by Herman Bavinck
The oneness of God does not only consist in a unity of singularity, however, but also in a unity of simplicity. The fact of the matter is that Scripture, to denote the fullness of the life of God, uses not only adjectives but also substantives: it tells us not only that God is truthful, righteous, living, illuminating, loving, and wise, but also that he is the truth, righteousness, life, light, love, and wisdom (Jer. 10:10; 23:6; John 1:4–5, 9; 14:6; 1 Cor. 1:30; 1 John 1:5; 4:8). Hence, on account of its absolute perfection, every attribute of God is identical with his essence.
Theology later taught this doctrine of Scripture under the term “the simplicity of God.” Irenaeus calls God “all thought, all perception, all eye, all hearing, the one fountain of all good things.”99 Over against Eunomius the three Cappadocians were forced especially to defend the correctness of the different divine names and attributes, but Augustine again and again reverted to the simplicity of God. God, said he, is pure essence without accidents. Compared to him, all created being is nonbeing.100 In the realm of creatures there are differences between existing, living, knowing, and willing; there are differences of degree among them. There are creatures that only exist; other creatures that also live; still others that also think. But in God everything is one. God is everything he possesses. He is his own wisdom, his own life; being and living coincide in him.101 After Augustine we find this teaching in John of Damascus,102 in the works of the scholastics,103 and further in the thought of all Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed theologians.104
Others, however, firmly rejected and criticized the doctrine of the simplicity of God. Eunomius, who did in fact teach the absolute simplicity of God, concluded from it that all the divine names were merely sounds, and that the divine being coincided with his “nonbegottenness” (ἀγεννησια). This one attribute, he believed, made all the others superfluous and useless.105 The Anthropomorphites of earlier and later date rejected the simplicity of God inasmuch as they ascribed a body to God. Arabian philosophers held to the simplicity of God but used it as a means of opposing the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, since according to them the three persons were simply “names added to the substance.”106 Duns Scotus, who for that matter expressly taught the doctrine of God’s simplicity,107 came into conflict with it insofar as he assumed that the attributes are formally distinct from each other as well as from the divine essence.108 Nominalism, being even much more radical, held that there were realistic distinctions between the attributes among themselves. In the period of the Reformation this view was adopted by the Socinians. In the interest of assuring the independence of humans, they arrived at the idea of finitizing the divine being and as a result were at a loss to know what to do with God’s simplicity. Socinus questioned whether Scripture permits us to ascribe simplicity to God. The Catechism of Rakow totally omits this attribute. Schlichting, Volkelius (et al.) denied that the attributes coincide with God’s being and asserted that a fullness of attributes is not inconsistent with his oneness.109 Vorstius, agreeing with this view and basing himself especially on the doctrine of the Trinity, stated that with reference to the divine being we must distinguish between matter and form, essence and attributes, genus and differentiae. Scripture, accordingly, reports that God swore “by his soul” (Jer. 51:14 MT) and that the Spirit is “within him” (1 Cor. 2:11). There is a difference, said Vorstius, between knowing and willing, between the subject that lives and the life by which the subject lives.110
The Remonstrants were of the same opinion. In the second chapter of their Confession they said that Scripture does not contain a single syllable about the simplicity of God, that it is a purely metaphysical doctrine and not at all necessary for Christians to believe. They especially raised the objection that the idea of the simplicity of God is incompatible with the freedom of his will and the changing character of his disposition. While Episcopius still listed the simplicity of God among the attributes and believed that the “relations, volitions, and free decrees” could be harmonized with it,111 Limborch no longer mentioned it. In rationalistic works it was either completely relegated to the background or left undiscussed altogether.112 Bretschneider writes that Scripture knows nothing of these philosophical subtleties.
Nor was pantheism able to recognize or appreciate the doctrine of God’s simplicity. It equated God with the world, while Spinoza, one of its exponents, even attributed to God the attribute of extension. Thus the attribute of God’s simplicity almost totally disappeared from modern theology. Its significance is no longer understood, and sometimes it is vigorously opposed. Schleiermacher refused to put the simplicity of God on a par with the other attributes, regarding it only as “the unseparated and inseparable mutual inherence of all divine attributes and activities.”113 In the works of Lange, Kahnis, Philippi, Ebrard, Lipsius, Biedermann, F. A. B. Nitzsch, Kaftan, von Oettingen, Haering, van Oosterzee (et al.), this attribute no longer occurs. Others vigorously oppose it, especially on the following two grounds: it is a metaphysical abstraction and inconsistent with the doctrine of the Trinity.114
This simplicity is of great importance, nevertheless, for our understanding of God. It is not only taught in Scripture (where God is called “light,” “life,” and “love”) but also automatically follows from the idea of God and is necessarily implied in the other attributes. Simplicity here is the antonym of “compounded.” If God is composed of parts, like a body, or composed of genus (class) and differentiae (attributes of differing species belonging to the same genus), substance and accidents, matter and form, potentiality and actuality, essence and existence, then his perfection, oneness, independence, and immutability cannot be maintained. On that basis he is not the highest love, for then there is in him a subject who loves—which is one thing—as well as a love by which he loves—which is another. The same dualism would apply to all the other attributes. In that case God is not the One “than whom nothing better can be thought.” Instead, God is uniquely his own, having nothing above him. Accordingly, he is completely identical with the attributes of wisdom, grace, and love, and so on. He is absolutely perfect, the One “than whom nothing higher can be thought.”115
In the case of creatures all this is very different. In their case there is a difference between existing, being, living, knowing, willing, acting, and so on. “All that is compounded is created.” No creature can be completely simple, for every creature is finite. God, however, is infinite and all that is in him is infinite. All his attributes are divine, hence infinite and one with his being. For that reason he is and can only be all-sufficient, fully blessed, and glorious within himself.116 From this alone it is already evident that the simplicity of God is absolutely not a metaphysical abstraction. It is essentially distinct from the philosophical idea of absolute being, the One, the only One, the Absolute, or substance, terms by which Xenophanes, Plato, Philo, Plotinus, and later Spinoza and Hegel designated God. It is not found by abstraction, that is, by eliminating all the contrast and distinctions that characterize creatures and describing him as the being who transcends all such contrasts. On the contrary: God’s simplicity is the end result of ascribing to God all the perfections of creatures to the ultimate divine degree. By describing God as “utterly simple essence,” we state that he is the perfect and infinite fullness of being, an “unbounded ocean of being.” Far from fostering pantheism, as Bauer thinks,117 this doctrine of the “utterly simple essence of God” is diametrically opposed to it. For in pantheism God has no existence and life of his own apart from the world. In the thought of Hegel, for example, the Absolute, pure Being, Thought, Idea, does not exist before the creation of the world, but is only logically and potentially prior to the world. All the qualifications of the Absolute are devoid of content—nothing but abstract logical categories.118
In describing God as “utterly simple essence,” however, Christian theology above all maintains that God has a distinct and infinite life of his own within himself, even though it is true that we can only describe that divine being with creaturely names. Pantheistic philosophy’s Absolute, Supreme Being, Substance—favorite names used for the divine being in this philosophy—are the result of abstraction. All qualifiers have been stripped from things until nothing is left but the lowest common denominator: pure being, unqualified existence. This “being” is indeed an abstraction, a concept for which there is no corresponding reality and which may not be further defined. Every further qualification would finitize it, make it into something particular, and hence destroy its generality. “All determination is negation.” But the being ascribed to God in theology is a unique, particular being distinct from that of the world. It describes God not as a being with which we cannot make any association other than that it is, but as someone who is all being, the absolute fullness of being. This simplicity of being does not exclude the many names ascribed to him, as Eunomius thought, but demands them. God is so abundantly rich that we can gain some idea of his richness only by the availability of many names. Every name refers to the same full divine being, but each time from a particular angle, the angle from which it reveals itself to us in his works. God is therefore simple in his multiplicity and manifold in his simplicity (Augustine). Hence, every qualification, every name, used with reference to God, so far from being a negation, is an enrichment of our knowledge of his being. “The divine essence is self-determined and is distinct from everything else in that nothing can be added to it.”119 Nor, taken in this sense, is this simplicity of God inconsistent with the doctrine of the Trinity, for the term “simple” is not used here as an antonym of “twofold” or “threefold” but of “composite.” Now, the divine being is not composed of three persons, nor is each person composed of the being and personal attributes of that person, but the one uncompounded (simple) being exists in three persons. Every person or personal attribute is not distinguishable in respect of essence but only in respect of reason. Every personal attribute is indeed a “real relation” but adds nothing real to the essence. The personal attributes “do not make up but only distinguish [the persons].”120
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99 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, I, 12; II, 13, 28; IV, 4; Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, V, 12; Origen, On First Principles, I, 1, 6; Athanasius, De decr. Nic. Syn., c. 22; Against the Arians, II, 38.
100 Augustine, The Trinity, V, 4; VII, 5; idem, Confessions, VII, 11; XI, 4.
101 Augustine, City of God, VIII, 6; X, 10; idem, The Trinity, XV, 5; T. Gangauf, Des heiligen Augustinus speculativ Lehre von Gott dem Dreieinigen (Augsburg: Schmidt, 1883), 147–57.
102 John of Damascus, The Orthodox Faith, I, 9.
103 Anselm, Monologion, c. 15; P. Lombard, Sent., I, dist. 8, nn. 4–9; T. Aquinas, Summa theol., I, qu. 3; idem, Summa contra gentiles, I, 16ff.; Bonaventure, Sent., I, dist. 8, art. 3.
104 D. Petavius, “De Deo,” in Theol. dogm., II, chs. 1–8; Theologia Wirceburgensi, III, 64; G. Perrone, Prael. theol., II, 92ff.; J. Heinrich and C. Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theologie, III, 417; G. Jansen, Theologia dogmatica specialis, II, 60ff.; J. Kleutgen, Die Theologie der Vorzeit, I, 183ff.; Philosophie der Vorzeit, II, 183ff.; J. Gerhard, Loci theol., II, c. 8, sect. 3; J. W. Baier, Compendium theologiae positivae, I, 1, 9; J. Buddeus, Institutiones theologiae moralis, II, 1, 17; A. Hyperius, Methodi theologiae, 88–89; J. Zanchi(us), Op. theol., II, 63–73; A. Polanus, Syn. theol., II, 8; J. Trigland, Antapologia (Amsterdam: Joannam Janssonium et al., 1664), c. 4; G. Voetius, Select. disp., I, 226–46; H. Alting, Theologia elenctica nova, 119ff.; B. de Moor, Comm. in Marckii Comp., I, 604–18; L. Meijer, Verhandelingen over de goddelyke Wigenschappen, IV, 517–52.
105 J. Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, II2, 21.
106 A. Stöckl, Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, II, 89.
107 Duns Scotus, Sent., I, dist. 8, qu.1–2.
108 Ibid., qu. 4.
109 J. Hoornbeek, Socianismus confutatus, 3 vols. (Utrecht, 1650–64), I, 368–69.
110 J. Trigland, Kerkelycke Geschiedenissen (Leyden: Andriae Wyngaerden, 1650), IV, 576, 585ff.; Schweizer, Theol. Jahrb. 15 (1856): 435ff.; 16 (1857): 153ff.; I. Dorner, Gesammelte Schriften (1883), 278ff.
111 S. Episcopius, Institutiones theologicae, IV, sect. 2, c. 7.
112 J. Wegschneider, Institutiones theologiae christianae dogmaticae, §61; F. Reinhard, Grundriss der Dogmatik, §33; K. G. Bretschneider, Handbuch der Dogmatik, 4th ed., I, 486.
113 F. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, §56.
114 A. Vilmar, Dogmatik, I, 208ff.; I. Dorner, A System of Christian Doctrine, I, 234ff.; idem, Gesammelte Schriften, 305; F. Frank, System der christlichen Wahrheit, 2d ed., I, 124; A. Ritschl, Theologie und Metaphysik, 12ff.; idem, Rechtfertigung und Versuchung, 2d ed., III, 2ff.; idem, Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie 10 (1865): 275ff.; 13 (1868): 67ff., 251ff.; J. Doedes, De Nederlandsche geloofsbelijdenis en de Heidelbergsche catechismus, 9; A. Schweizer, Christliche Glaubenslehre, I, 256–59; W. G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 3d ed., 3 vols. (New York: Scribner, 1891–94), I, 338; A. Kuyper, Ex ungue leonem (Amsterdam: Kruyt, 1882).
115 Augustine, The Trinity, V, 10; VI, 1; Hugo of St. Victor, The Trinity, I, 12.
116 D. Petavius, “De Deo,” in Theol. dogm., II, ch. 2.
117 F. C. Baur, Die christliche Lehre von den Dreieinigen Gottes, II, 635.
118 A. Drews, Die deutsche Spekulation seit Kant, I, 249.
119 T. Aquinas, Sent., I, dist. 8, qu. 4, art. 1, ad. 1; J. Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, 2d ed., I, 204ff.
120 D. Petavius, “De Deo,” in Theol. dogm., II, chs. 3–4; Zanchi(us), Op. theol., II, 68–69.
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