by Benedict Pictet
EVERY thinking being must not only have understanding, but also will; and since God must possess every thing which belongs to the nature of an intelligent being, a will must exist in him. The whole scripture teaches this: "Our God is in the heavens; he hath done whatsoever he hath pleased." (Psalm 115:3.) "I will do all my pleasure." (Isaiah 46:10.) This will is not to be conceived of as a mode, but as an act; and it is also the very essence of God, since there is nothing in God which is not God; and hence it is plain that this will is eternal, since the essence of God is eternal. This will moreover is, as it were, simple and individual; and therefore God, by one simple and individual act, wills all things, even as by one single glance he sees and understands all things; but, because we are finite, we cannot form any proper conceptions of things, as they exist in an infinite Being; and therefore, God is conceived of by us, sometimes as the Ruler of the world and the Disposer of events, at other times as the supreme Lawgiver; hence it is that the scripture attributes to God a will of various kinds, according to the difference of its objects; one will, by which God decrees what he wills to be done, or to permit to be done; the other by which he prescribes to men their duty: the former regards the futurition and taking place of things, the latter is the rule of our actions; the one is always fulfilled, and cannot be resisted, (Rom. 9:19,) the other is often violated by men. The first may be called the will of decree, because it decrees events, or the secret will, because it is, in general, though not always, hidden from us; or the will of good pleasure, "according to" which, Paul says that we are "predestinated." (Eph. 1:5.) The second may be called the will of commandment, because it prescribes to man his duty, or the revealed will, because it is revealed in the law and in the gospel, or the will of approbation and complacency, because it makes known what is pleasing to God or what he approves, and of which Paul thus speaks, "This is the will of God, even your sanctification." (1 Thess. 4:3.)
We have said, that by the will of decree God has purposed what he wills to do, or to permit. Now there are some things which God wills to do, that are good, but there are others which he neither does, nor can do, because they are evil, which, however, he permits to be done, and which he then overrules to good purposes. Thus he permits men to sin, but he is not the author of sin; on the contrary, he most strongly forbids it. The will of commandment also has two kinds of objects, the one good, the other evil; the former it enjoins, the latter it forbids. These two wills, although they are viewed by us as different, are yet by no means contrary to each other, because they are not directed to the same object. If indeed God did, by the power of his own decree, compel men to do those things which he has forbidden in his law, or if he had decreed that some things should be done by men, which afterwards he chose not to permit to be done, then he would will things that are contrary; but such is not the case, as will appear from the following example: God had decreed that Abraham should not sacrifice his son, and yet he commands him to sacrifice his son; these things appear contrary to each other, but they are not so; for the same God who had decreed that Abraham should not sacrifice his son, had decreed also to command Abraham to do so for this end, to thy the patriarch; and at the same time, he had decreed to prevent Abraham from doing so. In this manner the cases are perfectly consistent; God decreed to command Abraham to sacrifice his son, in order to try his faith, and he actually commanded him in due time; God decreed to prevent Abraham from doing this, and he actually did prevent him. But in order that every doubt on this subject may be removed, let it be observed,—1. That strictly speaking, there is only one will in God, and that is the will of decree. 2. That that will has not only determined what shall be done by men, but has also determined what things shall be enjoined upon, or revealed to them. 3. That the will of commandment is, properly speaking, the execution of a part of the other will, namely, that part which hath determined what shall be revealed to, or enjoined upon, men in due time. For example: God hath required of men faith and obedience, but he had decreed thus to require; in requiring, therefore, he only executes what he had decreed. But if he does not give to all the faith which he requires, it should excite no wonder, since in this way also he executes what he hath decreed, that is, not to give faith to all; thus there is no inconsistency between the will of commandment and the will of decree, since there is one and the same execution of both. This will of God is immutable; he is "the Lord that changeth not," (Mal. 3:6;) it is also free; for, although the eternal act of God's will having been once passed, he cannot will otherwise, nevertheless he is perfectly free, because he is impelled by no external power, but by himself only, and because he always acts voluntarily and with reason, which things constitute the highest degree of liberty. To this free will of God we owe all that we possess; to it, therefore, we ought to submit; nor must we ever murmur against it.
With regard to what are called affections, although they do not properly exist in God, seeing they are connected with the ideas of passion or emotion, which argues weakness and mutability, and therefore would be contrary to the supreme happiness of God, yet are they attributed to him in the scripture, which speaks to men in their own style; but they do not designate any passions or emotions, nor are to be understood as different wills or inclinations in the Deity, (for this would imply a changeableness in him,) but as acts of the same will, and denoting different relations of it. We will speak of the principal affections; and, first, of goodness. Now we call goodness that affection in God, by which he is inclined to communicate himself to his creatures. The scripture every where declares it, (Psalm 36:6, 7; 73:1; Acts 14:17); and even the heathens called their Jupiter Optimus Maximus, (very good and great); and, as Cicero observes, he is called optimus before maximus, because it is a greater and more acceptable thing, to do good to all, than to possess the greatest power. The first act of God's goodness in time is creation; and because what is produced always depends on what produces it, the second act of goodness is preservation. This goodness, moreover, is either general, which embraces all creatures, or special, which regards human creatures, and most special, which regards the elect. Nor should it seem strange that God is not equally good towards his creatures, for in this inequality is displayed his sovereign freedom and dominion.
From the goodness springs the love of God, by which God is inclined towards the creature, and delights to do it good, and, as it were, to unite himself with it. There are three kinds of this love usually ascribed to God. The love of benevolence is that by which God is moved to will some good to his creature as a creature, without any regard to the excellence which may be in it. This kind of love is the same as his goodness, and by it God, from eternity, willed good to the creature, even though unworthy, and deserving of hatred. The love of beneficence is that by which God does good in time; this expression in time must be noted, so that this love may be distinguished from the love of benevolence, which is from eternity. The love of complacency is that by which God is inclined towards the creature that is just and holy. By the first kind of love, God elects us; by the second, he redeems and sanctifies us; by the third, he rewards us being holy. Of this last Christ speaks, (John 14:21,) "He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me; and he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him." With this love of God is connected his grace, by which he is induced to communicate himself to the creature, freely and of his own accord; not from desert or debt, or any other cause out of himself; and not to add any thing to himself, but for the benefit of the object of this grace. For grace is nothing else but unmerited favour; it is always opposed to merit; "If it be of grace, then it is no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace." (Rom. 11:6.) Now this word grace is taken in scripture, sometimes for God's favour, by which he chose us from eternity unto life; sometimes for the favour, by which he receives us in time, and accepts us in the Son of his love; sometimes for the effects of grace, or the ordinary gifts bestowed by God on believers, such as faith, hope, and charity, or for the extraordinary gifts which were miraculously bestowed in the first ages, for the edification of the church. This grace is accompanied by mercy or pity, concerning which the Psalmist speaks, (Psalm 103:8; 145:9; also Lament. 3:22, 23,) which, as existing in God, is not a sorrow or sadness of mind arising from the miseries or evils of others, but a ready disposition to succour the miserable. It does not spring from any external cause, such as usually stirs up this emotion in human beings, but from the sole goodness of God. The greatness of this pity is shown by the extreme unworthiness of those who are the objects of it, compared with his majesty, by the number of the sins they have committed, and the greatness of their misery, by the severity of divine justice, by the eternal duration of this pity, and by its innumerable effects.
To the affection of love is opposed that of hatred; which is an emotion of displeasure, and abhorrence of a person who is unlike us, and disagreeable to us. As existing in God, it denotes his disapprobation of sin, his purpose of punishing the sinner, by withholding those saving blessings which flow from his goodness. The passages of scripture are numerous, in which the hatred of God is spoken of. "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity. (Psalm 5:5; 11:5; 45:8; Prov. 6:16, 17, &c.) The effect of God's greatest anger, is the punishment of eternal death; therefore, we must guard against this hatred of God, in order to which, sin must be hated most sincerely, for it is only sin which incurs the divine hatred.
To the love of God belong what may be called his desires or wishes, &c. Now it is the absence of good which excites desire; but since God enjoys all good, it is plain that desire cannot properly apply to him; yet it is frequently attributed to him in scripture, and to this may be referred all those passages in which God is introduced speaking to this effect: "O that my people had hearkened unto me" (Psalm 81:14; Isaiah 48:18; Luke 19:42.) Therefore this desire in God denotes, that man's obedience is highly pleasing to him, and that he will not pass it by unrewarded; at the same time it points out man's duty, and his great wickedness in not discharging this duty. To this desire is opposed aversion, by which God is said to loathe sin, and to have no pleasure in the destruction of the creature. From what has been said, we clearly see what ideas we ought to have of the hope of God, of his joy, sorrow, jealousy, &c. Hope or expectation in God, intimates that the thing is due to him. Thus when he said, that he "looked that his vineyard should bring forth grapes," (Isaiah 5:2.) he meant that the vineyard owed him fruit, and could not be fruitless without sin. God is said to rejoice when any thing is pleasing to him; and also when he performs any thing which displays his glory, as when he does good to his people, or when he punishes the rebellious and ungodly. (Deut. 28:63; 30:9.) God is introduced as fearing, (Deut. 32:27,) to show that the Israelites escaped more on account of their enemies than for their own aeserts. And sometimes fear is attributed to him, to denote his intention of anticipating, or preventing, some evil. Sorrow in God denotes that something highly displeases him, and is contrary to his perfections. Jealousy in him denotes his fixed purpose of not giving his glory to another, and of punishing him who would take it.
I will only add a few remarks on the repentance, and on the anger of God. The former is attributed to him in many places of Scripture, (Gen. 6:6; 1 Sam. 15:11, &c). Now in what sense in this attributed to him! In order to repentance, properly so called, there must be two things concurring in man; the first is inward grief of mind, whereby he detests what he has done, and could wish it had not been done; the second is a change of the work done. With respect to the former, repentance cannot apply to God, for it would argue the greatest imperfection, as it springs from the contemplation of a thing ill done, or a work heedlessly undertaken. With respect to the latter, repentance may apply to God, because he sometimes changes his work, and so far does the same thing which men do, who repent. But this change of work does not imply a change in the mind of God, for by one and the same act of his will he decrees both to do the work, and afterwards to alter it; thus he did at the same time decree to create men, and to destroy them all by a deluge some ages after. It must be observed also, that this repentance in God denotes that mankind have rendered themselves unworthy of the benefits bestowed on them by God, and deserved punishment by their wickedness; or on the other hand, have so reformed their lives, that God is pacified towards them. As to the divine anger, we are sure, that it does not signify any such emotion or passion of the mind as arises from bile inflaming the blood round the heart, such being altogether inconsistent with the calm and happy nature of the deity; but it denotes his just and free purpose of punishing sinners. It is spoken of, John 3:36; Rom. 1:18; 2:8. The effects of this anger are both temporal, which are either bodily, (Lev. 26; Deut. 33) or spiritual, such as blinding, hardening, &c. (Rom. 1:24, 26,) and eternal, i.e. banishment from God and being cast into everlasting fire. (Matt. 25:46.)
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Source: Christian Theology by Benedict Pictet