admits authority should be granted without reservation, and from which alone, he asserts, Augustine’s definitive view can be determined. And what does Augustine teach therein?

He teaches that the human will is indeed free, but only to will evil. And this term “free” is not applied in the true sense, for the will is a slave to iniquity. By nature, it is evil, and thus is bound and captive under the yoke of sin, until it is freed through Christ. This corruption is so deep that it renders us unable not only to will or accomplish anything good but even to conceive the thought of it. Therefore, God is not moved by any prior preparation on our part to bestow His grace upon us; rather, He precedes us in every way, so that the beginning lies solely in His pure mercy. For all human faculties are corrupt, capable of producing only evil fruit. Furthermore, this grace is not indiscriminately given to all but is bestowed only upon those whom God wills; the rest, to whom it is not given, remain evil, utterly incapable of attaining to good, for they belong to the mass of the lost and condemned and are left to their just condemnation. Moreover, this grace is not of such a nature as to merely bestow the potential to do good, contingent upon the human will; rather, it effectually moves them to will the good, transforming their evil will into a good one, so that they necessarily will what is good. This transformation is not a one-time event, leaving them thereafter to their own devices; rather, they are guided continually, so that their perseverance in goodness is no less a gift of God than the inception of that goodness. In taking individuals under the direction of His Spirit, and in continuing to guide them until the very end of their lives, confirming them in perseverance, God is motivated solely by His own free goodness, without any regard to merit, for indeed they can have no merit, neither in their works nor in their wills nor even in their thoughts.

If anything in this summary is found not to be drawn from those four books, I offer no defense against being judged unworthy of belief by the whole world. But what in all our teaching differs from what Augustine has articulated? Therefore, though Pighius may stir up much commotion, he cannot deny that Augustine stands with us. What then prevents him from declaring that Augustine has descended to the level of a brute beast, as he threatened to do if Augustine were shown to support our case?

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Source: Bondage and Liberation of the Will, by John Calvin