Of Original Sin and Free Will

by Peter Martyr Vermigli

Table of Contents

CHAPTER I: Of Sin, especially original sin; and of the universal corrupting of man's nature

-- How by Sin all things are subject unto vanity.

CHAPTER II: Of Free Wil

-- Of Voluntary and Not Voluntary

-- Of that which is Voluntary

-- Of Man's Election or Making of Choice

CHAPTER I:

Of Sin, especially original sin; and of the universal corrupting of man's nature

First, we will see whether there is any original sin or not: for there are some who utterly deny the same to be. Then we will declare what it is; lastly, what properties it has, how it is conveyed to posterity, and by what means it is released. As touching the first, we must remember that both in the Holy Scriptures and among the Fathers, it has diverse names. In the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, it is called sin, the law of the members, and concupiscence. Elsewhere, it is called the want of original righteousness, a corruption of nature, a lump of wickedness, a froth, a natural weakness, the law of the flesh, and other such names.

The Pelagians in old times denied this sin; today, the Anabaptists deny it. These are their arguments. First, they say that the fall of Adam was sufficiently punished in himself and that there is no cause why God would revenge it in his posterity; especially seeing it is written in the prophet Nahum, that God does not twice punish the same thing. It suffices Him that He had once punished. Moreover, it is also written, that the son shall not bear the father's iniquity, but the soul that sins shall die. Further, that the body, when it is formed in the womb, is the workmanship of God and has nothing that ought to be blamed; rather, it is worthy of great admiration. The soul is also either created or infused by God. The means of propagation cannot be accounted evil because marriage in the Holy Scriptures is commended, and from the beginning, God commanded man to beget children. Therefore, among so many defences of innocence, they demand by what entrances sin could insinuate itself.

They add also that Paul in his first epistle to the Corinthians, when he exhorts the believing wife to abide with her unbelieving husband if he will abide with her, among other things, says: Your children are holy. But they say that they cannot be holy if they are born in sin; and that therefore, those born of faithful parents cannot draw with them original sin. They affirm that it is commonly said that sin is a thing spoken, done, or lusted against the law of God; and that it is not sin unless it is voluntary. And as John says in his first epistle, the fourth chapter: Sin is iniquity, contrary to which is equity or right. This can be no other thing than what is contained in the law, and so that sin is a transgression of the law. All these things cannot fall into infants when they are born. They say further that it does not seem convenient to assert that this sin is by the flesh or body poured out from one to another; for that the flesh and the body are in their own nature senseless things, neither can they seem to be a meet subject for sin. To establish their devised argument, they add that those things spoken by Paul in the fifth chapter of Romans must be extended unto the sins which are called actual. They say it is said that sin entered by one man into the world because of the imitation and example which the posterity followed.

By these and similar arguments, they deny that there is any original sin. As for death and the afflictions of this life, which are commonly brought as tokens whereby original sin is confirmed, they say that those consist of natural causes, such as the temperature of the elements and of the humours. Therefore, they say, it is a vain fable to refer them to the fall of Adam. They think it absurd to affirm that to be sin which by no means can be avoided. Lastly, they say that if by that means we are said to sin in Adam because we were in his loins, as it is said of Levi in the Epistle to the Hebrews, that he paid tithes in the loins of Abraham: by the same reason, we may say that we were in the loins of other forefathers from whom we have descended by procreation. Therefore, there is no cause why the sin of Adam has been derived to us rather than the sin of our grandfather, great-grandfather, his father, or any other progenitors. By this means, the state of those who shall be born in the latter days would seem most unhappy, for they must bear the offences of all their forefathers. These arguments they allege to prove that there is no original sin.

But we, on the contrary part, will prove by many testimonies of the Holy Scriptures that there is such a sin. Thus God says in the sixth chapter of Genesis: My spirit shall not always strive with man, because he is flesh. And again: All the imagination of their hearts is only evil every day. And in the eighth chapter: The imagination of their heart is evil, even from their very childhood. These things declare that there is some vice in our nature when we are born. Also, David says: Behold, I was conceived in iniquity, and in sins my mother conceived me. Nothing can be plainer than this testimony. Also, Jeremiah in the 17th chapter says that the heart of man is wicked, perverse, and stubborn. Jeremiah and Job also curse the day they were born into the world because they perceived that the very original and fountain of vices sprang up together with them. Job has a most manifest testimony of the uncleanness of our nativity, for thus he says: Who can make that clean, which is conceived of unclean seed? And our Saviour says: Except a man is born again of water, and of the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven. Just as the potter does not make any vessel anew unless he perceives the same to be ill-fashioned before, so Christ would not have us be regenerated again unless He saw that we were first unhappily begotten. He also testifies in another place, saying: That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit. By these words, He would signify unto us that regeneration by the Spirit is necessary because we had before only a carnal generation.

Paul in the sixth chapter of Romans says that we must not abide in sin because we are dead unto it. He proves this by baptism, saying that all who have been baptized into Christ Jesus have been baptized into His death so that we should die unto sin and that our old man should be crucified, and the body of sin abolished. As young children are baptized, this testifies that sin is in them: for otherwise, the nature of baptism, as described by Paul, would not be consistent. He follows the same reasoning in the Epistle to the Colossians, where he says that we are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, by putting off the sinful body of the flesh, being buried together with Christ in baptism. He compares baptism with circumcision, stating that those baptized have put off the body of sin. It is certain that those baptized are baptized into the remission of sins. Assuredly, the circumcision given unto children in the old law corresponded to our baptism. Concerning circumcision, it is written: The soul whose flesh of the foreskin shall not be circumcised the eighth day shall die the death. Therefore, seeing children have need of the sacrament of regeneration, it follows necessarily that they are born under the power of sin. Paul to the Ephesians in the second chapter says that we are by nature the children of wrath. But our nature could not be hateful to God unless it were defiled with sin. In the same place, Paul with weighty words describes the fierceness of this wrath; how we walk according to the prince of this world, which is of strength in our hearts, by reason of our disobedience, and therefore we do the will of the flesh and of our mind.

Augustine also cites a place from the first epistle to the Corinthians that Christ died for all men: wherefore it follows that all men were dead and needed His death. It is wicked to exclude children from the number of those for whom Christ died. If you demand what kind of persons they were for whom Christ suffered, this the apostle sufficiently declares in the Epistle to the Romans, saying that they were weak, God's enemies, ungodly, and sinners. Among them, we must reckon young children if we grant that Christ died for them.

Besides this, it seems that original sin is most manifestly taught out of the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans: for thus it is written: The law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin. It is added: The good which I would do, that do I not; but the evil which I would not do, that do I: it is not I then that do it, but it is sin that dwells in me. He also mentions the law of the members, lamenting that he was thereby drawn captive against his will. In the eighth chapter, he says that the wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God and that it is not subject to the law of God, nor yet can be. The death of young children bears sufficient record that sin sticks in them; unless we say that God punishes them undeservedly. Moreover, the place in the fifth chapter of Romans contains a most evident testimony of original sin: for thus it is written: By one man sin entered into the world, and all men without exception have sinned, and the sin of one man spread over all men, and for the disobedience of one man many are made sinners. Further, those who are grafted in Christ are towards the end of the same epistle called wild olive trees, signifying that man degenerated from the good institution of his own nature. If we have departed from our own nature, undoubtedly we have gotten original sin. Paul before so accused all mankind, saying: There is none just, there is none that understands or seeks after God: all have declined, and are altogether become unprofitable, there is none that does good, no not one. All these things sufficiently declare the depravation of man's nature. By these testimonies of the Scriptures, it sufficiently appears (as I think) that there is original sin.

Next, I should confute the arguments of the adversaries, but first I thought it good to show the definition of original sin; for by diligently weighing and knowing the same, many things will in the meantime be known, which serve for the confutation of their reasons. First, we will recite the opinions of other men, then we will declare what we think thereof. The Pelagians affirmed that the sin of Adam did not spread abroad into the posterity, but by imitation only. Against these, Augustine disputed vehemently, and by many arguments showed that original sin is not only by the imitation of Adam's sin. For if Paul would have said that the first sin had been spread abroad in this manner, he would not have said that it came from Adam, but rather from the devil; for he was the first to give a form and example of sinning. Wherefore Christ in the Gospel of John said that the Jews, who boasted that they came from their father Abraham, were rather the sons of the devil, because they did his works. For the devil was a murderer from the beginning, and they sought to kill Him who had not deserved evil at their hands. Augustine cites that which is in the second chapter of the Book of Wisdom: "Through the envy of the devil, sin entered into the world, and they which are of his part do imitate him."

Nevertheless, I do not attribute much to this saying, partly because that book is not of the canonical scriptures, and partly because in the Greek text there is some ambiguity. For this verb 'do imitate' is not written there, but rather 'have experience of that death'. However, the reason is firm, that from the devil came the first example of sinning. Further, this opinion is hereby confuted, in that Paul makes an antithesis between Christ and Adam. But the righteousness of Christ is not only set forth for us to imitate; but also that those who believe in Him should be changed in mind, corrected in spirit, and amended in all their strength. Wherefore, on the other side, it is required by the nature of contraries that besides the ill example, which Adam gave unto his posterity, he has also infected their nature, and (as Augustine writes in his book De peccatorum meritis et remissione) has depraved it with a certain corruption.

Thirdly, this also makes against the Pelagians, that even infants die. For as Paul says to the Romans, in the sixth chapter: "The reward of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord." And in the 15th chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians: "The weapon (says he) of death is sin." Lastly, the baptism given to young children cannot blot out the sin of imitation. Wherefore, we must of necessity affirm some other kind of sin to be in them unless we will say that they are baptized in vain.

Another opinion was that which the Master of the Sentences cites in the 2nd book, the 33rd distinction of those who thought that original sin is only a guilt, or trespass, or bond, whereunto we are tied by the sin of Adam. They acknowledge not that there is truly and in very deed any fault or sin in those who are born, but only a certain offence and obligation, which might cause them to die and be condemned for the sin of Adam. This opinion Pighius seems to have revived; for he denies that original sin is sin indeed, because it is neither a transgressing of the law nor yet voluntary. Therefore, he affirmed it to be nothing else but the sin of Adam, for which we, his posterity, are made subject unto damnation and death and become exiles from the kingdom of heaven. But as for death and afflictions of this life, and lusts of the flesh, and other such like affections, he says that they come from the wellsprings of nature. All these things, so far from calling sins, he pronounces to be the works of God; for he says that God is the author of nature, and that these things follow the humours and temperature of the body. What happens in brute beasts happens also in men, as touching the flesh and grosser powers of the mind. They desire things preservative, pleasant, and profitable, whether they be agreeable to reason or against it, and avoid things contrary. Therefore, he affirmed original sin to be the only transgression of Adam, in the danger of which one transgression, he would have us all to be born: not for any sin, or fault, or corruption that we have in ourselves.

He says moreover that those who die only in the danger of that sin of Adam shall not be afflicted in another life with sensible pain. He imagines (although he dares not boldly affirm it) that they shall either in this world, or else in some other pleasant place, be happy with a certain natural blessedness, wherein they shall live, praising God and giving thanks, although they be banished from the kingdom of heaven. Of this discommodity, nevertheless, they shall not complain or be sorrowful; for this were to strive against the will of God, which a man cannot do without sin. But as they had no naughty will while they lived here, it is not to be thought that they shall have it in another life. He claims that they shall not be pressed with sensible pain, which he thinks he very well proves by two reasons: first, because they committed no evil, nor yet contaminated themselves with any naughtiness; secondly, because in this life no repentance or contrition for original sin is required. For this feigned devise, he has this colour: that sin should not be understood but in its true proper manner, that is, a thing spoken, done, or lusted against the law of God, and that it is voluntary, because it is not forced upon anyone against their will, but may be avoided. But as these things take no place in young infants, therefore sin cannot be in them. However, he says that he does not deny original sin; for he says it is the sin of Adam, for which we are all condemned and die.

This man seeks pretenses, because I see in very deed that he was moved to speak these things for some other cause. For as he attributes so much to free will and has written so many things touching that matter against us, and seeing that it might not consist if he plainly grants original sin in such a way as taught by all the godly, he found out this new devised doctrine, which (as I said) is not altogether so new, for it is both touched and rejected by the Master of the Sentences.

To give a more colourable show to this devise, he brings a similitude of a most liberal prince, who not only gives freedom to a servant of his, but also endows him with lordship and heaps of riches, which also should come to his posterity. He only charges him faithfully to observe certain commandments, which he, transgressing, knows that all those riches and preferments shall be taken from him, and he returns to his old bondage. This servant, as an indiscreet and ungrateful person, breaks the prince's commandment, whereby not only himself becomes a servant as before, but also his seed born unto him become bond-slaves. He says that those children have nothing wherefore they should complain of bondage to their prince, but rather give thanks that he had so liberally shown himself to their fathers. As concerning their father, they may grievously sorrow because he lost those benefits for himself and his posterity. What if this also be added: that the prince's liberality was so great, he invited the posterity of that ungrateful servant to the very same and much greater preferments, and so invited them, as frankly he sent his own son to provoke them? Even so (he says) stands our matter. Adam was so created by God, that he was capable of that supernatural felicity; who nevertheless, setting light by the commandments of God, was despoiled of all those supernatural gifts and left to the first state of his own nature. In the same state, we also are procreated, and so for his sin are we damned, die, and are banished from the kingdom of heaven, suffering many discommodities derived from the originals of our nature. Wherefore we may complain of our first parents, but not of God; for he was most liberal unto him, and especially, seeing he calls us again unto himself (which is the highest felicity) by his only son, and would have him suffer death for our salvation.

But that which I have now twice spoken of makes very much against this opinion: that infants die. For death has no right where there is no sin unless we say that God punishes the innocent. This reason is confirmed by Saint Paul's argument, whereby he proved sin to be before the law: "For death (he says) reigned from Adam even unto Moses." But according to Pighius's opinion, this reason might seem very blunt. For some might say: Though they died, yet it does not follow that they had sin: for sin happened to them by reason of Adam, for whose sin they became mortal. Moreover, does not Paul grant corruption to be in nature when he declares that sin dwells in him and confesses that the law of his members draws him away captive? But let not Pighius object that these things come from the originals of nature; for these originals are not of nature that is perfect, but of nature corrupt and depraved. Neither should he bring a similitude of brute beasts in this matter; for man is created far more excellent than brute beasts, and to be the ruler over them. Indeed, man had in himself originals whereby he might desire things pleasant and commodious, but not against reason and the word of God. To have such forcible and violent effects is not the property of men but of beasts. Seeing our soul was immortal and given from God, it requires a body meet for the same, namely, such as might be preserved forever, lest the soul should at any time be constrained to be without the same. So we must not fly to the first grounds of nature; for it was not so ordained at the first as we now have it.

If Pighius imagines that God created these wicked lusts and affections in us, he deals both blasphemously and reproachfully against Him, the faults of which he goes about to lay to our charge without cause. For seeing God is both the best, the wisest, and the most just, and created man unto the chiefest felicity, he would not have endowed him with those things that would draw him back from that felicity, which would induce him to that which is contrary to His commandments: which things of themselves would be vile, and lead us captive under the law of sin and death. For if these affections should be mortified and crucified in us (as indeed they ought to be), we must confess that they are vices and are hateful unto God. It matters not that he says that those things properly are not sins unless, just as cold is called slow because it makes men slothful, these things, because they stir up men to sin, may be called sins. Or else in the same way as the scripture is named a hand because it is written with the hand, or that the speech is called a tongue because it is uttered by the ministry thereof, these may be called sins because they have proceeded from sin. These similitudes do nothing to further Pighius's cause; for although Augustine used now and then to speak in that manner, he meant to be understood concerning those defects and imperfections that remain in man after baptism.

But Augustine says that in any wise they are sin before baptism; yea, the Holy Ghost also by Paul calls them sins, and the nature of sin is agreeable unto them. For we have defined sin in such a way as it pertains to all things whatsoever that strive against the law of God. For as John says: Sin is unrighteousness, and who perceives it not to be a thing unjust, that the flesh should make the spirit subject unto it, and that our soul will not repose itself in the word of God? Seeing therefore all these things do stir us up to transgress and rebel against the word of God, they are both unrighteous and must be called sins.

Besides this, the words of David are against Pighius: Behold, I am conceived in iniquity, and in sins my mother hath conceived me. If naughty desires and these vices were the works of nature, surely the man of God would not complain of them. And what did Paul the Apostle otherwise mean when he wrote these words unto the Ephesians: We are by nature the children of wrath, but that sin is in every one of us?

But Pighius goes about by a perverse interpretation to wrest this testimony from us, saying that to be the children of wrath by nature is no other thing than to be the children of wrath by a certain condition of our birth because we are so brought forth into the world. And he alleges that some are called servants by nature, which is no other thing but that they are born unto such a state as they do serve. But we neither can nor ought to rest upon this feigned device; for the wrath of God is not stirred up but upon just cause, for it is no such thing as can be kindled either rashly or by chance. So it behoves that in our nature there is something amiss, whereby God's wrath is provoked to revenge.

And that similitude of his serves not to his purpose; for those who are said to be born bondmen by nature have even by nature something in them apt for bondage. If we give credit to Aristotle in his Politics, they are bondmen by nature who exceed in strength of the body but are slow and dull in reason. And thereby it comes to pass that they are more meet to serve than to command others or to live at liberty.

Also, the Apostle does sufficiently declare why he calls us by nature the children of wrath: even because we by nature seem to be prone to stir up God's wrath, and do walk according to the prince of this world; and also for that the devil can do much in our hearts by reason of incredulity; and that we fulfill the will of our flesh and of our mind. These are the things which make us the children of wrath. And how can it be denied that sin is in our nature, seeing Christ would have us to be regenerate? For unless we are framed amiss, what need is there for us to be fashioned anew?

Besides this, in the eighth chapter of the Book of Genesis, it is plainly spoken that the imagination of man's heart is evil, even from his childhood. And how dare Pighius be so bold as to call that a good thing and the work of God, which the Holy Ghost in plain terms has called evil? But lest he should seem to say nothing, he imagines that the same was spoken by God of his mercy; as though he would so excuse men and testify that he would not destroy the world anymore by water, because men were made in that manner and that the cogitations of them did tend unto evil, even from their childhood. But while he judges this to be an excuse, he is far deceived; for this is thought to be the better and more natural sense of this place: namely, that God would enter into a covenant with Noah, that he would never destroy the world again with water; though otherwise men were such as they deserved the same, and the imagination of their hearts was evil even from their childhood. These things do not clear man's nature from sin but rather signify the same to be more vicious and corrupt, which nevertheless God will spare for his mercy's sake.

Lastly, we read in Paul that by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners, which shows that there is sin in those who are born of Adam, for which they may be called sinners. But Pighius thinks himself able by shifts to avoid this because sinners are sometimes so called by reason of guilt or fault, although the act of sinning is past and shows itself no more. Notwithstanding this, he is never able to show out of the scriptures that any man is called a sinner but that either he has sin in him, or else has surely committed sin before, unless he will say that God makes men guilty without any sin committed by them.

Moreover, Pighius does not consider that by this his feigning is brought in a middle opinion, touching the state of those who die only in the guiltiness of Adam; whereas the scriptures do plainly teach us that in the last judgment there shall be no middle ground, but that men shall either be committed to everlasting fire or else shall enjoy eternal felicity. It is rash to proceed further in such things than is revealed in the Holy Scriptures. Therefore, they deal with more moderation and greater wisdom who refer all this whole matter to God's divine providence.

But it is a goodly matter to see by what reasons our Pighius is moved. "They shall not be grieved (says he) with any sensible pain because they did not contaminate themselves in this life with any lewd purpose." What matter makes this? It suffices that they had a naughty nature, for they were prone unto sin, although in respect of their age they could not sin. The wolf's whelp is slain, which nevertheless might excuse itself, saying it had not yet worried any sheep or done any damage to the flock; yet the reason why he is killed is good: because he has a wolf's nature and would do those things if he were suffered to live.

Hereunto Pighius adds another argument, namely, that sorrow and contrition are not required for original sin. But how is he able to prove this? For all godly men have grievously lamented for being oppressed with this vice. David, at the time he occupied himself in repentance, broke out into these words: Behold how I am conceived in iniquity. Paul does so bewail this offence as he cries out: O unhappy man that I am! Who shall deliver me from this body subject unto death? And whereas Pighius says that these will be content with their state, he uses no other reason than because if they should strive against the will of God and should be sorrowful for the judgment done upon them, they should sin. This is not needed to surmise of them because they committed no sin in this life. But here Pighius must be demanded whether infants have had that right will in this life. He must of necessity deny it, seeing by reason of their age they could not have it. Which being so, how dare he assign the same to them in another life? It is much more probable that they shall there have an evil will, whereof there was a beginning in them while they were here, than any good will, whereof they possessed no token in this life.

But that similitude, which he brought of a liberal prince who not only freed his servant but also advanced him to great honours, is none of his own proper invention, for it is borrowed from Aegidius Romanus, the School-divine, who nevertheless acknowledges with us the corruption of nature and naughtiness naturally engrafted in us from the beginning.

But yet this similitude must be examined, lest, as tapestry hangings cover the blemishes of bare walls, so the same, with the show and colour cast upon it, may cloak some error and dangerously deceive and abuse us. He sets forth unto us Adam as a bondman, who from the beginning was both set at liberty by God and endowed with excellent gifts, and so furnished that those things should also have been extended unto his posterity, so that he had obeyed the commandment and law of God. But if he neglected to do the same, then he with all his posterity should return to the former state of bondage. Herein lies the error of Pighius, for he feigns to himself a man who from the very beginning had a nature that was subject to corruption and bound fast unto the servitude of unreasonable affections. Which thing is not true; for he was made perfect by God, not that he should be like unto a brute beast. Indeed, he had desires unto things which were both pleasant and might preserve, but yet unto no such things as should stir him up against the word of God and right reason. And there was a body given unto him which might have endured forever. Therefore when he sinned, he fell not into his first state but procured for himself a new infelicity. These things shall suffice at present concerning that second opinion.

The third is, that lust or concupiscence dispersed in the flesh and members is original sin. Of this opinion was Augustine, as appears by his book De peccatorum meritis et remissione and by many other places. The Schoolmen interpret that he meant not only the concupiscence of the grosser parts of the mind but also the naughtiness of the will. But Pighius repugneth, saying that Augustine affirmed that only concupiscence of the flesh and members is original sin, as though Augustine meant not that by the wickedness of the affections, both the mind is blinded, and the will corrupted. For seeing these vices are joined one with another, he would under one name comprehend them all, and he used the name of concupiscence because in it the force of this disease does more plainly and manifestly appear. Where Hugo De Sacramentis wrote, that original sin is that which we from our nativity draw into our mind through ignorance and into our flesh through concupiscence.

Lastly, whereas Christ said that none can be saved except he be regenerated, he meant not only as touching the flesh or lusting part of the mind: for it chiefly behoves that our reason and will be born anew; then follows the regeneration of the affections and of the body, whereby (as meet it is) all things are subdued to the spirit and word of God. Neither did Augustine by concupiscence understand the very act of lusting, but the ableness, proneness, and ready disposition unto ill-doing: which vices are not always known in children, but so far forth, as they disclose themselves by their age. For so in deep darkness, there is no difference between a blind man and him that sees; but as soon as light comes, or the day is present, the impediment of the blind man is easily perceived. Before the wolf passes the age of a whelp, he shows not his nature and ravening. The scorpion does not always prick, yet he always carries a sting. The serpent, while he is numb with cold in the winter, is safely handled, not because he has no venom, but because he is not able to pour it out.

And he says that this concupiscence is brought unto us by generation because all we have sinned with Adam; for he judges that all mankind was in Adam, as in one lump: and that because nature was corrupted in him through sin, we cannot from thence draw other than a corrupt nature; for grapes are not gathered from thistles, nor figs from thorns. But he says that this concupiscence is specially derived unto the posterity through the heat of lust which happens in procreation. Yet some of the wiser sort of Schoolmen have judged that although there should happen no wantonness of lust in the conjunction of the parents, yet the child should not be without original sin; because the same was in the first man, as it were in seminali ratione (as they speak), that is, the nature of the seed. But if you demand of Augustine whether he thinks that this concupiscence, which he says is original sin, is voluntary, he will answer that it may be called voluntary because the sin committed by our first parents was voluntary: but in us, it cannot be said voluntary because we have not taken it upon us by our own choice, unless perhaps it may be so called because it is not by violence put into us.

Against this opinion, Pighius inveighs, for thus he says: If the sin of Adam corrupted man's nature, it behoved such a natural effect to be in sin; for there was nothing at all in that first transgression that had a property to corrupt nature more than other sins have. Therefore, it shall be necessary to confess that our nature is corrupted, not only by the fault of our first parents but also by the sins of all our progenitors. Which thing seems very absurd unto Pighius, that we should be so much more corrupt than others, as we are later born than they.

But this chief point, whether the sins of all parents are derived from one to another unto the posterity, I will for this time omit and will speak thereof toward the end, so much as shall be thought meet. In the meanwhile, I deny that which this man takes for a ground; namely, that corruption is the natural effect of sin. For the reason thereof proceeds rather from divine justice, by which the grace of the spirit, and heavenly gifts, wherewith man was endowed before his fall, was removed from him when he had sinned. And this withdrawing of grace proceeded from God's justice, although the blame must be ascribed to the transgression of the first man, lest you should straightaway say that God is the cause of sin. For when he had once withdrawn his gifts, wherewith he beautified man, forthwith ensued vices and corruptions of their own accord, which before were strange from the state and condition of man.

This man demands how sin can have the power to corrupt man's nature. Whether by means of privation? Or by reason of the matter or subject of privation? But by means of privation, he thinks it impossible to be; for that, being nothing, can work nothing: neither can it be by reason of that action, which is subject unto privation, as was the wicked choice through the will of the first man. For he says that Adam, when he did eat the forbidden fruit, desired not this; neither was it his will to corrupt his own nature and the nature of his posterity. This is a very weak argument; for oftentimes we see that many things follow men against their wills and unawares, which things, though they would not, yet are they joined together with their actions. They who load themselves immoderately with meat and drink do not do it upon any such cause as to procure unto themselves the gout; but the gout follows of its own accord. Even so, although Adam would not have had these things happen, yet when he had sinned, they happened of themselves.

But he says that seeing this concupiscence happens of a certain necessity of birth, and not by choice or election, it cannot have the nature either of a fault or sin. But this comes to pass by reason that he makes a lesser and lighter matter of sin than he ought to do: for he would have sin to be voluntary, and a thing spoken, done, or lusted against the law of God. But if he takes the same to be iniquity, as John has described it, he shall perceive that the nature of sin is to be found in concupiscence. For it is an unjust thing that the body should not obey the mind in honest things, and that the lusts should be at variance with the mind and seek to have dominion over it, that reason should strive against God, and despise his commandments. These things being unjust, whether they come willingly or necessarily, are doubtless sins.

But does not this Pighius, who objects to these things, perceive that it is necessary also for him to appoint that the posterity of Adam is guilty of his sin, whether they will or no; which thing is especially against the word of God? For it is written in the prophet Ezekiel; The son shall not bear the father's iniquity; And; The soul that sins, the same shall die. Which doubtless will be false if we believe Pighius, seeing children do die and are guilty of eternal damnation, although they have sinned nothing at all. Unto which absurdity we are not driven, for we put in every man that is born, the fault and the cause why he dies and is condemned.

Also unto Pighius, it seems a reproachful and blasphemous thing against God that he suffers sin to be sown in newborn babes, seeing they cannot do withal, but be born and affected in such sort as we see all other men to be born and affected. But let Paul make answer to this objection, which says in his epistle to the Romans; O man, who are you that make answer unto God? Has not the potter power of the clay to make of one lump one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour? Let Isaiah also answer, which says; that it is not convenient for one potsherd to dispute with another touching the workmanship of their maker. God is not such a one as ought to be brought into order by our reason; which would come to pass, if we should measure his justice by the rule of our judgment. Seeing there is no day that passes over wherein there happens not something in the government of worldly things, that we blame, and that does not content and satisfy our own wisdom; when, I pray, shall we count God to be just? For who is able to declare the cause why grace is not so much given unto him which perishes everlastingly, as to another which is saved?

I know that these men have been accustomed to say that God does nothing unjustly because he is not bound to any law, and that he distributes one and the same grace unto all men. But here certainly human wisdom will not stay itself, for it will complain and say that he ought to deal alike towards all, though not by the precept of man's law, yet by the law of his own goodness. Moreover, what human wisdom can see what the justice of God is, that some are taken away while they are yet infants or children, lest afterward their hearts should be perverted with lewdness, and by this means attain unto salvation: whereas others are preserved safe unto their ripe years, at which time they deserve their own destruction, where otherwise they might have been saved, if they had died in their infancy? Here ought we to have in honour and estimation the secrets of God's judgment, and not to be of the mind to correct and amend them, according to the prescript of our law.

Cato, a heathen man, taking part with Pompey, because he judged that part to be juster than Caesar's part; at last, when victory inclined to Caesar and that Pompey’s side was discomfited and fled; he looked up to heaven, and cried out that there is great obscurity in divine things: for he thought it unworthy of God's providence that Caesar should have the victory. And surely, when I think upon these things, I am much delighted with the answer of Augustine, which he used against the Pelagians, when he treated of the very same matter that we have now in hand. For two arguments somewhat subtle and difficult were objected unto him by the Pelagians. One was: how it might be that God, who for his goodness's sake, forgives us our own sins, will impute other men's sins unto us? Another was: If Adam, by original sin, condemns those who sin unadvisedly and against their wills, why does not Christ also, (lest he should give place to Adam in anything) save the unbelievers?

To these, Augustine makes answer. What if I were somewhat dull and could not confute these reasons upon the sudden; should I therefore give less credit to the scriptures? Nay rather, it is much more meet that I should acknowledge my own simplicity than lay any falsehood unto the scripture. But afterward, he dissolves both the arguments: for unto the first he answers that God is exceedingly good and does not impute the sins of others unto us (as these affirm he does in original sin); but the iniquity of our own selves, which cleaves to our own nature, even from the first beginning of all. Unto the other he says that Christ saves even those that are unwilling, for he expects not them till they are willing; but of his own accord comes unto sinners when they are both unwilling and resisting, and also that he brings many infants unto felicity before they as yet believe, neither by reason of their age can have faith, whereby they should believe.

These things I thought good to bring in, to show that it is lawful for me, if I will, to use the answer which this father first used, and to say unto Pighius; Let us leave unto God the defence of his own cause, he has no need of us to defend him, that he should not be counted unjust or cruel. Let us believe the scriptures, which cry out everywhere that we are born in sin and corruption. Which thing also both death, and an infinite heap of calamities do show; which in very deed should not be laid upon the children of Adam unless there were some sin in them to be punished. But they who descend not into themselves, nor look into their own nature, how prone it is unto all naughtiness, do not know what this concupiscence means. Yet no small number of the heathen philosophers perceived the same; for they marvel how in so excellent a nature, so great lewdness, and self-love, and desire of voluptuousness can be: and they so acknowledged these evils that they also adjudged it most needful for their children to have chastisement and discipline. And for the redressing of this engendered naughtiness, they counselled us to take in hand labours and exercises and other weighty and hard enterprises: but indeed they perceived not the cause and fountain of these evils; for that is only to be perceived by the word of God.

Furthermore, Pighius disputes that this lusting, which Augustine calls concupiscence, is the work of nature and of God, and therefore cannot seem to be sin. But it is answered before that it proceeds not from the originals of nature, as the same was instituted by God, but from it being corrupted. For when man was created, he was made just, and (as the scripture speaks) in the image of God. Therefore that same appetite in Adam, of things pleasant and preservative, when he was first created, was not raging and vehement, that he should do against right reason and the word of God; for that followed afterward. Wherefore the same must not (as Pighius says) be called the work of God, but the naughtiness of sin and the corrupting of affections. And therefore Augustine calls Julian the Pelagian a shameless praiser of concupiscence, for he commended it, even as Pighius does, to be a notable work of God.

Moreover, Pighius is against Augustine for the same very cause, that he says concupiscence is sin before baptism and denies it so to be after baptism; whereas (says he) concupiscence is all one, God all one, and his law all one: wherefore he concludes that either sin must be in both, or else in neither of them. But here Pighius greatly errs in two respects: first, because he thinks that in regeneration, there is no change, especially seeing he cannot deny that Christ's remedy is added, his righteousness applied, and our guiltiness taken away; for God does not impute that concupiscence which remains after regeneration.

Moreover, the spirit is given, wherewith the strength of concupiscence may be broken; that although it does stick within us, yet that it shall not reign over us; for to this end Paul exhorts us, when he says: Let not sin reign in your mortal bodies. Again, on the other part, he is deceived in thinking Augustine judges that the concupiscence which remains after baptism is no sin at all; but most especially, if the sin is considered alone, as it is by itself. For in most plain words he declares it in its own nature to be sin because it is disobedience, against which we must continually wrestle. And where he denies the same to be sin, it must be understood as concerning guiltiness; for that, out of all doubt, is taken away in regeneration. For by that means it comes to pass, that although it be very sin indeed, yet God does not impute it for sin. Moreover, Augustine compares concupiscence with those sins which are called actual; by the comparison whereof, it may be said to be no sin: for it is far from the grievousness of them.

But I marvel how Pighius dares say that Augustine determines without testimony of the scriptures, that concupiscence is original sin, seeing he, in his disputations against the Pelagians, defends his opinion chiefly out of the holy scriptures. And the cause why he calls original sin concupiscence is that original corruption chiefly declares itself through the impure desires of the mind and of the flesh.

Now it is expedient to see what others have said concerning this matter: for, besides this, there is also another opinion of those who say that original sin is a lack of original righteousness. This was affirmed by Anselm in his book De partu virginis, and he drew many other scholastic authors into his opinion. These men mean no other thing by original justice or righteousness but the right institution of man, when the body obeys the mind, and the inferior parts of the mind are subject to the superior, and the mind is subject unto God and to his law. In this righteousness was Adam created, and if he had so continued, all we should have lived in it: but seeing he fell, all we were deprived thereof. And they would have the lack of this righteousness to be original sin.

But to show their opinion the better, they say that every defect is not evil; for although a stone does lack righteousness, yet it shall not be said that a stone is unrighteous or evil; but when a thing shall be fit and meet to possess that whereof it is destitute, then such a defect is said to be evil: as it happens in the eye, when it is bereft of the ability to see well; we do not say therefore that there is a fault or blame in the eye. For sin comes when by reason of such a lack, there follows a contending and wrestling against the law of God. And this opinion is also condemned by Pighius; for he says that it is no sin if one keeps not the gift which he has received. For it may be that one who is born in perfect health and in a good state of the body may fall into a disease, or be maimed in some member, or else become lame; yet there is none that will call those defects offenses or sins.

But this similitude is not agreeable to the purpose; for a disease or maim of the body does not pertain either to the performing or violating of God's law: but that which they call a want of original righteousness does of necessity bring with it the breach of God's law. Moreover, he labours to prove that the loss of original righteousness in young children is not sin because the same was not foregone by their fault: but this again is to call God to account. But God is not registered among the decrees of men; he is not to be brought into the order of man's laws.

Let Pighius confer that opinion with this, which he reasons against. This affirms he, that God condemns the faultiness and uncleanness, which he appointed and showed to be in newborn babes: Pighius makes guilty and condemns children of that vice and sin which is not in them; but only is that which Adam the first parent of all committed in himself: for otherwise, he takes those children to be most innocent. But whether of these is the further from reason, and dissents from the laws of men? To punish an innocent for the sin of another? Or else, to condemn him who has cause in himself why he should be condemned? Undoubtedly, to those who shall diligently consider the thing itself, the saying of Anselm is better in many respects than this opinion of Pighius. We know it to be true, which Ecclesiastes says, that God made man upright: but when he had once sinned, he fell immediately into wickedness. He does not now behold God and heavenly things anymore, but he bends himself continually down to earthly and carnal things and is subject to the necessity of concupiscence: and this is to lack original righteousness.

For actions are not plucked away from man, but the power of well-using them is taken away: as we see happen by experience in those taken with the palsy; verily they move their hand, but because the power is hurt whereby they might rule that motion, they move the same faintly and deformedly. This also happens in us; for seeing divine righteousness is wanting, the ground is corrupted, whereby our works should be rightly ordered and performed. But (says Pighius) it cannot be sin in young children to be destitute of this gift; for they are not bound by any duty or obligation to have it. But if (says he) our adversaries shall say otherwise, let them show a law, whereby we that are born be bound; which (says he) because they cannot do, let them cease to say that this want of original righteousness is sin.

But we not only will show one but three laws. The first is the institution of man; God made man according to his own image and likeness, wherefore such it behoves us to be: for God does justly require that which he made in our nature. And the image of God does herein chiefly consist, that we be adorned with divine properties; namely, justice, wisdom, goodness, and patience. But contrariwise, Pighius cries out that this is not the nature of the image of God; for that (he says) consists in understanding, memory, and will: as Augustine in his books De Trinitate and in many other places has taught. These things indeed are said of the Schoolmen. But we will prove the matter to be far otherwise, both by the scriptures and sayings of the fathers.

First, it is thus written in the Epistle to the Ephesians: "Put off the old man, according to the conversation in times past, which is corrupt, according to the deceitful lusts: and be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, which according to God is created in righteousness and true holiness." And in the third chapter to the Colossians: "You have put on the new man, which is renewed to the knowledge and image of him that created him." And a little after he shows the properties of this image: "Put on the bowels of mercies, goodness, modesty, meekness, gentleness, forbearing one another, and forgiving one another." And in the eighth chapter to the Romans: "Whom he before knew, he also predestinated, to be made like unto the image of his son." All these things do sufficiently declare what manner of image of God the holy scriptures set forth unto us in the creation and restoration of man. Neither did the fathers dislike this opinion.

Irenaeus, in his fifth book, says that by the infusion of the Holy Ghost, man is made spiritual, even in such a manner as he was created by God. And Tertullian, against Marcion, says that the image of God is that which has the same motions and senses as God: and the reason which persuades us hereunto is that man was therefore made at the beginning like unto the image of God because he should be the governor of all things created, as if he had been a certain deputy of God. And no man can doubt that God will have his creatures to be well governed; for he continually bids us that we should not abuse them. And we are bound by a law to ascribe unto God all those things whereby we are helped, as from whom all things do flow. But a good use and right administration of things cannot appear unless we be furnished with those conditions which (we have said) belong to the image of God. And whereas Augustine assigned the image of God to be in the understanding, memory, and will; we say he did it to set forth unto us some form or example of the divine persons, how one of them respects another. But he must not be so understood as though he would make these faculties of the mind to be the image of God, they being naked and despoiled of those virtues which we have declared.

Wherefore we have a law given unto us, either by the institution or by the restitution of man, which Paul commands: and by this bond we are bound to have the original righteousness which we have lost. We have also the law of nature, and to live agreeable unto it (as Cicero says in his third book De Finibus) is the principal and last end of man's estate: and this law depends on that other which we before spoke of. For it is from no other source that we, in cogitations, have our minds, which accuse and defend one another; but that they are taken from the worthiness of nature, as it was first instituted by God. For whatsoever either the philosophers or law-givers have commanded, as touching the duties of man's life, the same does wholly depend on the fountains of our creation. For those precepts cannot come out of a corrupt nature, out of self-love, and out of malice; whereof it comes that we are prone unto evils: but they come from that kind of most upright nature, which they feign to be done by the worthiness of man, and which we know out of the holy scriptures to be instituted by God and commanded to be renewed by us. And hereunto (as some will have it) does appertain that law of the mind, which the law of the members does resist. There is also a third law, which God would have to be put in writing, namely; Thou shalt not lust: which commandment, although our adversaries do wrest unto actual sins, yet we have shown that the same belongs also unto original sin: and that God, by his commandment, would have all kinds of naughty concupiscence to be utterly cut off from men.

Now therefore we have laws, which, so long as they exist, shall perpetually bind us and make us debtors to perform that righteousness which they require. True indeed it is that infants do not feel those laws; and therefore sin lies asleep in them; as Augustine says in his second book De peccatorum meritis et remissione, following that which Paul says; "I sometimes lived without a law": not that there was at any time no law prescribed unto Paul, but because in his childhood he felt not the same, by reason of young age. Wherefore Paul says; that "sin was dead", which Augustine interprets as being asleep: but when the commandment was come, that is, when the law began to be known to me, sin revived. No doubt, but it was in him before sin; but when he felt it not, it seemed dead. Now it appears how those things which we have spoken agree with the holy scriptures. But Pighius urges yet further that these do pertain nothing unto infants, for that a law ought not to be made as touching those things which cannot be avoided. But when he speaks thus, he does not follow the sense of the holy scriptures; for they sufficiently teach that those things which are commanded in the law cannot be perfectly fulfilled, even though they be strictly commanded.

Paul says in the Epistle to the Romans that "what was impossible to the law, forasmuch as it was made weak by the flesh, God sending his only son, etc." By these words, it appears most plainly that the law, as it is commanded, cannot be performed; for if it could, we should be justified by works. Neither had it been needful that Christ should suffer death for us. There are also other offices of the law for which it is written. For assuredly, the same is profitable to direct the actions of godly men, but most profitable of all to discover sin: for "by the law" (says Paul) "comes the knowledge of sin." Again; "I had not known lust unless the law had said unto me, Thou shalt not lust." Besides, by the law, sin is also increased, and does burden us the more, and does the more grievously press us; for "the law entered in, that sin might abound." And to the Corinthians; "The power of sin is the law."

All these things tend to this end, that man, as by a schoolmaster, should be brought unto Christ, and should crave his help, and pray that strength may be given unto him: that at the leastwise in part, and with an obedience begun, he may execute those things which are commanded; and that such things as he fails in may not be imputed unto him but may be supplied by the righteousness of Christ. Augustine, in his first book against Julian, reprehends the Pelagians because they thought that they knew some great matter when they vaunted that God commands not those things which are impossible: and he shows that these, which we have now declared, are the ends of the law. Yea, and the same Augustine, in his book of Confessions, makes mention also of those sins which young children, while they are yet sucking, do commit: yet none will say that they could resist them. But they should be no sins, unless they might be referred to some law violated by them. Neither does it anything help Pighius, or yet take away their sins, because they are not felt by them: for a thing that is dishonest, although it seem not so to us, yet in its own nature it is dishonest. That (says he) which is dishonest, is dishonest, whether it seems so or no.

This opinion of Anselm, as touching the lack and want of original righteousness, differs in very deed nothing from the saying of Augustine, wherein he calls original sin concupiscence; but that it is there spoken somewhat more expressly, which in the word concupiscence is wrapped up more obscurely. But because this want of original righteousness might so be taken, although we understand only the privation of the gifts of God, without any fault of nature; therefore it shall be very well to set down a more full definition.

Original sin, therefore, is a corruption of the whole nature of man, derived by generation from the fall of our first parent into his posterity; which, were it not for the benefit of Christ, would adjudge all that are born therein to infinite miseries and eternal damnation. In this definition, all the kinds of causes are contained. For the matter or subject, we have all the parts and powers of man; the form is the corruption of them all; the efficient cause is the sinful will of Adam; the instrument is the spreading of derivation, which is done through the flesh; the end and effect are eternal damnation, together with all the discommodities belonging to this life.

And from this have arisen diverse names for this sin; sometimes it is called a defect, sometimes perverseness, sometimes vice, sometimes a disease, sometimes a contagion; and by Augustine, an affected quality and a rude lump. That the whole man is corrupted is evident because he was created to cleave unto God, as unto the chief good. But now he understands not divine things, he patiently waits for the promises of the scripture, he hears with grief the commandments of God, and he contemns punishments and rewards. His seditious affections impudently deride right reason and the word of God; the body refuses to obey the mind.

Although all these things are experiments of natural corruption, they are also confirmed by testimonies of the scriptures. As touching the impediments of the understanding, Paul says: "The carnal man perceiveth not those things which be of the Spirit of God: no verily, nor cannot, because they be foolishness unto him." In these words, we note, by the way, against Pighius, that the law was made concerning that which could not be done: for first of all the law wills us to know divine things, which nevertheless Paul affirms plainly that a carnal man cannot perceive. And as touching our purpose, we see that Paul affirms that this blindness or ignorance is engrafted in men, and that by nature: for it cannot be imagined that the same has come unto us by reason either of time or age. For the older that every man waxes, the more and more he is instructed as concerning God: wherefore in that he is a carnal man and unapt to perceive heavenly things, that has he gotten by nature corrupted.

This corruption is of such great importance, (as Augustine says in the third book against Julianus, the twelfth chapter;) that by the same, the image of God has become a stranger unto the life of man, through the blindness of the heart; which blindness (says he) is sin, and does not sufficiently agree with man's nature. The same father, in his first book De peccatorum meritis et remissione, the 36th chapter, where he alleges that those words of David; "Remember not the sins and ignorances of my youth," makes mention of the most thick darkness of ignorance that is in the minds of young children while they are yet in their mothers' wombs: who know not wherefore, from whence, or when they were there enclosed. For there lies the poor infant unlearned, unapt to be taught, unable to conceive what a commandment is, being ignorant where he is, what he is, of whom he was created, and of whom he was begotten: all of which things did not agree with the nature of man as it was first created, but are rather corruptions of nature. For Adam was not so created, but he was able both to understand the commandment of God and to give names to his wife and to all living creatures: but in infants, a long time must be expected, whereby they may by little and little pass over this kind of dizziness.

Moreover, that this kind of ignorance is to be accounted sin, Reticius, the most ancient bishop of Autun, bears record, as Augustine testifies in his first book against Julianus. For when he speaks of baptism, thus he writes: "It is a principal indulgence in the church, wherein we cast away all the burden of the old crime, and do blot out the old wicked acts of our ignorance, and do put off the old man with his natural ungraciousness." By these words, we understand that wickedness is natural unto us and that the sins of ignorance are taken away in baptism. Wherefore, seeing infants are baptized, they by the authority of this father are proved to have sins, and that their old ignorance is abolished in baptism.

Now as concerning the will, let us see whether that also be corrupted or no. Thereof the apostle gave an excellent testimony, to wit, that "the sense and wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God": and under this sentence, he comprehends all the affections of men not yet regenerate. But I marvel at the impudence of Pighius, who to wind himself out by some means or other, says that this place must be understood as touching the sense of the letter, which he affirms to be against God, and cannot be subdued unto him. For, as well that which goes before as that which follows, does manifestly reprove him; for Paul forthwith adds the difference between men that be in the flesh and those which be in the spirit. Wherefore it appears sufficiently that he treats not of the diversity of the sense of the scripture but of the diversity of men themselves. And the next words before that sentence are: "That which was impossible to the law, inasmuch as it was weak, because of the flesh, God sending his own son in the likeness of sinful flesh, by sin condemned sin in the flesh, that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us." These words also do testify that Paul spoke of us; not of the spirit, or the letter of the scriptures. For in us is the infirmity, whereby the law is weakened, that it could not bring us to salvation; and by Christ, the righteousness of the law begins to be fulfilled in us.

Neither must we hearken unto them, which both in this place and in many others, will that by flesh should be understood the grosser parts of the mind. For when Paul to the Galatians reckons up the works of the flesh, he puts in that number not only adulteries, fornications, and wantonness but also idolatry: which no man can deny but that it does pertain to the mind, not unto the flesh. And Christ, when he says: "That which is born of the flesh, is flesh; and that which is born of the spirit, is spirit," exhorts to regeneration: which in very deed pertains not only to the substance of the body or grosser parts of the mind but especially also unto the will and mind. And when he said unto Peter: "Blessed art thou Simon, the son of Jonah, for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee": he meant that he had not learned those things by natural knowledge, but by the spirit of God. For under the name of flesh, he comprehends those things which pertain to the mind and reason. But yet we say not (as Pighius fondly cavils) that in the nobler part of the mind there is nothing but flesh: for we know, although Pighius had not told us, that the soul is a spirit, which nevertheless in the scriptures is called flesh, before it be regenerated; because whereas it ought to make the flesh, that is to say, the grosser part of itself spiritual, and ought to reduce the same to the obedience of a mind instructed by the word of God, it will rather bend unto the pleasures thereof, and so is made carnal.

But they object against us, that saying unto the Galatians: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh": as though this may not be, if in the minds of men, we leave nothing that is sound. But we will easily answer to this objection; for first, those words are pronounced by Paul, as touching believers, which be already regenerated: which thing those words that follow do sufficiently declare: "That ye do not those things which ye would." By which words he declares that they obtained a right will by the spirit of Christ, which nevertheless they could not accomplish, by reason of the continual conflicts of the mind and their great infirmities. And therefore the apostle meant no other thing in that place than that whatsoever is in us not perfectly regenerated, all that does strive against the spirit of God. Nor do we deny, but that some such conflict is otherwhile in men, which be not yet regenerated: not that their mind is not carnal, and prone unto naughtiness, but because the laws of nature are as yet engraved therein, and that also there is some illumination of God's spirit in the same, although it be not such as either can justify or bring in any change to salvation.

Moreover, that reason is corrupted in us, Paul's words sufficiently declare, wherein he exhorts us to "put on the new man," which must be continually renewed in us. Seeing he wills that man be so wholly changed, and that man consists not only of the body and affections of the flesh, but also, and much more, of the mind, will, and reason, it is necessarily gathered that these things were also corrupted in him. For otherwise, what need have they to be renewed? And it matters not greatly if you say that these things must be understood of such as have come to ripe years, who of their own choice and voluntary sins have corrupted these things in themselves. For I will ask, wherefore all in general, who are not regenerated, did so contaminate themselves, as there was not one innocent to be found among them all? Truly, there can be nothing else answered to this question, but that the very fountains were corrupted and defiled in them, even from the beginning.

Augustine teaches also that we are only regenerated in so much as we become like unto Christ; for in that we are unlike unto him, therein we are not born anew, but retain still the old man in us. Wherefore, let us see whether from the beginning we have a mind, will, and reason like unto Christ; for if they be found unlike, we must conclude that they are corrupt and do pertain unto the old man. As for the corruption of the baser parts of the mind, daily experience sufficiently teaches us.

Again, this property belongs unto the baser parts of the mind, that they are sprinkled abroad in the members and do spread themselves over all the parts of the flesh; which cannot be agreeable unto the mind and reasonable part, being things spiritual and invisible. That the body also and its parts have fallen from their duty, to become rebellious and repugnant to the mind, Paul teaches, when he cries out: "O unhappy man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" And again, when he says: "I feel another law in my members." Finally, that the whole man, how much soever he be, is corrupted, the commandment of Christ sufficiently proves, wherein he bids us to deny ourselves. But if our nature were innocent and perfect, there would be no need for us to renounce the same; for things that are good should be retained and not abandoned. With this definition of original sin, which we have made, agrees the want of original justice: so likewise agrees Augustine's definition, wherein he says that the same is concupiscence of the flesh; so that both the one and the other be rightly understood.

Those who were chief among the Schoolmen acknowledged this doctrine, such as Thomas, Scotus, and especially Bonaventure. These affirm the material part in this sin to be the corruption of nature or concupiscence; the formal part to be the want of righteousness; and so of those two opinions, which I now spoke of, they make one. But there are some of our men who would have the formal part to be guiltiness, or the imputation of God; but seeing that this is an outward thing from sin, I would rather incline to that sentence which makes those formal parts to be the fight and wrestling against the law of God, for that is the principal reason why the corruptions of nature must be called sins.

And there must be no credit given unto them who cry out that our nature is good. Indeed, I would grant it to be true, as concerning our first creation of nature, but not as it has fallen; for it is good indeed, but yet so good, as it has some corruption joined therewith. But whereas these men say that lusting is good, they must give me leave if I give more credit unto Paul than unto them. For he says: "I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, there dwells no good thing": and a little after; "I find by the law, that when I would do good, evil is present with me." In this place, he says that concupiscence is evil. To the Galatians also, he sufficiently proves it to be evil, when he wills the same to be crucified. It is also false what they say, that it always desires things which are profitable and tend to preservation; for we find by experience that it is continually prone to offenses and to those things which are enemies unto life.

Moreover, if nature were as innocent and good as they imagine it to be, wherefore should it be so grievously punished by God? Among all the kinds of living creatures, we see in a manner none more miserable than man. If we respect either his birth, infancy, childhood, education, and discipline; all things are replenished with tears, with sorrow, with lamentation, with infirmity, and with pains taking. The body must labor to get its living; the mind is continually disquieted with troublesome affections, the heart is stirred up with perturbations, the whole body is tormented with diseases: all which things, some considering with themselves, have said that nature is not a mother, but a step-mother.

I pass over that the bodies and souls also of children and infants are sometimes delivered unto the devil to be vexed; as we read in the Gospel that a young man was in such a manner tormented by the devil that he cast himself sometimes into the fire and sometimes into the water. So the severity of God does so account for the innocence of man's nature, as he grievously punishes the same. And it should appear that the very heathen men perceived more concerning this thing than these divines; for Plato in his second book De Republica says that men by nature are evil, as those who cannot be led by their own accord to embrace righteousness, but only to be discontent with injury. And Socrates shows that unless men be inspired, as it is said the poets were, with some divine power, virtues cannot be had. And Cicero in his third book De Republica (as Augustine alleges in his fourth book against Julian) says that "Man is brought into light by nature his stepmother, with a naked, frail, and weak body; having a mind vexed with grief, subject to fears, feeble unto labours, prone unto lusts, in whom is hidden the fervent love of God, and also his mind and his wit." Also, the ecclesiastical writers have condescended to this opinion, many of whose consents Augustine has gathered together in his book against Julian.

Touching Irenaeus and Tertullian, I have already spoken. Cyprian also says that Christ healed the wounds which Adam made and the venom with which the devil infected our nature. Cyprian acknowledges infirmity to be derived from the sin of our first parent, wherewith we are so provoked unto sin that no man can flatter himself in his own innocence: for who can boast that he has a clean heart? For as John says, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and there is no truth in us." Again, Cyprian in his epistle unto Fidus teaches that children must be baptized, lest they perish everlastingly.

Augustine cites Reticius, the bishop, whose words we recited before; he also cites Olympius, a bishop of Spain, who says that "the sin of Adam, the first framed man, was so sprinkled among the young plants that sin is born together with man." He also cites Hilary, who thus wrote concerning the flesh of Christ: "Therefore, he being sent in the similitude of sinful flesh; even so he had sin. But because all flesh is of sin, namely of the sin derived from Adam the first parent, he was sent in the similitude of sinful flesh; so that there was no sin in him, but the similitude of sinful flesh." The same father in another place, expounding the 18th Psalm, urges this sentence of David: "Behold how I was shapen in wickedness, and in sin my mother has conceived me." The same father in a homily upon the book of Job says that "the body is a matter of naughtiness," which could not so be said to be at the first creation.

And Ambrose upon Luke says that "the body is a foul puddle, and a harbour of sins; but by the benefit of Christ it is changed into the temple of God, and a holy place of virtues." The same father, writing against the Novatians, says that "our beginning was in sin"; again, in his apology: "David says that before we are born, we are spotted with contagion; and before we have the use of light, we receive original unrighteousness and are conceived in iniquity." And he says of Christ, "It was not requisite for him, in whose body no sin should be, to feel any natural contagiousness of generation. Justly therefore did David bewail in himself the foul filthiness of his nature, and that infections began to be in a manner before he had life." The same Ambrose, in his book De arca Noe, writes: "Whom then has he now called just, but him that is free from these bonds, whom the common bonds of nature cannot hold?" Also upon the gospel of Luke: "Through the washing of the healthful ministry, those infants who have been baptized are now cleansed from wickedness."

Jerome upon the prophet Jonah says that young children are subject to the sin of Adam. And lest you should think he only spoke of the guiltiness of Adam's fault, upon the 18th and 41st chapters of Ezekiel, he says: "Not so much as the child of a day old is without sin," urging also that sentence: "Who can make that clean, which was conceived of an unclean seed?" Gregory Nazianzen says, "The image of God shall cleanse the blemishes of bodily inundation." And afterward: "Reverence the birth by which you are delivered from the chains of earthly nativity." And entreating of baptism he says: "By this man the spots of our nativity are taken away, by which we were conceived in iniquity, and in sins our parents begat us."

Basilius Magnus is defended by Augustine: for the Pelagians would have had him seem to be of their part. He writes against the Manichees that evil is not a substance; but a conversation, which comes only of the will. He meant this of those who procured the infection of conversation by their own proper will; which conversation (he says) may easily be severed from the will of them that be diseased: for if it could not be severed from the same, evil should be a substantial part thereof. All these things Augustine affirms to be rightly spoken; for the Manichees decreed that evil is a certain substance, and that the same is the beginning of worldly affairs. But contrariwise Basil says that evil is in a good thing and that it happened through the will of the man and of the woman that sinned. And whereas he says that it may easily be severed from the will, he ascribes not that unto our strength, but unto the mercy of God. And in that he says, there shall be no token thereof left, we also do hope the same; though not in this life, yet in the life to come. But that he acknowledged original sin, his own sermon of fasting does sufficiently bear witness: for thus he says: "If Eve had abstained from the tree, we should not have had any need of this fasting: for sound men have no need of the physician, but sick men. We became sick through that sin, let us be healed by repentance: but repentance without fasting is vain." By these words, Basil determined that we by reason of the sin of Adam are not sound.

Moreover, he cites the twelve bishops of the East who condemned Pelagius. To whom we should add Origen, who interpreting that sentence of Paul, which we have spoken of: "Death came upon all men"; said that Abel, Enoch, Methuselah, and Noah sinned: other fathers he says he will not recite, because they sinned all, every one, and that none is clean from corruption, though he has lived but one day. But upon the sixth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, he speaks more plainly, when he says that baptism was appointed by tradition from the apostles, to be given unto infants; because the apostles knew that the natural corruption of sin is in all men, which ought to be washed away by water and the Spirit. And Chrysostom upon Genesis, entreating of the question: Wherefore are men nowadays afraid of beasts, and hurt by them, seeing they were created lords over them? He says that this happens by reason of sin, and because we depart from our confidence and honour. And thereby Augustine proves that the natural gift of young children is fallen away, in that the beasts do not spare them. The same Chrysostom, expounding that place of the sixth chapter of Romans, says how that sin, which remains through the disobedience of Adam, has polluted all things. He has also many other places to the same effect.

Yet the Pelagians, and especially Julianus, were not ashamed to cite this father as a witness, as though he had made a case for them; because in his sermon De baptisatis, he reciting many gifts of baptism, says that those who are baptized not only receive forgiveness of their sins but also are made the children and heirs of God, the brethren of Christ, and joint-heirs with him, the members and temple of God, and instruments of the Holy Ghost. He adds at the end: "Do you see what a variety of liberality there is in baptism? And some do think that heavenly grace consists in the remission of sins; and for that cause, we baptize young children, when nevertheless they are not polluted with sin, that unto them should be given or added righteousness, holiness, adoption, inheritance, brotherhood of Christ, that they may be his members."

By these words, Julian thought that Chrysostom does not consent that there is original sin. But Augustine says that his words must be understood concerning sin committed by their own advisement, from which sin assuredly they are exempt; and by this reason they may be called innocent. According to this meaning, Paul writes of those two brethren: "Before they had done either good or evil." Nevertheless, there is none altogether exempt from what the apostle said: "By the sin of one, condemnation came upon all men." And: "By one man's disobedience, many are made sinners." Hereof it appears how warily we must read the fathers; for sometimes we read in them that young children have no sin proper to their own actions, while they especially acknowledge the corruption of nature, that is, original sin, to be in them.

To have sins proper may be understood in two ways: either concerning things they have done of their own will and free election, and in this respect, Chrysostom's statement concerning infants is allowed; or else sins are called proper corruptions of nature, whereby we are both defiled and condemned, which cannot be removed from young children, seeing they are born with them, as David plainly proves. Augustine noted in Chrysostom's words, which are extant in Greek, that "there are set down sins" in the plural number, and not "sin" in the singular, as Julian had cited them. For thus it is read in the Greek, "τα αμαρτήματα." The word "αμαρτήματα," in the plural number (as Augustine thinks), is most properly applied unto sins, which they name actual. He adds that the more ancient fathers did not so copiously dispute original sin because the Pelagians had not yet arisen to impugn it.

These many sayings of the fathers, Pighius should have weighed; especially seeing he accounts them for eagles, which see most sharply and always fly unto the carcass. But it seems to me that he esteems them as counters to reckon with, which, being set in sundry places, may sometimes signify a talent and at another time but a dandiprat, as it pleases him that casts the account. So Pighius will sometimes have the father's authority to be exceedingly large, and sometimes (if they do not content him sufficiently) to be none at all; thus at one time he extols them as eagles and another time despises them as jays.

In this, he seems not to regard the judgment of his Roman church, which otherwise he equates with God himself; for that church so acknowledges original sin that it does not vouchsafe even the churchyard for burying those infants who die without baptism and requires that the devil be expelled from young infants by exorcisms when they are brought to baptism because it says they are bondslaves of the devil. I do not speak of this because I would either allow those exorcisms or wish for them to be retained still: for this must be obtained of God by prayers, and we must not deal as if we would seem by miracles to heal a man possessed by the devil. Seeing at this day there is no such gift extant in the church, there is no cause why we should imitate the same. Neither do we grant that infants not yet baptized are assaulted by the devil. Also, Innocentius, the bishop of Rome, who lived in the time of Augustine, condemning Pelagius, was of the very same mind that we are of concerning original sin. We ought not to extenuate this evil; otherwise, we shall extenuate the benefit of Christ. Those who will not acknowledge this sin are neither sorrowful for it nor seek the remedy of Christ. Truly Pighius herein went further than the Pelagians; for they only denied the propagation of sin by Adam. But Pighius cries out that this opinion is wicked and blasphemous and reproachful against God. Again, they thought this enough, to say that infants, dying without baptism, shall both be excluded from the kingdom of heaven and also be placed in the pains of hell. But this man dreams that they shall be happy through a certain natural blessedness, and so happy, as they shall bless, praise, and love the Lord with all their mind, with all their heart, and with all their strength.

Chapter XXIV:

Now let us see how obscure he endeavours to make the definition alleged. First, he says by these darknesses and corruptions of nature, you understand either mere privations of God's gifts or certain positive things. If you appoint them to be privations, I understand what you say. But your cavillations are nothing else but tragic names and vain terms. But if you will have these things to be positive: seeing in the infant newborn, there is nothing but the soul and the body, which are clean and have God and nature to be their author, from whence or by what means did these mischiefs break in, which you do make mention of?

First, we answer that the privations here set down are not as though they were mere negatives, which take away the whole: as when we say there is no Centaure nor Scylla; but we say they are such names of things as leave their subject maimed, unprofitable, and deformed, as appears in the eye destitute of sight, and in the trembling hand of one that is taken with the palsy. Even so fares original sin with us. Indeed, the powers of the mind and actions do remain, but yet destitute of their right government, and therefore evil and corrupted.

But Pighius errs still because he feigns the nature of man to have a certain natural integrity of itself, to which have come these supernatural gifts, which were planted in the first parent. But that after sin was committed, those gifts being taken away, man fell into his old state. But this is a mere dream, for such a nature of man was instituted by God as was convenient for him. Therefore, his gifts being taken away, it is corrupted and very much marred. Seeing he swerved from his creation, he is in sin. Moreover, we do not only say that original sin is this privation, but also that it does comprehend things positive, such as proneness unto evil, a violence of nature against the word of God, and such other like things. Therefore, Bernard says that "in the conjunction of the soul with the body, it is even as if it should fall upon a heap of most hard potsherds and hurting stones." Among the Schoolmen, Gulielmus Parisiensis, in his book called Summa de vitiis et virtutibus, brings this similitude: that a soul is so let down into the body, as if a man should fall into a miry, deep, and stony place; and so should both sink in, be defiled, and hurt. In like manner (he says), we through original sin are plunged in the darkness of ignorance, we are defiled with lusts, and as touching the powers and faculties of the mind, we are wounded.

And whereas Pighius says that both the body and the soul are good things and have God for their author, I grant it. When he afterward demands how they are then corrupted, I answer with Paul: by one man, who fell; and that by procreation, as will be shown a little later. But in that he says they can by no means be corrupted because God is the author of them, it is no firm reason. For even those who are of ripe years have both a body and a soul, which are the works of God and are continually preserved by His power, and yet they may be defiled and corrupted. If he shall say that this comes of man's will and free choice, so will we answer that the same may come of other causes, namely through propagation and seed. Pighius reasons from what is not the cause, as though it were the cause. His meaning is that if men are corrupted, it cannot be otherwise than by the will and free choice, which is not true. All the arguments he objects against us arise from this: that he says he does not understand how this corruption can be derived to the posterity, how it is possible that infants should be bound by any law, and how a law can be made of that which we are not able to avoid.

But seeing the holy scriptures declare, teach, and testify these things, it matters not how much Pighius either understands or does not understand: for we believe many things which we neither perceive nor know by any certain reason. Nevertheless, this ought not to be of such force that every man should insist we believe whatever they think good, under the pretense that although they cannot be perceived by reason, yet they ought to be comprehended by faith, since God is also able to make things which are far greater. First, what we would have believed ought to be shown out of the holy scriptures: then afterward, if we cannot attain unto it, let us cling to faith and set reason aside.

It does not follow from our definition that there is no good thing left either in nature or in non-Christians. Only this we affirm: that this sin would destroy all if God (through Christ) did not bring a remedy unto the regenerate. Also, God is sometimes present in those who are not regenerate and adorns them with excellent and noble virtues, whereby original sin is restrained and commonwealths and empires are kept at least in some civil order. Socrates would not leave prison when he might. Aristides, being driven into banishment, wished unto his citizens that they might never be in such ill case as to remember him. Phocion, being asked a little before his death whether he would have any message sent to his son, said, "Let him never remember the injury done unto me." The Commonwealth of Rome had its Curtius, Scipios, and Catos, men of civil honesty and very great lovers of upright dealing. These duties, although sins in those who knew not God, were yet bridles of original sin and of nature corrupted, lest all things should be confounded, good laws fall to ruin, and the light of nature be extinguished.

Now, seeing we have confirmed original sin by the testimony of the scriptures, confuted the opinion of Pighius, rejected the opinion of those who think original sin to be a guilt and bond procured through the sin of Adam, and presented the definition of Augustine—that original sin is concupiscence of the flesh—and of Anselm—that it is a want of original righteousness—and last of all, seeing we have extensively and by many testimonies proved our own definition, it remains that we proceed to the third topic: namely, the conditions and properties of original sin, how it is spread, how it is abolished, how the remnants of it persist in the renewed, and what punishment is due to it.

As for the manner of how it is transmitted to posterity, many opinions are cited. The first is of the propagation of souls, which we will show, by the judgment of Augustine, to be a more ready way than the rest, although it is not received by all men. Another opinion, which Augustine follows, is that original sin is conveyed from one to another by the lust and inordinate delight of the parents. This reason has two errors: first, because it says that this evil is in procreation as a matter of necessity, which nevertheless may be separated from the same. The Schoolmen themselves confess that one begotten without a vicious desire of the parents would still draw original sin, as they say it is sufficient that it was in Adam, as in the first principal seed. Another absurdity is that original sin would only consist in the foul affection of lust, whereas it truly comprehends the entire corruption of nature.

Others have thought that the soul was created evil by God, because it should be a part of man, execrated and put under the curse. But because this seems to be against the nature of creation, that it should be called a depravation, that opinion is also rejected. The last opinion, commonly received, is that the soul gathers original sin through conjunction with the body, which is already infected and corrupted by the parents. If it is asked, what is the seat thereof, or, as they commonly speak, what is the subject? We answer that it has place in the flesh, as in the root and beginning: then out of that fountain, it also possesses the soul and so is extended throughout the whole man, so that the seed is the instrument by which this sin is conveyed from the parents to their children.

Pighius objects that vices cannot be derived by seed to the posterity, unless perhaps those vices which cling and stick in the body of the parents, as we see in the case of leprosy, epilepsy, and other diseases of the body. He argues that nature does not permit sin to take place in the very substance of the seed so as it can be conveyed by it to the children. Here we answer first that it is not true that only the diseases of the body of the parents are derived to the children. We also see that many conditions of the mind are derived from the parents to their children, such as wit, fury, ambition, gentleness, pride, and the like. As to the other, we grant indeed that the ill quality or corruption, which is brought by the seed, as it is in the seed, is not sin. But this does not prevent the corruption brought into the children by seed, as by an instrument, from having in it the nature of sin, just as the qualities I have now recited do not make the seed to be witty, docile, or covetous, but those qualities derived to the child do make him such a one.

Howbeit, whether it may be affirmed that God is the author thereof; they commonly say that the deformity and unrighteousness that is in this sin is drawn out of nature already corrupted, which, as it was created by God, was not so depraved. And so they affirm that whatsoever is in the nature of goodness, the same is of God; but whatsoever is evil therein, forasmuch as it is nothing else but a defect or want, there needs to be no efficient cause for it. For that which is but a want is not of necessity that it should be made; for if it should be made, it should be also in it. Howbeit, this is not enough; indeed we agree with them that God is the author of the subject, or of the substance, wherein the defect is. But in that they say that the defect itself has no efficient cause, therein we do not agree with them. For something must remove or prohibit that perfection which is requisite, and withdraw the grace and gifts wherewith our nature was endowed at the beginning. Thus we must of necessity refer this privation or defect unto God, who does not give perfection utterly without a defect: which is always done by His just judgment, although it is not always manifest unto us. And by the scriptures, it is most certain and cannot be denied, that God punishes sins by sins; but yet they are not so laid upon us by God, as they should be sins, in respect that they depend upon Him: for whatsoever God does, is without all controversy both right and just.

And punishments themselves, so far as they are punishments, do pertain to the nature of goodness. However, as they proceed from us, they are sins. For we affirm not that God himself pollutes the soul when He creates it; for it draws the filthiness of sin from the corrupted body, to which it is adjoined. But man's wisdom in this thing is very much offended; for it thinks that in no wise there ought to be made such a conjunction: for it seems to be as if a man should cast a precious thing into an unclean vessel. Also, it appears an unjust thing that the soul, which has done neither good nor ill, should be joined with a body and draw from it original sin: rather, that if it be so, men should abstain from procreation. As those also who have leprosy are persuaded to refrain (if it be possible) from procreation, lest they might thereby proceed to infect mankind. And because the end for which man is instituted is eternal felicity, it seems not convenient that the soul should be placed in that body, whereby it should be called back from the end prescribed. And as it is unjust that the soul, which has not sinned, should be punished in hellfire, even so it seems unjust that the same should be cast into that body, wherein it incurs not pain as in hell, but sin and the hatred of God, which are more grievous; and does so incur, as it can by no means avoid it.

These things are so difficult and obscure that they cannot fully be satisfied by man's judgment. Indeed, there are certain consolations gathered out of the ecclesiastical writers, which do so mitigate and qualify these objections as may suffice godly minds, but not so much as man's reason would require. For the soul is joined with an infected and unclean body, that consideration may be had of the whole world, lest mankind, which is the principal, should be wanting therein. God fails not in His office, He hinders not the course of nature; but the body being made, He creates the soul according to His order prefixed and would rather that a man should be, although he be not born without sin, than that he should not be at all. And although He does not bountifully give all things which He gave at the beginning, yet of His mercy He gives many things. Further, He has set forth the remedy, which is Christ our mediator, by whom the sin which we have drawn shall be cleansed. This sin, before conversion, drives the elect unto Christ, that they, feeling the force of their disease, may receive the medicine of Him: and then, after they are once grafted into Christ, they have this sin remaining still, that they, having battle and wrestling, may at last bear away victories and triumphs.

But you will say; God might by some other kind of means have saved mankind from destruction; namely, if He had created another man pure and perfect, so that Adam, dying without kindred, all the posterity might have been procreated of that other man uncorrupted. There is no doubt, but God could so have done if He would: but this had not been to raise up him that was fallen, to save him that was lost, and to redeem him that was utterly perished. This form of goodness God would show, that (notwithstanding the corruption of nature) He might preserve from destruction as many as He had chosen. A shaken reed He would not bruise, and smoking flax He would not quench. For He would bring forth Christ, as another Adam, who should so preserve His, as the other had destroyed them. These and such other things persuaded Gregory to cry out; "O happy offense, that deserved to have such a redeemer!" Which words I would not be hasty to speak, forasmuch as I see nothing in that cause which is not miserable and meet for great lamentation. For, in that there followed so great a salvation, that must be wholly imputed to the goodness of God, and not to the offense committed by Adam: for so great a good thing has not proceeded otherwise than by accident.

These things, although they cannot fully answer those objections which we have put forth as human reason would require, yet by them we have something we may answer. The conjunction of the soul with the corrupt body makes nothing to the destruction of the chosen, for in Christ, as well the body as the soul is renewed. And as the soul is infected by the body, so by the faith of Christ, which is in the soul, the same, together with the body, is repaired. And whereas the innocent soul, which has done nothing, either good or evil, is joined with a corrupted body; this the order of nature does require, unless the body should be left without life and be forsaken, as destitute of all mankind. But if we shall stand in disputation with God, there will be no measure nor end. Innumerable souls would complain because they were created, not predestinated [to salvation;] who nevertheless deserved not the same. Many would complain that they have been born of wicked infidels and barbarous parents, and that they died in their tender age, by means whereof they could not come by the knowledge: and a thousand more complaints they might imagine.

As concerning procreation, we say that it is commendable when it consists of lawful matrimony: therein must be considered man that is begotten, that is, (as the Schoolmen term it) the effect proper and of itself. But man is the good creature of God, vice and corruption is added by accidental means. And this evil has a remedy; which thing happens not in leprosy and other incurable diseases. Also we do grant that man is made to attain eternal felicity. And whereas it is objected that he is revoked from this end through the corruption of the body, we contrariwise do say that by the very same means he is invited unto Christ. Lastly, we grant that it may seem to be an unworthy thing that the innocent soul should be placed in hell; seeing no hope of redemption is there to be looked for: but being set in a body, although it be a corrupt body, yet it may obtain salvation and redemption.

Now must the reasons be brought forth, which firmly and soundly prove that original corruption is spread in men by seed and generation. This we will show by the holy scriptures because many openly repudiate it and think that all the matter is feigned.

First, Paul says that sin by one man came into the world. Therefore, we must see how men depend on Adam, in such a way that they can be partakers of his sin. There can be no other means found than by seed and generation. Moreover, when the apostle says unto the Ephesians that we by nature are the children of wrath; and nature, as the natural philosophers affirm, is the origin of motion, we must have recourse to seed and generation, for they are the foundation of our motion and beginning.

David more evidently shows this when he says, "Behold how I am conceived in wickedness, and in sin my mother hath conceived me." In these words, he plainly teaches that this sin is derived by generation. Most manifest of all is that saying of Job, "Who can make that clean which is born of unclean seed?" By this passage, the infected seed of our forefathers is proved to be unclean, though Pighius denies it ever so much.

But now, on the contrary part, let us examine by what means this sin is taken away. Just as by one man it was brought in, so by one man it is removed away. And just as sin is from Adam spread over all through seed and generation, so on the other side, in that multitude which pertains to Christ, there are some things which may have the respect of seed: such as election, predestination, grace, the Spirit, the word of God, and baptism. These two latter instruments God uses to regenerate those who are His. But if anyone demands whether the outward word or visible sign of baptism is altogether necessary, we answer that indeed the inward word, whereby men are moved unto Christ and reformed, is wholly required if we speak of such as are of perfect age. But in young infants, neither the inward word nor the outward word has any place.

Undoubtedly, the outward word is the ordinary instrument whereby God calls those of ripe years to salvation, although in some He uses only the inward word, after an extraordinary manner. For so He called Abraham out of his own native country and instructed Adam immediately (as the School-divines term it) without any outward ministry. The sacrament of baptism also must not for any cause be contemned, for those who despise it when they may attain unto it shall not obtain regeneration. But if there be no opportunity to come unto it, it shall be no danger unto the godly man who is converted unto Christ, although he be not baptized. Upon this occasion, among the fathers, there was mention made of the baptism of blood and of the Spirit. Ambrose, writing of the death of Valentinian the Emperor, says that he was not without the grace of baptism (seeing he burned with the desire thereof) although he were not baptized.

Howbeit, if I should be asked concerning the infants of Christians who depart without this sacrament, my answer would be that we must have a good hope for them and hold fast to the word of God; namely, to the covenant made with Abraham, wherein God promises Himself, not only to him but also to his seed. This promise, seeing it is not so general as to comprehend all, I dare not promise certain salvation particularly to any that departs hence. For there are some children of the saints who do not belong to predestination; such as we read of in Esau, Ishmael, and others, whose salvation is not hindered because they were not baptized.

Yet, while we live here, the remnants of this sin remain even in those who are regenerate. For original sin is not utterly eradicated, even by regeneration; indeed, the guiltiness is taken away, and those things which remain are not imputed unto us for our eternal destruction. But everything ought to be considered for what it is in itself. Therefore, if it is demanded of us whether it is sin that remains in the persons regenerate, we will answer that it is sin. But if you read that it is not sin, understand that to be spoken of the guiltiness of sin. Of this matter, we will speak more at large in another place. At the time of death, this kind of sin shall be completely abolished, for in the blessed resurrection we shall have a new body, a body made fit for eternal felicity. Meanwhile, while we live here, our old man and natural corruption continually pine away, so that finally, at the time of death, it ceases to be at all. Now we have seen these three things: how original sin is derived, how it is taken away, and what we are to determine concerning the remnant of the same.

Now let us speak of the punishment. Some of the School-divines think the same shall be without feeling. The Pelagians judged that such should only be banished from the kingdom of heaven and appointed nothing else. But Pighius adds this also, that those who die having but this sin only should be blessed with a certain natural happiness and that they shall love the Lord with all their heart, with all their mind, and with all their strength and shall set forth His name and praise. Although he dare not teach these things for any certainty, yet he allows them as very likely.

But Augustine, in De Fide ad Petrum and elsewhere, adjudges young infants to hell-fire if they die not regenerated. The holy scriptures seem to favor his part, for in the last judgment, there shall be only a double sentence pronounced. There is no third place appointed between the saved and the condemned. The Papists, although they think there shall be a purgatory until the day of judgment, do not appoint any mean place between both after that day. It is written evidently that those who believe not in Christ not only shall not have eternal life but also that the wrath of God rests upon them. While we are enemies of Christ, we are called the children of wrath. There is no doubt that God punishes those with whom He is angry. Therefore, we will say with Augustine and with the holy scriptures that they must be punished. But of the kind and manner of punishment, we are able to define nothing. However, whereas there are diverse sorts of punishments in hell (for the scriptures affirm that it shall be easier for some than for others), it is credible concerning these that, since they did not join actual sin to original corruption, they shall be punished more lightly.

I always except the children of the elect, for we doubt not to number them among the company of believers, although they as yet believe not by reason of their age, just as those born of infidels are reckoned among the unbelievers, although they do not yet resist the faith. So the children of the godly, departing without baptism, by reason of the covenant that God has made with their parents, may be saved if they belong to the number of the predestinate. I also except all others, if any there be, who by the secret counsel of God belong to predestination.

Now, with these matters thus ordered, we will address the arguments of the Pelagians, who believed they could prove that there is no original sin. The first of their arguments is that it is unlikely that God would continue to persecute Adam's sin, having already punished it sufficiently long ago, especially since the prophet Nahum says that God will not judge twice for the same offense.

I know some answer that God did not judge twice upon that sin but only once, including Adam and all his posterity under one judgment. However, to clarify the matter, I say that in each of us, whenever we are punished, there is a cause why we ought to be punished, and therefore, in every person, it is not the fault of another that is condemned, but his own. If we read that God avenges Adam's fault in us, it must be understood because our corruption originated from him. This is similar to one being sick with the plague, infecting others, and causing their deaths. If a man says they perished through the contagion of the one who first brought the plague, it must be understood because he was the first to spread the infection.

However, that sentence of the prophet Nahum is not relevant here. Indeed, Jerome, when interpreting that place, said that by those words, Martion the heretic was confuted, for he falsely accused God of being cruel and vengeful in the Old Testament because of the severe punishments He inflicted upon men. Jerome argued that this severity was due to God's benignity, aiming to prevent eternal perishing by delivering once and for all severe judgment to avoid future punishment.

Jerome, seeing that his explanation might not be firm enough, addressed an objection that it may seem advantageous for adulterers to be caught late since they could escape everlasting hell by receiving only temporal punishment. He replied that the judgment of this world cannot prevent God's ultimate judgment and that easy punishment cannot erase sins deserving severe and prolonged pain.

In Jerome's words, two points are notable: one, that adultery was punished with death in those days, and two, that his first interpretation seemed unsatisfactory. He thus provided another Jewish exposition, suggesting that God meant the Assyrians would not succeed in also taking the kingdom of Judah after leading away the ten tribes. God would not allow a double trouble; He was content with the destruction of the ten tribes and would save Judah.

Although this explanation is pious, it does not seem to align with the prophet's intent, who prophesied against Nineveh, foretelling the severity of punishment by the Chaldeans, implying no further need for vengeance. This is similar to saying a man struck dead with one blow does not need a second. This is the scope and sense of the prophet's message.

Regarding the matter, we do not deny that afflictions in the godly aim to prevent them from being condemned with the world, as Paul says. These are fatherly corrections leading to repentance. However, a general rule cannot be drawn from this to limit God's judgment, assuming that earthly punishment precludes further punishment if faith and repentance are absent. If they return to God, they will suffer nothing in another life, not because they have satisfied God with their earthly punishments but because Christ paid the price for their redemption. Just as godly men receive pledges of another life, the wicked begin their everlasting punishment with earthly afflictions. Christ also grants this when He says to fear the one who can destroy both body and soul in hell. Thus, the prophet's oracle, as plainly expounded, does not pertain to the matter at hand.

Another argument from the Pelagians is taken from the prophet Ezekiel: "The son shall not bear the iniquity of his father." To this, we might answer that children do not bear their parents' iniquity but their own, which cleaves to each from birth. However, as this passage is interpreted differently, we will briefly state our view.

A common proverb among the Jews was: "The fathers ate sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge," meaning that the children suffered for their fathers' sins. The Rabbins said the ten tribes attributed this to Jeroboam, who made the golden calves, while the kingdom of Judah referred it to Manasseh, whose ungodliness they believed brought captivity upon them. God reproved this proverb, stating that each soul belongs to Him and the son shall not bear the father's iniquity but will die for his own sin. Some interpret this as referring to temporal punishment, citing Deuteronomy 24, which commanded that parents not be killed for their children's offenses nor children for their parents. Amaziah, king of Judah, observed this law as recorded in 2 Kings 14. However, the Israelites did not always follow this, as seen in Joshua 7, where Achan's entire family and possessions were destroyed for his sin, by God's special command, which does not contradict the general law.

Nevertheless, this exposition concerning the civil law does not align with the prophet's words. The Jews did not complain of judicial punishment or that imposed by the prince; they lamented the calamities God Himself brought upon them, such as the spoil of their goods, the destruction of the Jewish kingdom, and the Babylonian captivity. They accused the judgments of the Lord, murmuring that His ways were not right. Some interpret the passage as referring to eternal punishments, the loss of grace, and the spirit, which occur to everyone for his own sins, not for the sins of others. Meanwhile, they affirm that both children, for their parents, and people, for their princes, suffer temporal punishments. God punishes fathers in their children, considering children a part of their parents. They argue it is not absurd if children, through their afflictions, benefit their parents by calling them to repentance. No injustice is done to the children if they die, as they are mortal, and God wisely determines the times of living or dying. He may take children from life to prevent their corruption by naughtiness or to halt their sins, thus sparing them further burden and allowing them to end their sinful living.

Augustine leans towards this opinion in his questions on the book of Joshua, questions eight and nine. Those who deny the remnants of original sin after regeneration are compelled to say this, as they cannot show that infants are punished for their own sins, which they claim infants do not possess. We, who assert that these are sins, teach that they are not imputed to eternal death but sometimes warrant certain punishments to show they displease God. Augustine's exposition does not fully align with Ezekiel's meaning. The prophet says it shall no longer be that children suffer temporal punishments (like exile and captivity) for their parents' sins. The Lord declares, "The son shall not bear the iniquity of his father." This contradicts the idea that this applies only to spiritual punishments and eternal damnation, as the prophet speaks plainly of bodily punishments in this life.

Another of Augustine's interpretations, found in "Enchiridion ad Laurentium" chapter 46, suggests this sentence prophesied Christ's benefit to us. Since Christ's death made satisfaction for original sin, the prophet says, "Hereafter the son shall not bear the sin of his father, but his own." Augustine may have been led to this opinion because, in Jeremiah 31, a similar promise of the New Testament follows a similar statement. "Behold," says the Lord, "the days shall come when I will make a new covenant with the house of Judah." However, this interpretation does not seem to fit the prophet's original intent. Furthermore, although Christ suffered at a specific time, the grace of His death saved children in the Old Testament as well. Therefore, it was unnecessary to say it would no longer be so, as it was not so before.

Moreover, those strangers to Christ bear their iniquity and suffer punishment for their offenses, not others'. Thus, we say the prophet's sentence is generally true, applying to all, whether children or adults, of both the Old and New Testaments. Each bears his own iniquity, for all are born with sin and corruption deserving punishment. This sentence supports our view and contradicts Pighius, who claimed children bear their parents' sins while otherwise being sinless. The Jews claimed they were innocent and suffering for their parents' sins. God declared that this proverb would no longer be relevant, as His judgments do not punish any innocent person for another's sin. The prophet foretold a time of enlightenment through the Holy Spirit in the New Testament, clarifying that each would bear his own sin.

The law seems to contradict this exposition. God says He will visit the fathers' iniquity upon the children to the third and fourth generations. These statements appear contradictory, as God both punishes the fathers' iniquity on the children and also declares the children will not bear their parents' sins. To reconcile this, we must first understand the law's words.

Some interpret this law as reflecting God's mercy, others His severity and justice. Those who see it as mercy argue that God is so gracious that He does not immediately destroy a sinner but waits for repentance. Sometimes, He spares the father but punishes the son; sometimes, He defers punishment to the third or fourth generation, as seen with Jehu, king of Samaria. God did not remove Jehu's posterity from the kingdom until the fourth generation, showing His patience. Others see it as demonstrating God's severity and justice. His goodness is shown by blessing those who love Him for a thousand generations, but His justice is seen in punishing iniquity not just upon the sinners but also their descendants to the third and fourth generations.

Examples support both views. The Amalekites, who harassed Israel in the wilderness, were eventually destroyed by Saul, as commanded by God. Gehazi, Elisha's servant, was struck with leprosy for his greed, and the curse extended to his descendants. Both interpretations are godly, but the latter better aligns with the text. The law clarifies that God punishes the iniquity of fathers upon children to the third and fourth generations of those who hate Him. Only children who share their parents' sins bear their punishment. Hatred of God can be understood as both a conscious act by those of mature age and an inclination and corruption inherent in infants.

But someone may object: If we understand that God punishes only those who imitate the vices of their forefathers, what need was there to add "unto the third and fourth generation," seeing punishment is always to be administered against all sinners, whatever their generation? Augustine was so troubled by this objection that he suggested that by this form of speaking, "unto the third and fourth generation," must be understood to mean all posterity in general, with a definite number used for an infinite one. For if you join four to three, it makes the number seven, which is often used to represent any other number.

Similarly, he says it is written in the prophet Amos: "For three wickednesses and for four, I will not spare him," which he interprets to mean that if one offends once or twice, God may forgive him. But if he heaps sin upon sin and continues to do so immeasurably, God cannot forgive him. In this place, "three or four wickednesses" denote the continuation of sins. Thus, God may be said to punish to the third and fourth generation of those who hate Him when He punishes all such people, regardless of their generation.

But another answer might be that God prescribed the third and fourth generation to show that His wrath is tempered with kindness, indicating that He may eventually cease His torments and go no further in punishing. Others think the third and fourth generations are specifically mentioned because the posterity up to that point is often led into sin by the bad example of their progenitors. Most ancestors do not live past the fourth generation; they usually die having seen their great-grandchildren. Therefore, the words of the prophet are not contrary to the law but rather interpret it. The prophet says the son shall not bear the father's iniquity because the law states that God punishes the sins of the fathers on the children if they follow their parents' sins. When punished, they understand they suffer for their own sins, not for their parents'.

It is said that God punishes the sins of the fathers upon the children because those sins originated with them and continued through the children. If the children had not had such sinful ancestors, God might have forborne His wrath, as He did with their progenitors. But since both progenitors and descendants sin, God no longer defers punishment, lest He appear to neglect human affairs and encourage others to sin more securely. Nevertheless, those punished cannot be called innocent since they also hate God.

This does not contradict what Christ says in John concerning the man born blind: "Neither did this man sin, nor his parents." The meaning is not that the blind man was punished without cause, but that God's providence directed the fault of his eyes for a different purpose—to celebrate Christ's divinity. God arranges His punishments to serve not only as penalties but also to achieve other ends He has appointed. Therefore, the prophet's words do not contradict the definition of original sin we have provided but rather support it, contrary to our adversaries who claim that children are guilty of others' faults.

The next argument is that since both the soul and body are God's works, and since progenitors can be pure and godly, commended in the scriptures, and marriage and procreation are praised, how has sin crept in among such fortresses of innocence? We first answer with Paul: By one man. They falsely claim the ancestors were clean and holy. Though they were godly and original sin is forgiven regarding guilt, a corrupt nature and impure state remain. They pass on their nature to their descendants through seed and generation.

Some argue that the body cannot corrupt the spirit, but we do not claim the soul is corrupted by the body through a natural action. Rather, since the body is corrupted, it resists the soul. Without its original endowments, the soul is subject to the body's inclinations and does not rule as it should but is ruled by it. Natural reasons teach that there is a natural agreement between the body and the soul, with the soul affected by the body's condition. Those with abundant choler or melancholy are often angry or sad. Thus, the argument based on false principles concludes nothing.

Furthermore, they cite 1 Corinthians: "Your children are holy." They argue this means children do not have original sin, as holiness cannot coexist with sin. Some interpret this as civil holiness, meaning children of Christians are legitimate, not bastards. This does not hold, as even children of infidels in lawful matrimony are legitimate heirs. Others interpret holiness as godly education. If a godly spouse leaves an ungodly one, the children may remain with the ungodly and be led astray. If both parents live together, the godly one will impart some godliness to the children. This interpretation also falls short since godly education can occur even for children born of adultery and fornication, as seen with Adeodatus, Augustine's son.

The apostle likely means that some holiness is imparted to the children from their parents, not through flesh but through the covenant's promise. God promised Abraham to be God not only to him but also to his seed. In the prophets, God calls the children of His people His own and laments their sacrifices to Moloch. Relying on this promise, we baptize infants in the church, believing they belong to God and Christ, confirmed with an outward seal of the promise.

But you might say, you could be deceived because perhaps your child does not belong to the number of the elect. I answer that the same difficulty can happen even with those of mature years. Someone may profess faith with a feigned heart, be led only by the persuasion of man, or have faith only for a time, and thus not truly belong to the elect. But the minister does not concern himself with these matters; he only regards the confession that the person to be baptised professes. He will say that God's election is hidden from him and does not trouble himself about it. Concerning particular matters, he can determine nothing but relies on the general promise, from which, although many are excluded, it is not his part to define who they are.

Paul speaks of the Jews: "If the root is holy, the branches also shall be holy; if the first fruits are holy, so is the whole batch or lump." By these words, he shows that God's favour was inclined towards the Jews because of the promise made to their fathers and that salvation was due to them for the same reason. Although this promise is indefinite and many are excluded from it, it remains stable because some are always converted to Christ and will be until the end. This is evident in Isaac, to whose seed God promised to be gracious. Although the promise applied only to Jacob, not to Esau, this did not prevent Esau from being circumcised.

Similarly, we confess that the children of Christians who belong to God's election are holy, but they are still infected with original sin because they are, by nature, children of wrath, just as others are. If God does not impute guilt to them against their salvation, it is by His grace and mercy, not by the purity of their nature. Therefore, we affirm that they are both holy and, by nature, children of wrath. Thus, it is clear how this argument should be discussed.

They also add that infants neither speak, do, nor think anything against the law of God, and therefore have no sin. How shamefully they err is evident from what we have already said. This argument is as if they were saying: They have no actual sin, therefore they have no sin at all. To argue from the particular to the general by a negative is the worst kind of reasoning. They are deceived because they do not follow the general nature of sin, which comprehends all things repugnant to the law of God.

Chapter 41

They also object that it is not right to say that original sin is spread through seed and flesh because these things have a senseless and dull nature and are therefore not capable of sin. But I have already said that sin is not in them except as the root; the nature of sin is perfected when the soul is joined to them. We have also explained how to answer the Pelagians, who affirm that Paul's words to the Romans should be understood as referring to imitation. That cannot agree with all the apostle's sayings, for he states that all have sinned and that by the disobedience of one, many became sinners. More firmly, he proves that sin was in the world before the law because death reigned from Adam to Moses.

There are reasons Augustine used against the Pelagians that we need not repeat. They add that human afflictions and death itself are natural because we have natural sources from which they flow. But we answer that these sources were not ordained in man's nature at creation but were later defiled and corrupted. Philosophers attribute effects to present principles, but Christians refer them to the word of God.

Since scripture teaches that death came by sin and that man, as created, could have always lived, let Pighius and his followers see how truly and godly they affirm that death comes to man by nature. They also argue that what cannot be avoided should not be considered sin. This is false because the law is given to us, which no one can perfectly perform or avoid all offenses against it. In considering sins, we must not inquire whether something happens by chance or necessity, but whether it is repugnant or agreeable to the law of God. This is the measure by which sin must be weighed. Thus, their arguments about necessity are vain and trivial.

Finally, they argue that if the sin of our first parents is derived to their descendants, there is no reason why the sins of the immediate parents should not also be conveyed to their offspring. If we grant this, they think the most absurd consequence would follow: that we born in this latter time would be most miserable because we would bear the sins of not only our first parents but also all our progenitors.

The Schoolmen have thought that it is not possible for the sins of immediate parents to pass into their children, and they seem to be led to this conclusion for two main reasons. The first reason is that immediate parents only communicate nature to their children and such other things as naturally accompany it, but they do not transmit special properties and accidental qualities unless they pertain to the body. For instance, hereditary diseases like leprosy or gout may pass to the children, but mental qualities are not inherited; a grammarian does not beget a grammarian, nor does a musician beget another musician. Therefore, they argue that since sins pertain to the mind, they cannot be inherited from the parents.

The second reason is that the first parents had original righteousness, which was not only implanted in the mind but also in the body and members. Consequently, in procreation, they might transmit the lack of this righteousness, as it was inherent in the body and flesh. However, actual sins, which occurred later and pertain to the mind, cannot be inherited by children. Yet, Augustine in his Enchiridion ad Laurentium, chapter 46, argues that it is probable that even the sins of immediate parents are communicated to their children. He supports this by comparing two scriptural passages previously discussed.

Since God says He will visit the sins of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation, and elsewhere says the son shall not bear the father's offense, Augustine reasons that if the child does not bear the father's iniquity (but his own), yet God visits the sin of the father in him, it must be that the son has that sin within himself. Otherwise, these passages would be contradictory. Therefore, sin so permeates human nature that it not only corrupts the mind but also taints the body, flesh, and members. Paul tells the Corinthians that our bodies are temples of the Holy Ghost and severely threatens anyone who destroys God's temple. Thus, if God punishes the sins of parents upon their children, and the child bears only his own iniquity, it follows that the children of wicked men, when afflicted, must have some of their father's wickedness within them, serving as a punishment to the fathers.

No one should complain about God's justice in this matter. If God, by His most sincere justice, can deliver sinners into a reprobate sense and punish sins with sins, there is no reason why He cannot justly allow the corruption of sin to affect both soul and body, so that those born of sinners inherit a similar nature. This doctrine serves as a warning to live purely, lest one pollutes both mind and body and, by the same means, infects one's children.

Having established these points, some may ask what the difference is between original sin and the sin inherited from immediate parents. We answer that original sin's propagation is continuous, as the holy scriptures teach, whereas the continuation of other sins is not necessary. Sometimes, no sin apart from original sin is transmitted from immediate parents to their children. It appears that God has set a limit to prevent evil from abounding excessively and moderates this propagation of evil. Experience shows this; for example, Hezekiah, a most godly prince, had King Ahaz, a most wicked man, for his father. Similarly, Hezekiah begat Amon, a most wicked child, who begat Manasseh, even worse than himself.

Although the beginnings of sin might be transmitted from parents to children, God sometimes grants such grace and strength to children that they can overcome these inclinations. However, this does not differ from original sin in that grace is granted to the godly to achieve victory over it. Moreover, when God gives good children to bad parents, He shows the power of His goodness, repressing the corruption of the parents so it does not pass to the children. Conversely, when He allows evil children to come from good parents, He prevents the assumption that the children's godliness comes from the parents' merits, as grace is entirely spiritual and not naturally transmitted through procreation.

Therefore, while honesty and godliness are pure gifts from God, He promises to bless the posterity of godly men for up to a thousand generations, not due to the ancestors' merits but because of His mercy. To illustrate His freedom, God sometimes allows things to happen differently, showing that even holy parents still possess much corruption, which may manifest in their children. This serves to remind us of our inherent corruption, even among the godly. To support this opinion further, some cite the Psalmist's prayer against the children of the wicked: "Let them be fatherless; let none have compassion on them; let them beg for their bread." If the children of the wicked were innocent, this prayer would be unjust, suggesting that they partake in their parents' wickedness. Given their infancy, this must occur through propagation.

Some argue these words of David are prophecies of future events revealed by the Holy Ghost. Even if they are prophecies, they retain the form and inclination of a prayer, which must be just to be valid.

But whereas they say that it is most absurd, which may arise from this doctrine, namely, that the last men should also be more miserable than all others, inasmuch as they should bear the sins of Adam as well as all their forefathers, this must be answered in two ways. First, not all things which seem absurd to us are absurd to God. For let us consider this very matter: Christ threatens the Jews that all the blood of the godly, even from Abel to Zechariah, the son of Berechiah, should be laid to their charge. Who does not see that the state of those children of Israel, who were led into captivity, was more miserable than many generations of their forefathers who had defiled themselves with the same sins?

Secondly, we answer that indeed it would be absurd if the forefathers' sins continually passed from them to their children. But since we have declared that this does not always happen, and that God's providence has limited and measured this evil, and that He has expressly pronounced this only concerning the third and fourth generations, there is nothing absurd in it. The reasons of the Schoolmen, wherewith they wrestle against this propagation, are very feeble. First, they presume that the properties of the mind are not communicated by the parents to their children, which experience teaches to be false. For we often see that angry persons beget angry children, and melancholic parents beget melancholic children. Neither does this comparison serve them, saying that one grammarian does not beget another grammarian, nor one musician begets another; for these are arts attained by precepts and exercise, not affections bred in men. Yet we sometimes see by experience that in what art the father chiefly excels, he has children inclined to the same, be it husbandry, warfare, or liberal science. Moreover, we are chiefly concerned with those affections which are the springs and beginnings of actions.

In another argument, they say that sin in parents only corrupts the mind, which is not true. As we have taught before, their body is also polluted, so it is no marvel if fathers communicate such bodies to their children. On this matter, I willingly agree with Augustine that it is a probable thing and agreeable to the scriptures. This doctrine is also supported by Martin Bucer, a very godly and learned man, who holds that private sins are derived from parents to children. However, it must be considered that this is contingent and not of necessity. God sometimes suspends the sin of the parents and, for His goodness, does not allow human nature to be utterly destroyed. When He either represses this derivation of sin or allows it to take place, He alone knows. But it is enough for us to consider these two things: first, that sin is poured out from the fathers into the children; secondly, that the same is sometimes prohibited by God's benefit, which cannot be said of original sin, for we are all born infected with it. Thus far, from the Epistle to the Romans, the fifth chapter, upon these words: "Even as by the disobedience of one," etc.

Look to a similar place in Genesis 8:21. These things I thought good to add out of the fifth chapter of Romans upon these words: "Even as by one man," etc.

To understand these words of the apostle clearly, let us examine three things set forth by him: first, what the apostle means by sin; secondly, who that one man is by whom sin entered into the world; thirdly, by what means sin is spread abroad. Concerning the first, the apostle uses the word sin generally and broadly to signify all that is against the law of God and His will. By this sin, man departs from the creation of nature and the image wherein he was created. For God made man in the beginning so that His image would shine forth in him. This does not happen when we contend against God's law. This is the only and true reason why man is not permitted to delight himself with every kind of pleasure; for if he did so, he would draw near to the nature of brute beasts and not to the similitude of God, his Creator. God would have him be His deputy in this world and therefore be most like Him.

Surely, if sin is understood thus broadly, it does not only comprehend original sin, which is our depraved nature and the corrupt powers of our body and soul, but also all the evils that ensue from it, such as the first motions of the mind to forbidden things, wicked deliberations, naughty endeavors, and corrupt customs. Therefore, the apostle, under the name of sin, includes both the root itself and all the fruits of the same. Neither should we listen to those who claim that these things are not sins, for since the Holy Ghost calls them by this name, I see no reason why we should not also speak so and adhere to His doctrine. Moreover, the very etymology of the word itself shows that the first motions of the mind and corruption of nature are sins. For this word "sin" comes from the verb meaning "to err from the right scope appointed," by whatever means this happens. Since it is the rule of our nature and all our actions that we should be very conformable to God in all things, when we are prone to those things forbidden by God's law and are carried headlong into them at the first impulse, without controversy, we must be said to sin, that is, to err from the scope and end appointed to us.

The Hebrew word for sin has a similar signification. The word "Chataa" is derived from "Chata," used in the same sense in Judges 20:16, meaning "to miss the mark." It is written of the seven hundred children of Benjamin that they could sling stones at a hair and not miss. Besides this, experience teaches how grievous these evils are, even in us who are regenerate, for we are so hindered by them that we cannot fulfill the law, which we are nevertheless bound to observe in every point. We are also commanded not to lust, to which precept everyone gives his secret consent, witnessing to himself how much he resists because of our proneness to sins and first motions to vices.

But if the Fathers seem to write that the law may be fulfilled by men regenerated in Christ, they speak of an obedience begun and of such a kind of fulfilling that has much imperfection joined with it. They pronounce those to be perfect and to perform God's law who can perceive their own imperfection, so they may daily say with others, "Lord forgive us our trespasses," and acknowledge with Paul that they have a great way to go. The same Fathers confess that no one, not even the holiest, has perfectly loved all virtues. Jerome says, "He that excels others in one virtue, often fails in another." He cites Cicero, who said that it is rare to find someone most excellent in either the knowledge of the law or the art of rhetoric, but to find one excelling in both was unheard of. Therefore, the apostle may magnify and make famous the entire benefit of God through Christ bestowed upon us. He not only touches on original sin but also includes under the name of sin all kinds of vices that flow from it.

Now we must see by which one man it is that Paul says sin had such an entrance into the world. The same undoubtedly was the first Adam, who was as a common lump or mass in which all mankind was contained. This lump being corrupted, we cannot be brought forth into the world but corrupted and defiled. Although Eve transgressed before the man, the original sinning is ascribed to Adam because succession is accounted in men, not in women. However, Ambrose understood "one man" to be Eve. But since the word "one" in that place is in the masculine gender, it can hardly be applied to the woman without much wrestling. Others think that under the common name of "man," both Adam and Eve are understood, so this speech may not differ much from that in the first chapter of Genesis: "Male and female created He them." They do not much regard the adjective "one," because the scriptures testify that Adam and Eve were one flesh. The first interpretation is the more sincere and easy; therefore, I willingly follow it.

But we must remember what Paul writes to Timothy, that although both of the first parents sinned, their transgressions were not the same. He says that Adam was not deceived, which is gathered by their answers to God when He reproved them. The woman, being asked why she did it, accused the serpent: "The serpent," she said, "deceived me." But Adam, when asked the same question, did not say he was deceived but said, "The woman whom Thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat." These things must not be understood as though we affirm that no error happened to the man when he transgressed. For, as it is plainly taught in the Ethics, in every kind of sin there always happens some error. This only we are taught: that man was not seduced by so gross a guile as the woman was.

This very much furthers Paul's reason, for in the same place, he willed the woman to keep silence in the church because she was an instrument fit to deceive. He confirmed this by the example of the first parents, for she who persuaded man to sin is not likely to rightly instruct him. She who could be seduced by the devil and deceived by the serpent is not meet to bear office in the church. Yet the book of Ecclesiasticus says that sin had its first beginning from the woman, which is not to be denied if we consider the history in Genesis. But Paul, as we have already said, follows the usual manner of the scriptures, which ascribe succession and procreation to men, not women. His purpose was not to teach at that time whether Adam or Eve sinned first but to show the root from which sin spread in the world. This also answers the objection from the book of Wisdom that "through the envy of the devil, sin came into the world." John also writes that "the devil sinned from the beginning." Here it is not treated as the imitation of the sin of another or the persuasion to sinning. Otherwise, it is true that the first example of sin came from the devil, who was the very persuader and author of transgression. But the apostle's scope is to teach from what beginning sin was conveyed by propagation to mankind.

That this is the apostle's meaning may be proved by the antithesis, or contrary comparison, which he makes between Christ and the first Adam. The Lord did not restore us or make us just only by laying an example before us of following Him or by showing Himself as a most faithful admonisher but by altogether changing us and making us new by the Spirit and grace. Augustine seems to have rightly expressed the harm brought by Adam when he said that Adam "brought mankind into a consumption," signifying that by a certain contagion, he infected us all.

Against this doctrine, the Pelagians use this argument: "That which has no being cannot hurt; but original sin (if any) is already wiped away by faith in Christ and by baptism, and does not remain; therefore, it cannot hurt the children who are baptized." But what these men take as granted, namely that original sin is abolished in believers and in those who are baptized, is not perfectly true. In every sin, two things must be weighed: the action or lewd affection, which is as it were the matter, and the offense or bond unto punishment, which they call guiltiness.

Original sin differs from actual sins because in actual sins, the matter does not continue. As soon as one commits adultery or speaks blasphemy, those actions cease and are no more extant; only the offense against God and the guiltiness remain. Therefore, seeing by faith and repentance the bond unto punishment or the offense against God is remitted, we may easily grant that the whole sin is abolished. But in original sin, the consideration is otherwise because its matter does not pass away. Everyone has experience that the corruption of nature remains, seeing that we continually run headlong into sin and are unapt to divine things both in body and mind. These sins are not imputed to the faithful, for the guiltiness and offense against God are forgiven in baptism through faith in Christ, although the matter of sin remains. This matter, though broken and of slender force in the godly, will not be perfectly abolished until we die.

Since regenerate men procreate children not as regenerate but by nature and flesh, it follows that the children of believers are born subject to original sin. Into them is poured the same defiled and corrupt nature that is in the parents, while forgiveness or imputation, apprehended by faith, cannot be poured into them. For explaining this matter, Augustine uses two analogies. One is of grains of corn, which, although they are sown into the ground, being purged of their small leaves, chaff, straw, and ears, yet they grow up again with all those things. This happens because cleansing comes to those grains not by nature but by the art and industry of men. Since the corn springs not from principles of art and industry but from nature, it follows the order of its own nature, not of human industry.

The other analogy is of a man circumcised, who nevertheless begets a child with his foreskin. This happens because circumcision was not in the father by nature but by an outward act. Since children are not begotten by that outward power but by the inward strength of nature, it is necessary that when they are begotten, they follow the order of nature. Therefore, we bring forth children just like ourselves. Since we have the infection of original sin, they cannot be without it. But we cannot impart to our children the remission and forgiveness of that sin; that must be hoped for from God alone.

The same thing happens in sciences and virtues, which, although they are in the parents, are not derived to their offspring. This sufficiently shows wherein the Pelagians were deceived. Neither can any man justly accuse us of taking anything away from faith or baptism. We grant plentifully to baptism that it seals to us the remission of guiltiness and offense, grace and the Holy Ghost, and engrafting into Christ, and that it seals to us the right to eternal life. Yet it does not follow that baptism abolishes the corruption of nature or the continual nourishment of sin. Paul rightly says that "by hope we are saved."

It is a great marvel how the Pelagians can deny original sin in infants, seeing they perceive them dying every day. The scripture manifestly teaches that "the wages of sin is death, and the sting of death is sin." Therefore, whoever you exclude from sin, you must also exclude from death. By the testimony of the scripture, these are compared together as cause and effect. Here we must except Christ only, who, though He knew no sin, yet for our sakes died; but death had no dominion over Him, for He voluntarily suffered it for our salvation. To affirm that there are some without sin, although all men die, is to join together things repugnant and contrary to each other.

Besides this place, there are many others that prove infants are not without sin. David says, "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." Paul to the Ephesians calls us "children of wrath by nature." In Genesis, it is written, "The heart of man is prone to evil even from his infancy." Many other places serve this purpose besides those we have brought forth.

Now, seeing it has been declared by me what the apostle means by sin and by what one man the same entered into the world, it remains to consider by what means the same has been spread abroad. The matter is indeed obscure and very hard, and therefore I purpose to stand on it less. For seeing the word of God plainly teaches us that there is original sin, and that it is conveyed unto posterity, although we understand not the manner and way how it is imparted, yet we must yield unto truth and not trouble ourselves by reasoning more than necessary regarding the way and manner, which is hard to be known and may without damage be left unknown.

However, I will not hesitate to rehearse those means I have observed among the ecclesiastical writers, whose opinions regarding this matter are four in number. The first is of those who suppose that we receive from our parents the soul together with the body; that just as God, by human seed, frames the body, so from the same, He creates the soul. This opinion Augustine mentions in his tenth book upon Genesis ad literam, and in many other places; he did never (as far as I can remember) disallow the same. Rather, he says that by this doctrine may be resolved the knot of original sin. Tertullian and many ancient writers favoured this opinion. When I examine their arguments diligently, I judge them probable but not necessary. For that which they allege out of the 46th chapter of Genesis, touching the 66 souls that came forth from Jacob's thigh, it may be expounded not unfitly by the figure Synecdoche, so that by the soul, which is the chief part of man, is understood the body, which without controversy is begotten of the seed of parents. Also, by the soul, we may understand the grosser parts of the soul, such as the vegetative part and the sensitive part, which doubtless are procreated from the seed. The holy scriptures sometimes use the word soul in this sense, as Christ testifies in the Gospel where He says, "He that loseth his soul for my sake shall find it."

Another of their reasons (as Augustine writes in his tenth book upon Genesis) is this: In the creation of the woman, it is not written that God breathed into her a living soul. Whereupon they gather that she had not only her body from Adam, but her soul also. But Augustine judges this reason weak, for it might be replied that it had already been said that God breathed a soul into Adam, and therefore there was no need to repeat it. If there had been a new manner of procreation of souls, the scripture would not have passed it over with silence. Seeing the scripture makes no mention of a new manner, we ought to use that which it had before expressed. Especially, seeing Adam said of his wife, "This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh," but did not add, "and soul of my soul," which would have served better to express the knitting of matrimony. However, Augustine confesses that the doubt is not thereby dissolved. If we affirm that souls are created every day and so created in bodies with no preceding means of seed, which he calls [Ratio seminalis], then God shall not seem to have perfectly ceased from all His works on the seventh day, seeing He still creates souls out of nothing every day. But it may be answered that in the body derived from parents, it is sufficient if there are qualities and conditions whereby it can receive a reasonable soul, and this is the Seminalis ratio here spoken of.

But whatever may be said about these arguments and answers, Augustine inclines this way. He thinks at least that the soul of Christ proceeded not from the Blessed Virgin by propagation. He says that others besides himself judged this and that they affirmed it could be proved by the epistle to the Hebrews. There it is said that the priesthood of Christ excelled the priesthood of Aaron because Christ is a priest according to the order of Melchizedek. The priesthood of Melchizedek was more excellent than the priesthood of Aaron because Levi gave tithes to Melchizedek; for he was in the loins of Abraham, who paid tithes to Melchizedek. But Christ should also have been no less in the loins of Abraham than Levi if He had received both His soul and His body from him. Therefore, in this respect, the dignity of each priesthood would have been alike, seeing either of them in Abraham paid tithes to Melchizedek.

But here they who favour that opinion might answer that there was another manner of difference between Christ and Levi. Although both of them were in the loins of Abraham concerning both the body and the soul, yet they did not derive their nature from him in the same manner. Christ was born of the Virgin by the means of the Holy Ghost, but Levi was begotten and born in the ordinary manner that other men are procreated. Therefore, Augustine passes over this reason and brings another out of the book of Wisdom, wherein it is written, as he thinks, under the person of Christ: "I have by lot obtained a good soul." He thinks that this phrase can have no place if the soul of Christ had been derived by propagation through the law of nature from His forefathers, unless we shall affirm that nature works by chance. He thinks that this word "lot" took place in the soul of Christ so we would understand that those ornaments, which were most abundant and plentiful in it, were not bestowed thereupon for any preceding merits but through the mere mercy of God. He thinks this was a very great ornament of the soul of Christ, to be joined to the same substance and person with the word of God. But this testimony, not being from the holy scriptures reckoned canonical, has no great force.

Lastly, he leaves indifferent the question of the derivation of souls [from parents] as a thing each way probable. Because those against it cite this place from the 33rd Psalm: "He fashioned the hearts of them severally," Augustine says this is weak because even those who defend the derivation of the soul [from parents] do not deny that souls are created by God, although they affirm the same is done by a means. For so we read in Genesis that the birds were not created from nothing but at God's command issued forth from the waters. Every one of us is said to be dissolved into the earth from which we were taken, although we have not bodies immediately from the earth but from our parents' bodies. Thus, this opinion cannot be confuted and overthrown by the scriptures. Although I know the opinion received in the church is that souls are created in creating and infused in infusing, I have recited these things not to cause any alteration concerning this doctrine but so it may be understood what manner of propagation of original sin seemed most reasonable to some ecclesiastical writers. The School-men, when they refuse this doctrine, only use natural reasons, that the reasonable soul in nature is spiritual and indivisible, and cannot be sundered. They hold it to be the understanding part, more worthy than that it can be drawn out of the matter or substance itself, and earnestly affirm it must not have its being by generation but by creation.

Augustine assigns another way in his book De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia and in many other places where he disputes against the Pelagians regarding this kind of sin. He says that this vice is supposed to pass into the children through the pleasure which the parents take in the fellowship of nature. But this reason for propagation leans on a suspected and, in my judgment, untrue ground. The pleasure taken from procreation is not evil in its own nature unless a naughty desire accompanies it. For if that action should necessarily have sin joined with it, the Holy Ghost would not exhort any man to it, which He does when He persuades us to matrimony and when, through Paul, He admonishes those who are wed to yield mutual benevolence to one another. However, even if it were so, it would follow that only this kind of lust is derived to the children. But the infection of original sin consists not only in carnal desires but also in other lusts after riches, honours, revenge, and finally in the whole corruption of our nature.

The third way is that God creates the soul with such an imperfection or defect because it must become the soul of a man now damned and appointed to be under the curse. They say God creates such a soul as is required for such a man, just as we see a dog's body given a life suitable for a dog and an ass's body given a life suitable for an ass. But this seems a very hard opinion, namely, that God should contaminate with sin a soul that does not yet belong to Adam, especially since they cannot say that this kind of sin is the punishment of a preceding sin. Therefore, this idea is rejected by all men, lest we make God the absolute author of sin. The fourth manner, embraced by many and seemingly true, is that the soul is not created sinful but immediately draws sin unto itself as soon as it is joined to the body derived from Adam. Lacking the graces and virtues with which the first man's soul was endowed, and obtaining a body subject to the curse, with instruments unfit for spiritual works, the soul is oppressed by the body and drawn into its lusts. Thus weakened on both sides—by the body's impurity and its own weakness due to a lack of power to overcome nature—corruption and the naughtiness of the whole nature depend on these two points. I have now discussed sufficiently what the apostle means by the word Sin, by whom it is spread abroad over mankind, and what the ecclesiastical writers have taught about how it is conveyed from one to another.

Against the Pelagian errors, Augustine disputes earnestly in his book De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione, where he declares that the body of the first man was not necessarily subject to death. Yet he was mortal because, if he sinned, he was to die. But Augustine would not have it said, "This is mortal; therefore, it shall utterly die." Even as we grant that our flesh may be wounded, yet it may come to pass that we shall not be wounded. The body of man, as I may say, is in a state to be sick, though it often happens that some die before they become sick. Therefore, he says that the state of Adam's body was such that although he might die, unless sin did happen, he would be preserved from death by God, just as the garments and shoes of the Hebrews were not consumed or worn over forty years in the wilderness by God's power, as we read in the 19th chapter of Deuteronomy. He thinks that Enoch and Elijah now have the state of Adam's body because they are preserved from death, whether they are sustained without meat or use sustenance prepared by God. The first man had meats to nourish him and ate other fruits to withstand nature's defects. But the tree of life was against old age, making decayed matter as good as the lost matter. But since this does not happen to us, we both suffer old age and, at last, death.

In Adam, therefore, there was a state of mortality, but such as was to be swallowed up by God's benefit when he would be translated to ultimate felicity. Augustine judged that we might perceive the greatness of Christ's benefit, seeing He has restored us to more than Adam took from us. Through Christ, not only is life restored, and death chased away, but mortality is also removed at the resurrection. We shall not be able to die, which Paul teaches when he writes, "This mortal shall put on immortality." Romans 8:10 seems to support this doctrine: "But if Christ dwells in us, the body is dead because of sin," where he does not say our body is mortal through sin but is dead, that is, subject to death. He adds, "His Spirit, which raised Christ from the dead, shall quicken your mortal bodies," speaking of the resurrection, wherein our bodies must be quickened, which he called mortal but not dead, to understand that not only death shall be taken from them, but they shall be mortal no more.

The Pelagians think death is allegorically taken for the fall of souls, which cannot be allowed, as it is written in Romans 5:12: "By one man sin entered into the world, and by sin death." If only the death of souls is brought by Adam, why did Paul express both, saying not only "sin" but also "death"? Moreover, Genesis clearly convicts them, where man's punishment is recited: "Earth thou art, and into earth thou shalt return," which these men must ascribe to the death of the body unless they dare affirm that our souls are fashioned of earth and will return to earth. They object that we have a body naturally composed of contraries, but it matters not because preservation depends on God, not nature, as the scriptures declare regarding the Hebrews' garments and shoes.

To understand what he means by death, we must compare it with life. Life is twofold: one that moves us to spiritual, divine, and heavenly good things, which comes to pass as long as we are joined with God; for unless moved by the Spirit of God, we cannot aspire to things beyond our nature. The other life moves us to pursue good things that preserve our nature and maintain our bodily state. Both these lives were taken away by the death brought by sin. Death is the deprivation of life: as soon as man sinned, he was turned away from God, forsaken by His grace, and unable to aspire again to eternal felicity. This bodily life was also taken away through sin, as hunger, thirst, sickness, consumption of moisture and heat, and the daily quenching of life invaded man, leading him to death.

Chrysostom on Genesis says the first parents were dead forthwith after sinning, as God pronounced the sentence of death against them immediately. Though they lived longer through God's benignity, they were dead in truth after God's sentence. Ambrose says they were suddenly oppressed with death, having no moment without being subject to death, showing that both sorts of death were brought by sin.

We must not consent to those who say death is natural to man and a rest interrupting life's motion. These opinions belong to the pagans, for the godly affirm that death feels God's wrath, bringing grief and fear, as Christ in Gethsemane and other holy men showed. If anyone finds death pleasant, it is not through the nature of death. Paul says death is the sting of sin, as it consumes us by sin. Those who claim original sin is merely a certain feebleness that cannot condemn do not understand sin's nature nor Paul's sentence. If death flows from sin, all sins must be called mortal. God imputes not some sins to us, not due to their lightness but through His mercy. No sin, however light, does not bring destruction unless God's mercy intervenes. We do not say with the Stoics that all sins are alike, as Paul describes grievous sins excluding men from heaven.

How by Sin all things are subject unto vanity.

But the revelation of us is awaited by all creatures; because, in the meantime, while it is deferred, every creature is subject to vanity. Indeed, this place of Paul is somewhat hard. However, I think this sense is plain enough: that generally every creature is in a grievous state, and until the time of our full redemption, is toiled with troublesome labours. For the earth is, for our sake, subjected to the curse and brings forth thorns and briers; and to nourish us, it bears fruits, which ever among are falling to decay, and is compelled, for our sins, to suffer ruins and destructions. The air has become unwholesome, sometimes frozen with cold, sometimes inflamed with heat, sometimes covered with clouds, and sometimes with rain. Living creatures of all sorts are brought forth and die for our relief. The celestial spheres are continually moved; they go down, rise, and suffer eclipses; the moon wanes and increases. At the death of Christ, the light of the sun was darkened; and when Christ shall come to judge (as the evangelists declare) the powers of heaven shall be shaken. Further, every creature is constrained to serve the wicked and to become subject to their abuses, which the prophet Hosea declares in his second chapter. The Israelites ascribed the good things of this world, which they abused, not to the true God as they should have done, but to Baal. To him, they gave thanks, and him only they called upon. Wherefore God, being angry, said, "I will take away my wine and my oil, and I will set at liberty my wool and my flax, that they should not cover thy shame." By these words, the prophet shows that when creatures are taken away from the ungodly, they are set at liberty, so they should not be compelled to serve the wicked anymore.

Augustine, in his 83rd book of questions, and the 67th question, interprets this place otherwise. By "Every creature," he understands men, even as it is also taken in the Gospel; for so Christ says, "Preach ye the Gospel unto every creature." And this, therefore, is convenient for man because in him, as in a certain little world, are comprehended all kinds of things. Although the same Augustine does not deny that these words may also be otherwise expounded, he warns us to beware, so we do not foolishly think that the sun, moon, stars, and angels above sigh and groan, which some have not been ashamed to imagine. "We must confess," he says, "that the holy angels do service unto us at the commandment of God. But seeing they are now in a blessed state and behold the face of the Father, mourning and sorrowing for our sakes is not convenient for them, lest they might seem to be in a worse state than Lazarus in the bosom of Abraham." Add to this that Paul says, "Every creature is subject to vanity, and not only sighs and groans but shall also be delivered from the bondage of corruption." All which things cannot apply to the nature of angels. But, says Augustine, "We must not rashly pronounce anything; it suffices if we beware of the absurd and foolish opinions of heretics, who have falsely and unadvisedly uttered many things touching the groaning and mourning of creatures." In these words, I think the Manichees among others are noted.

To speak somewhat of Augustine's opinion, whereby he thought that "Every creature" is understood as men, I consider that all mankind is divided into two parts, so that some men are godly and some ungodly. Then it must be sought which of these awaits the revelation of the sons of God with such great desire. I think it will not be said that the ungodly await it, for they care nothing for what shall happen in the world to come. Wherefore there remain only the godly, who, being such, must undoubtedly be called the sons of God. And so it will follow that only those who await the revelation of the sons of God are the sons of God themselves. Thus, those who desire and are also desired will be all one. It seems Augustine was not ignorant of this, for he says, "The sons of God, seeing they are now oppressed with sundry cares and troubles, earnestly covet a better state, which they hope shall be one day revealed." It often happens that those in heaviness and hard state earnestly desire a quieter state. But if we consider what Paul adds a little after, "And not only it, but we also, who have the first fruits of the Spirit," we shall perceive that godly men, endowed with the Spirit of God, are distinguished from the multitude of other creatures, for so means this particle "Not only."

Although I know some understand by those who have the first fruits of the Spirit not all Christians in general, but only those who abounded in the Spirit at that time, such as the apostles, Paul himself, and a few certain others endowed with the apostolic spirit. As if it had been said, "The revelation of the glory of the children of God is awaited not only by all the godly but also by us who are endowed most plentifully with the Spirit of Christ," so that the argument is taken from the judgment of the most excellent and wise men, which is of great force either to confirm or amplify. But the apostle does not seem to use that distinction in this place, for before he universally pronounced that we who are of Christ have His Spirit dwelling in us. Neither does he, in mentioning the first fruits of the Spirit, mean to differentiate between the common sort of Christians and the apostles. He called the first fruits of the Spirit the spirit we now have, because in another life we shall reap the full fruits and plentiful commodities thereof. Ambrose, when interpreting that place, "Not only it, but we ourselves also, who have the first fruits of the Spirit," adds straightway, "When he had now spoken of the universal creature, then he speaks of men themselves."

The arguments that led Augustine to avoid the common interpretation of other men are not so weighty and firm that much should be attributed to them. For in that Paul makes insensible things desire our salvation, and for its cause to groan and be in travail, he uses the figure Prosopopoeia or Anthropopathia. They who hold this opinion are not far from the foolishness of heretics, believing absurd things concerning the sun, moon, and stars. Here we are in doubt between two figures; Augustine follows one, thinking every creature signifies man, while we think it to be Prosopopoeia. The controversy is which of these two figures is rather to be used. That which best agrees with the words of the apostle and makes his argument more weighty and forceful must be allowed. And seeing the sense we take it in may achieve both, I think the same is rather to be admitted. First, the apostle added, as we noted, "Not only it, but also we who have the first fruits of the Spirit." These words sufficiently declare that he did not previously speak of men but of other creatures. Further, the reason is of great force to advance our redemption, which we await, if we know it to be expected by all sorts of creatures.

Regarding the angels, this exposition seems less clear, for they might seem to be miserable if they should groan or travail for our sakes, whom we must believe to be in a blessed state. However, their felicity does not prove that they are utterly free from all kinds of affections. Peter, in his first epistle and first chapter, says that they desire to look upon the promises of the prophets, which pertain to the Gospel. This place should not be read as our interpreter has translated it, "In quem desiderant angeli prospicere," meaning "Upon whom the angels desire to look," but rather "In quae,", meaning "Upon which the angels desire to look." Therefore, they are held with a desire to see those promises fulfilled.

In Zechariah, we read that they, among the myrtle trees, like a troop of horsemen, prayed with great affection for the holy city, that it might be rebuilt. I pass over what we read in the Gospel, that they are in great joy when they perceive sinners converted to repentance; therefore, by an argument of the contrary, they must be grieved at the stubbornness and obstinacy of the wicked. Concerning the souls of godly men departed, no one doubts that they are endowed with singular felicity; yet we read in the Apocalypse that they cry and pray to God to avenge the blood that has been shed and labour with great affection that the clothing of the now corrupted body may one day be restored.

Thus, both to angels and blessed souls, such a felicity is to be ascribed that does not exclude these kinds of affections, which the scripture shows to be appropriate for them. This should be less marveled at, seeing that the scriptures show that God, the very fountain and head of all felicity, is touched with repentance, changes His mind, and suffers many other things that seem not to be agreeable to His divine nature. However, how these things are to be understood, we do not intend to declare now, nor does this place require it. It shall suffice to say briefly that such an affection may fall even to the angels, as Paul mentions here. Although we cannot yet understand how this does not hinder their happiness, there is no cause to deny that it can be so. When we finally reach that felicity, it shall be manifest to us. In the meantime, let us believe the holy scriptures, which bear witness that the holy angels have such affections.

How shall we understand that they are subject to vanity? Easily enough: indeed, not according to the substance of their nature, but concerning those works God has appointed for them. They are set over cities, kingdoms, and provinces, as Daniel plainly writes. They are also present with every private person, for Christ says, "Their angels always behold the face of my heavenly Father." The disciples in the Acts of the Apostles said concerning Peter, when he knocked at the door, "It is his angel." Some endeavour to expound this as Peter's messenger. In Genesis 48, "His angel has delivered me from all evil," these things prove that angels, by God's command, serve even private individuals.

But if we inquire to what end angels govern kingdoms, provinces, and cities, and every person, and what their aim is with such great care and diligence, we shall find that their aim is to bring all men to obey their God and King, to acknowledge, worship, and reverence Him. When this does not occur, and many leave the true service of God, giving themselves to superstition and idolatry, and dishonour themselves with various crimes, the labour of the angels is thwarted, and so they are, in a way, subject to vanity. This will cease when they are discharged from these governments. We must now see how the angels will be delivered from the bondage of corruption. Although their nature is uncorrupt and immortal, their affairs are continually among transitory and mortal matters. They continually uphold and sustain these things or, by God's command, endeavour that they may be taken away and destroyed.

Further, Paul declares to the Ephesians and Colossians that the benefit of Christ also pertains to the angels. In Ephesians 1, he says, "According to the good pleasure which He had purposed in Himself, even unto the dispensation of the fullness of times, to make all things anew through Christ, both in heaven and on earth." In Colossians 1, "It has pleased the Father that in Him should dwell all fullness, and by Him to reconcile all things to Himself, and to set at peace through the blood of His cross, both things in heaven and on earth." Chrysostom interprets this, saying that without Christ, the angels would have been offended with us, and these two natures, of angels and men, were severed and alienated from each other. Celestial spirits could only hate the enemies of their God; but when Christ became the mediator, men were gathered together again, having one head with the angels and becoming members of the same body. Therefore, Christ is rightly said to be He by whom we are gathered together.

There may be four reasons why we think creatures are vexed and mourn. The first is that they are wearied with continual labours, serving our daily uses. This often leads to creatures suffering punishment alongside us when we sin grievously, as seen with the flood, Sodom, and the plagues of Egypt. Moreover, there is a certain sympathy or mutual compassion between man and other creatures, causing them to sigh and mourn together in adversity. Lastly, great injury is done to them when they are compelled to serve wicked and unclean men. The prophet Hosea had respect to this when he said in the person of God, "I will take away my wheat, my wine, and my oil, and I will send away my wool and my flax, that they shall not cover thy filthiness." Ambrose supports this in many places, including his epistle to Horantianus, where he shows that every creature sorrows and waits for the appearing of the sons of God. He begins with the soul, which cannot but be afflicted and mourn when it sees itself enclosed in the body, not willingly, but for the sake of Him who made it subject. It was God's counsel that it should be joined with the body to attain some fruits through its use. Paul says in 2 Corinthians that we shall all appear before the judgment seat of Christ to account for the things done in the body, good or evil. He also says in the same epistle that we sigh as long as we are in this earthly mansion, not because we want to be rid of it, but to have it overclothed.

Ambrose cites the Psalms, stating that man is made like unto vanity and that man is altogether vanity. This heaviness and grief come to the soul by reason of the body, which did not come by God's institution but crept in by sin. The body was not given to the soul as a grave or prison but as a fit instrument to accomplish singular acts and excellent enterprises. Ambrose continues, stating that the sun, moon, and stars are wearied with their continual course, and the inferior creatures take pains for our sakes. He says this is not done unwillingly, for they understand that the Son of God took upon Himself the form of a servant for our sakes and procured their life and safeguard by His death. They comfort themselves, knowing that one day they shall be delivered and their labours will end.

If I may declare my judgment, I doubt whether the sun, moon, and stars labour in their courses. Moreover, I think it figurative when Ambrose says all creatures bear their molestations with a quiet mind because they know Christ suffered for our salvation. Similarly, when he says they are comforted because they understand their labours will end and they will be repaired, it is also figurative. Lastly, he mentions that angels are not glad to punish wicked men, as they are touched with mercy and prefer to adorn them with benefits rather than afflict them with punishments. Christ says in Luke that the angels greatly rejoice over one sinner who repents. Ambrose, expounding this place, says that the sorrow of creatures will endure until the number of those who shall be saved is fulfilled. He interprets being subject to vanity as being mortal and transitory. Vanity, therefore, is mortality, under which all creatures universally labour, continually wrestling with it. Solomon rightly said, "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity."

The commentaries attributed to Jerome seem not to disagree much with the sayings of Augustine. They interpret "every creature" as the whole number of saints from the time of Adam, who, together with Adam, sorrowfully wait for the revelation of the sons of God, so that they too, as taught in the epistle to the Hebrews, may be perfected with us. Origen mentions that the soul, the chief part of our mind, laments and sorrows heavily because it is continually compelled to humble itself to serve the manifold and sundry necessities of the body. However, Chrysostom is plainly on our side, confessing that Paul uses the figure Prosopopoeia here, a figure frequently employed in holy scriptures. For example, the Prophets and Psalms often command the floods and the woods to clap their hands, and show the mountains dancing and the hills leaping for joy. These are not literal motions and senses ascribed to lifeless things, but a way to signify that the good they commend is so great that it ought to pertain even to senseless creatures. Similarly, the Prophets sometimes bring in the woods, vines, earth, and other elements lamenting and howling, amplifying the evil they describe with more vehemence. It should not be strange if Paul imitates these phrases of the Prophets, as both are inspired by the same Spirit of God.

It is not hard to understand how our calamities also affect creatures. When man was judged under the curse, the earth was also condemned to be accursed, compelled to bring forth thorns and briers. The scriptures and experience teach us how the earth has become desolate and unpleasant due to sin. Isaiah says in chapter 24, "The sun shall be confounded, and the moon shall be ashamed." In the destruction of Babylon, he writes, "The moon and the stars shall give no light, and the sun shall be clothed with darkness." Concerning heaven, David declares, "The heavens from the beginning are the works of thy hands; they shall perish, but thou endurest. As a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed." Moses says in the law, "I will give a heaven of brass, and an earth of iron," which came to pass in the time of Elijah when the heaven was shut up for three and a half years, yielding no rain. The prophet Hosea contrasts this by saying, "I will hear heaven, and heaven shall hear the earth, and the earth shall hear the wheat, wine, and oil, and they shall hear Israel." Scripture everywhere shows how every creature serves godly men. The sea made way for the Israelites; the stony rock gushed out water; heaven gave a cloud and manna; the sun stood still for Joshua and went back for Hezekiah.

All these events can be plainly discerned in Christ alone, in whom all things are wonderfully reiterated. At his birth, the heavens rejoiced and shone by night, angels sang, and a star guided the wise men. At his death, the sun darkened, and everything was enveloped in darkness, stones shattered, the veil was torn, and graves opened. At his resurrection, the earth quaked, and angels attended. At his ascension, a cloud embraced him; and when he returns to judge, the whole world will be shaken, and the powers of heaven moved. After his judgment, there will be a great renewal of all things, as Isaiah says in chapter 30, "It will come to pass that the moon shall shine like the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold greater."

Is there any injury done to creatures when, without fault, they suffer for the sins of men? Chrysostom answers that they suffer no injury. He says, "If they were made for my sake, there is no injustice if for my sake they suffer." Furthermore, the concept of right and wrong does not apply to lifeless things and those void of reason. Lastly, if they suffer for our sakes, they shall also be restored with us when our felicity appears. Chrysostom, in his second homily upon Genesis, declares that it is neither unjust nor absurd if the creature suffers some calamities for man's sake. He explains that just as a man's family may suffer when he incurs the displeasure of a king, so too do all creatures, which are man's household, lament and sorrow with him when he sins. He cites scripture showing that every creature was drowned in the flood, all things were burned in Sodom, and all creatures were destroyed in Egypt due to Pharaoh's obstinacy. In his book De reparandis lapsis to Theodorus, Chrysostom shows that after Judgment Day, all things shall be renewed, and the glory of the Lord revealed, filling all things.

Greek scholars acknowledge the figure Prosopopoeia and affirm that the creature shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption because it was made subject to corruption for our sakes. They explain that the adoption of the sons of God shall be revealed because the sons of God are now among the children of the devil and cannot easily be distinguished. Moreover, we are pressed with afflictions, surrounded by infirmities, and defiled with many falls. Although these do not frustrate the adoption we have by faith, they so obscure and dim it that without the inward testimony of the Spirit, it cannot be known. But our glory shall be revealed in due time, and it shall not only appear but also be given to us. We have it now, though not fully and perfectly; then it shall be perfected, obtaining all that is now wanting.

CHAP. II. - Of Free Will

Now it shall be good to discuss somewhat the liberty of our will. At this present, we will inquire how much free will the natural corruption, which came by original sin, has left unto us, especially seeing whatsoever we do well, all that is said to be attributed to the grace of God. And although this word 'free will' is not read in the Holy Scriptures, yet the thing itself must not seem to be either imagined or devised. The Greeks call it ἐξ αὐτοῦ, which is 'of his own power' or 'of his own right': the same thing the Latins signify when they call it 'libertatem arbitrii', that is, the liberty or the choice of will. For that is free, which follows not the will of another, but his own will. The choice seems herein to consist in that we follow, as we think good, those things which are decreed by reason. Then doubtless the will is free when it embraces those things which are allowed by the considering part of the mind. Wherefore, the nature of free choice, although it does most of all declare itself in the will, yet the root thereof consists in reason. But they who will use this power aright must have a special regard that there falls no error into reason.

This error commonly comes in two ways: either it is unknown to us what is just and what is unjust in the doings of things; or else, if we do know it, yet we fail in giving judgment of the reasons which are alleged on both sides. For often, our desire joins itself to the weaker argument. Wherefore, it often happens that the stronger and the better reason is neglected and forsaken.

This we see often happens in disputations: for those who take upon them to defend the weaker part are wont to dress up the same with all the ornaments and colors they can, so that the hearers, being allured with eloquence and counterfeit speech, may not thoroughly weigh wherein the strength and weight of the argument consists. Moreover, it is to be understood that men do not commonly deliberate concerning all manner of things, but only those which are called πρακτικά by the Greeks, that is, which are to be done by us. Indeed, all the things which we either pursue or avoid do not need deliberation: for there are some things so manifestly and undoubtedly good or evil that it suffices they be named; for they are immediately either chosen or refused: such are felicity, infelicity, life, death, and whatever is of the like sort. But there are certain other more obscure or indifferent things upon which men are wont to deliberate.

That God is to be worshipped, all men confess without any doubting; but after what manner, and with what rites and ceremonies he must be worshipped, therein is great doubt. That it is profitable for men to be together in cities and to maintain fellowship, all men do know; but by what laws they must be ruled, or what kind of commonwealth ought to be used, there men many times do doubt very much. In these and such other like things, free will is occupied.

2. I define free will after this sort: Free will is a faculty or power whereby we either take or refuse, as we desire ourselves, those things which are judged by reason. But whether such a kind of power exists in men or not, or how it exists in them, cannot be defined with one answer. First, we must necessarily distinguish the state and condition of man. There are verily found in man four different states at the least: for the state of Adam, when he was created in the beginning, was far different from the state after his fall, such as is now also the state of all his posterity. Moreover, those who are regenerated in Christ are in a far better state than those who live without Christ, for we shall become most happy and most free when we have put off this mortal body. Wherefore, we will answer the proposed question according to these four states.

We must believe that Adam in his first creation had free will. Before I declare this, three kinds of works that are in us are to be noted. Of these, some pertain to nature: as to be sick, to be in health, to be nourished, to digest our food, and such other like: in these things, albeit the first man was a great deal happier than we are at present, yet he was subject to some necessity: for it behooved him both to eat, to be nourished, and to take food. Nevertheless, he was free from all calamities which might bring death.

There are other works also, which after a civil or moral consideration, are either just or unjust. The third kind is of those works which are pleasing and acceptable to God. Concerning all these, man was free from the beginning, for he was created in the image of God, to whom nothing agrees better than true and perfect liberty. Of him it is thus written: God has crowned him with glory and honour; and again: When he was in honour, he knew it not. And what honour can there be where liberty is lacking? Lastly, God made all things which he had created subject to him: which without doubt he could not truly and according to right reason have governed if he himself had been created a slave to affections and lusts. But in what sort that state was, seeing there is a lack of scripture to show us, nothing can be defined for certainty.

Augustine, in his book De correptione et gratia, says that the help of the grace of God was bestowed upon Adam: and such a help it was, as both he might forsake it when he would, and in it might remain if he would; but not that it should be as he would. And as for this thing, Augustine dares prefer the grace which we enjoy by Christ above that grace which Adam had in paradise: for now, by the grace of Christ, not only do we abide if we will, but also (as Paul says) we have both to will and to perform; for the heart of believers is changed, so as of not willing, they are made willing. And this same 'to will' was in the very choice of the first man, neither was it the grace of God that wrought this in him. But why God gave free will to Adam in his first creation, Augustine brings this reason in his second book De libero arbitrio: for that God had decreed to declare to him both his goodness and his justice. And he would have declared towards him his goodness if he had done well, which thing undoubtedly he could not have done if he had not been free. But if he should behave himself dishonestly and naughtily, God was to use towards him the severity of his justice. But he, when he was free, fell miserably. And even as Christ describes the man coming down from Jerusalem to Jericho, to have fallen among thieves, to be ill-treated by them: so he [to wit Adam], not only having his garment taken away, lost all his ornaments; but also having received many wounds, was left for half dead and destitute of hope.

3. Wherefore we say, concerning this second state of man, when we are strangers from Christ, there is but a little freedom remaining to us: for we are subject to the necessities of nature and are afflicted with diseases, whether we will or not; and last of all, we are struck with death. However, there is some freedom left concerning works that are civil and moral: for these things are both subject to our natural knowledge, and also they do not exceed the powers of our will. Yet in them also men experience great difficulty because licentious lusts resist moral honesty. Enticements and pleasures always hurt our senses, and these are set forward by wicked persuaders; Satan also continually urges us and drives us forward. For he, envying man's welfare and perceiving that civil discipline is still retained by such works, covets by all means to overthrow them. But that man's power may do much in these civil matters, at least in respect of judgment, many good laws set forth by Lycurgus, Solon, Numa, and various others sufficiently declare. And Paul to the Romans says: Do you think, O man, that you shall escape the judgment of God, when you do the same things that you judge?

Moreover, in these things there are two points which must not be passed over. The first is that God uses the will of man for the ends which he has appointed. The second is (which also depends on the first) that those events do not follow which they appoint who apply themselves to civil works: for oftentimes things happen far otherwise than they ever imagined could be. Hence it comes to pass that pagan men are often troubled. Pompey, Cato, and Cicero thought to themselves that they had intended excellent counsel: but when the same came to nothing, there remained nothing but desperation for the authors; for being disappointed of their purposes, they attributed all to fortune and chance. But Jeremiah declares that the success and event of things are in the hands of God: The way of man (says he) is not in his own power, nor does it lie in man to direct his own steps. The Hebrews expound this place of Nebuchadnezzar, who (they say) went forth from his house not against the Jews, but to make war upon the Ammonites, as we read in the 21st chapter of Ezekiel: but when he came to a way that had two turnings, he began to deliberate and to take counsel of the entrails of beasts, of idols, and of lots by the brightness of a sword: and having received guidance, he set upon Judah, and leaving the Ammonites, he besieged Jerusalem. These two things are not hidden from the godly; namely, that God is the author of counsel and gives such a success to things as he will. Therefore, they determine nothing with themselves without adding this condition: If God wills it, which James warned us to do. Paul, in his epistle to the Romans, says that he desires to have a prosperous journey to them, but yet by the will of God. Wherefore, if things happen otherwise than they looked for, they are comforted in themselves because they know that God, their most loving father, better provides both for his own kingdom and their salvation than they could have provided for themselves. They always have in their mouth what David sang: Unless the Lord builds the house, those who build it labour in vain. Therefore, it is their care that they may frame and apply their counsels to the word of God, and the event they commit to God: and so they work surely on every part.

4. But in those works which are acceptable and grateful unto God, such men as are strangers from God have no freedom at all. From this came that saying of Augustine in his Enchiridion: "Man, abusing his free will, has lost both himself and also the liberty of his will; for when sin got the upper hand in battle, it brought man into bondage."

I know there are some who interpret this sentence of Augustine as saying that Adam lost free will concerning grace and glory, with which he was adorned, but not concerning nature. Truly, I will not labour much here to deny that the reason and will, which belong to nature, were left to man after his fall. However, that the same nature is imperfect and wounded, they themselves cannot deny. The Master of the Sentences also affirms this in his second book and 25th distinction: he says that a man now after his fall is in such a case as he may sin; and that it fares with him as he cannot but sin. Although Augustine and others did not affirm it so, yet most sound reason might teach it to us.

For holy works depend upon two principles: knowledge and appetite. Concerning knowledge, Paul says, "The natural man does not understand those things which are of the Spirit of God; indeed, he cannot, for they are foolishness to him." If we do not know what is to be done and what is pleasing to God, by what means may we show the same in our work?

Moreover, in what sort our appetite and thoughts are toward those holy works is shown by the sixth chapter of Genesis: "My spirit," says God, "shall not strive in man forever, because he is flesh." And a little after: "God saw that the malice of man was great, and all the imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil every day." In the eighth chapter: "The imagination of man's heart is evil even from his infancy." These things God himself speaks; there is none to be believed better than him who made us, when he gives testimony of his own work.

In the 18th chapter of Jeremiah, the people said, "We will follow our own imaginations." Jerome, expounding this passage, writes: "Where is therefore the power of free will, and the judgment of man's own will, without the grace of God; seeing it is a great offence to God for a man to follow his own thoughts, and to do the will of his wicked heart?" That we are subject to servitude, Christ teaches us in John, saying, "He that does sin is the servant of sin." Wherefore, seeing we commit many things and have sins cleaving to us from our mother's womb, we must necessarily grant that we are servants. But we shall be free indeed if the Son sets us at liberty; otherwise, we serve in a most bitter bondage.

Paul said he was sold under sin, and so sold that in his flesh he confessed that no good thing dwelt; he did the things he would not and hated, and felt another law in his members, resisting the law of the mind and leading him captive to the law of sin. To the Galatians, he says, "The flesh strives against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, so that we cannot do what we would."

If these things are true, touching so worthy an apostle and holy men regenerated by Christ, what shall be thought of the wicked, who do not belong to Christ? They cannot come to him unless they are drawn: for Christ says, "None can come to me unless my Father draws him." As Augustine says, one who would go before of his own accord is not drawn but led. If we must be drawn to Christ, in that we would not before, the same is a most grievous sin. Therefore, we will not, because "The wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can be." Those who are not set at liberty by Christ live under the law and, as Paul adds to the Galatians, are under the curse. This would not be true if they could fulfil the law of God, for they incur the danger of the curse only if they transgress the law.

Paul expressly says, "It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that has mercy." Our salvation is his work, not the work of our strength. It is he who works in us, both to will and to perform. Before he does that, whatsoever he does with us, either by the law or by the instruction of his word, he deals with stones; for our hearts are stony unless God changes them into fleshy hearts, which he promises in Ezekiel to do, and will bring to pass that we should walk in his ways.

Surely, if we might live well and rightly without grace, we might also be justified by our own works, which doctrine is utterly condemned by Paul and all the holy scripture. Jeremiah says, "Convert me, O Lord, and I shall be converted." David says, "A pure heart create in me, O God." That this does not come to pass in all men, we perceive from the 29th chapter of Deuteronomy, where it is written, "The Lord has not given you eyes to see, nor ears to hear, nor a heart to understand." In the 30th chapter, God promises that he will circumcise their hearts and the hearts of their seed, that they should walk in his commandments. For he both begins and finishes our salvation: Paul says to the Philippians, "I hope that he who has begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Christ."

Understanding this, holy men pray with David, "Incline my heart to your testimonies," and with Solomon, "The Lord shall incline our hearts that we may walk in his ways," and with Paul to the Thessalonians, "The Lord direct your hearts in patience and in the expectation of Christ." Solomon in his proverbs says, "The heart of the king is in the hand of God, and he inclines it to whatever end he wills." These testimonies sufficiently declare that it is God's work, not ours, to be converted to him and to do uprightly.

5. Here some object to us the commandments which are set forth in the Holy Scriptures, for they seem to signify that it lies in ourselves to observe those things we are commanded. Isaiah says, "If you will and will hearken to me, you shall eat the good things of the land." And the Lord often commands us that we should convert ourselves to him: "Be converted," he says, "to me; I do not desire the death of a sinner, but rather that he be converted and live." When he had published the law, he said that he had set before them life and death, blessing and cursing. An infinite number of other such testimonies might be brought.

But here it must be considered that these things are indeed commanded to men, but we are nowhere taught that a man is able to perform them by his own strength. Neither is it appropriate to measure the greatness of our own strength by the precepts of God's law, as though we could accomplish as much on our own as God's law commands. Rather, our infirmity is to be measured by this: that when we see the excellency and worthiness of God's commandments exceed our strength by innumerable degrees, we may remember that the law has a certain other end than to be performed by us.

Paul shows that end to be manifold: "By the law," he says, "comes the knowledge of sin," which he says was made so that the number of transgressions might be increased. By this means, "The law has become a schoolmaster to lead men to Christ," so that when they see themselves overburdened with the heavy weight of the commandments and the greatness of their sins, they may perceive their salvation to consist only in the mercy of God and the redemption of Christ. Considering our weakness and unworthiness, we immediately begin to pray to God that he will, for Christ's sake, pardon our sins and give us the sufficiency of his Spirit so that we may endeavour to follow his will. "Give what you command," says Augustine, "and command what you will."

Furthermore, another use of the law is that we should see to what we must apply ourselves. Also, it may be that through the grace of God, if there is an increase of obedience begun, men may apply themselves to the law. Lastly, though in this life it is not given to us that we can in every condition satisfy the law, we shall fully obtain the same in another life when we shall cast away all this corruption. Yet God ought not to be accused of injustice for this, for he is not at fault that men are not able to keep his commandments. Neither can any of us be excused because we willingly and greedily break the law that is appointed to us. The same was given in such a manner as it might best agree with our nature when it was first instituted, for the image of God could not by any other means be more plainly and effectually expressed. And if, because of sin, we are not able to accomplish the law, yet at least we see what manner of persons we ought to be.

6. But that sentence, which is commonly objected: "Nothing is to be counted sin which does not depend on election," must be understood (as Augustine interprets it) of that kind of sin which is not the punishment of sin, for otherwise, original sin is neither voluntary nor received by election. But you will say, "Seeing the matter stands thus, we shall seem of necessity to stick fast in sin," which indeed I do not deny; although such is this necessity, as it has no compulsion joined with it. God is of necessity good and cannot sin by any means, and yet he is not driven by force to be good. Augustine, in his 22nd book De Civitate Dei and 30th chapter, declares this very well: "Because God himself," he says, "cannot sin, shall we therefore deny that he has free will?" Ambrose, in his second book and third chapter De Fide to Emperor Gratian, testifies that God is free when he says: "One and the same Spirit works all things, dividing to all as it pleases him according to the choice of his free will, and not to obey necessity."

In these sentences of the fathers, free will is taken as contrary to violence and compulsion, not as equally bent to either part. Jerome, in his homily of the prodigal son, which he wrote to Damasus, because he took free will in another sense, wrote otherwise: "It is only God," he says, "on whom sin does not fall nor can fall; but others, since they have free will, may be bent every way." It is also agreeable to blessed spirits and angels that they cannot sin, seeing their felicity is already confirmed.

Wherefore Augustine, in his 22nd book De Civitate Dei and 30th chapter, says: "Even as the first immortality, which Adam through sin lost, was that it was possible he should not die; even so the first free will was that it was possible he should not sin; but the last free will shall be that he shall not possibly sin." Yet nevertheless, there is granted a certain kind of liberty to them, not whereby they can be bent to either part, but such that, although what they do is of necessity, they are not compelled or violently driven. Just as there are certain true things so manifest that the mind cannot but consent to them, so the presence of God, now revealed and made manifest, is so good a thing that the saints cannot fail or forsake it. Likewise, although we of necessity sin before we are regenerated in Christ, the powers of the will are not violated, for whatsoever we do, we do it willingly, and we are led to do it upon some hope.

We must not therefore be accounted to differ nothing from brute beasts, for they, although they are moved with a certain kind of judgment, it is not by a free judgment. But in men, although they are not yet renewed, there is (as we have said) much liberty remaining concerning civil and moral works. Further, among the very sins in which they are necessarily involved, they have a choice to choose one and refuse another, though they cannot attain those things which please God. These things do not accord with brute beasts, for they are rather driven by the force of nature than that they can do anything by any liberty or free choice. Men may be said to be free, either in respect of compulsion, sin, or misery. The first liberty from compulsion is given to all men; however, unto sin and misery all men who have not attained to Christ are altogether subject.

After what sort men who are regenerate are subject either to sin or misery while they live here, I will declare afterward. In the meantime, we ought to be sure that the will is not constrained to sin through this necessity we speak of.

7. But that we may with more clarity and plainness declare this whole matter, it must first be determined what the words Free, Violent, and Willing signify. We call that Free which, having two or more things set before it, can choose, as it desires, what it will. Therefore, we deny that the will of unregenerate men is universally free, for it cannot choose those things which pertain to salvation. Violent is that which is so moved by an outward cause that it of itself contributes nothing to that motion but rather resists it, as when a stone is cast on high. That is said to work of its own accord, or willingly, which has an inward cause inclining to that motion whereby it is driven. By these definitions, it is clear that to act of one's own accord and to act of necessity are not contrary to one another, for they may be joined together. This is evident in our will, which of necessity embraces felicity; yet it does so not against its will or by compulsion, but of its own accord and gladly. Neither is it possible that the will should be compelled to will what it does not will. Augustine even thinks it so absurd that a man should will what he does not will, as if one should say that something can be hot without heat.

Yet the necessity by which the wicked are said to sin is not absolute and perfect, so that it cannot be otherwise. For as soon as the grace and Spirit of Christ come, that necessity is immediately loosed. Augustine therefore says that it is natural to be able to have faith, hope, and charity; but to have them indeed is entirely the gift of grace, for that power or ability does not break forth into action unless grace is given from God. In this, Augustine agreed with the Pelagians: that to be able is natural. But Augustine added what Pelagius did not allow: that to will well and to live uprightly is to be attributed to grace only. However, I think that regarding this power of nature, a distinction must be made: if they mean that our nature is so made by God that neither faith, hope, nor charity strive against it if given by God, but rather accomplish, perfect, and adorn it, I confess what they say is true. But if they mean that the power of nature signifies some strength by which it can claim these things for itself, I do not yield to them in any way, for it is a wicked and damnable opinion.

We say, therefore, that the will of man has respect to both good and evil, but in different ways. It may embrace evil of its own accord, but it cannot embrace good unless it is restored by the grace of God. We need divine inspiration to perform those things which are good, a point even the pagan writers, forced by the truth, sometimes declared. Aristotle, in his first book of Ethics, says, "If there be any gift of God, we must verily think it is felicity." And he defines felicity as nothing else but a most excellent action proceeding from the chief power of the mind by a most notable virtue. Plato confesses in a certain place that virtues are engendered in men by divine inspiration. The Schoolmen also, if any were somewhat sounder than the rest, confessed that the grace of God is necessary to assist man's strength in every good work. However, afterward, forgetting themselves, they decreed that a man, not being renewed, may do some good deeds which may please God and merit the grace of Christ by congruity (as they term it).

8. They call congruity what we may call meet and good, which is when the rigour and sharpness of the law are remitted. But condignity they call that which is of right due. But those who first invented these terms did not consider that those goodly civil works, though in show they seem good to men, are sin before God, as Augustine by most certain reasons proves. Before we are converted to God, we are the children of wrath. John says, "He that believes not in the Son of God has not everlasting life, but the wrath of God abides upon him." What can be offered to God by his enemies and those who hate him that may be acceptable to him? Paul to the Ephesians says that before we came to Christ, we were dead in our offences and sins. Just as the dead feel nothing, they can bring nothing to pass whereby they should be called back to life. Paul to the Philippians counted all things he did before he was converted to Christ as loss and dung; so far was he from placing any merit in them.

God in the first chapter of Isaiah testifies that he abhorred, detested, and counted abominable those oblations which the Jews offered without faith and godliness. The same prophet compares all our righteousness to most vile and filthy rags. And our Saviour Christ says, "I am the vine, and you are the branches." Just as the branch cannot bear fruit unless it abides in the vine, so you can bring forth no fruit unless you abide in me. He adds, "Without me, you can do nothing." In another place, he says that an evil tree cannot bear good fruit, for the root must first be good before any good fruit can be hoped to come from it. But good trees we cannot be before we are grafted in Christ. This grafting in the Holy Scriptures is called regeneration. Just as no man helps anything to the generation of himself, no man can help anything to the regeneration of himself. Paul also says, "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin." Seeing therefore the wicked are without faith, whatsoever they do is to be reckoned as sin. If your eye is single, your whole body shall be single; but if your light is darkness, how great shall that darkness be? Unless faith is present, we live in darkness and necessarily cleave to sin.

Moreover, if we follow the opinion of these men, we utterly overthrow the nature of grace: for grace, if it should be of works (as Paul says), now ceases to be grace. Paul also adds that the Israelites, pursuing the law of righteousness, did not attain righteousness because they sought it by works and not by faith. Also to the Colossians, he teaches plainly what we are before we are justified: "We are alienated," he says, "from God, enemies in mind, and engaged in evil works." In the epistle to the Romans, he calls men not yet grafted in Christ wild olive trees, and we know that wild olive trees are barren and cannot bear any fruit. Furthermore, works cannot be good unless they either satisfy the law or, if they stray from the law, it is not imputed to them because of Christ. But unrenewed men cannot satisfy the law, for even the regenerate cannot do it. Not being joined to Christ by faith, they cannot attain the benefit of Christ, whereby these imperfections are made whole and sound.

He who teaches that a man is able without the grace of God to do works acceptable to God must also of necessity teach that Christ is not the redeemer of the whole man. For he who teaches that we, without the grace of Christ, work well and live uprightly, ascribes to our nature no small part of salvation without Christ. Paul also in the epistle to the Romans says, "When we were servants of sin, we were free from righteousness," which is nothing else but that we had no trade or acquaintance with righteousness. Furthermore, he exhorts us that just as we have served sin, so we will now be servants of righteousness. He also teaches that we should now altogether serve righteousness without any sin, as we served sin before altogether without righteousness. Lastly, he has left no mean at all between the servitude of sin and righteousness.

But these men, on the contrary, imagine some sort of persons who, although they are not yet justified, yet do good and just works which may be acceptable to God. All these things sufficiently teach how absurd and foolish these men's opinions are.

9. Yet in the meantime, they cry out that we are blasphemous for claiming the whole nature of man to be evil. But as Augustine prudently writes, "Under the praises of nature, lie hidden the enemies of grace." It is fitting that they should consider to what ground we refer that evil of which we complain, for we ascribe it neither to nature as it was created nor to God, but to sin, which entered through the first man. By all means, we disagree with the Manichees, for they believed that our nature is evil and that it was created evil by God. We confess and acknowledge that man was created free, and in that he has now lost his freedom, we do not ascribe this to God, but to man's own fault. Those who deny free will have been called heretics by the Church. This must be understood concerning the first creation of our nature; otherwise, there is not one of the fathers who, if the truth is well weighed, does not bewail the calamity of man into which he fell through sin.

Our adversaries come closer to the Manichees, who affirm that our corrupt affections, as they are now, were created by God. Thus, they claim that He created them evil. But as we perceive that these troublesome affections are not void of sin, we deny that they were so created by God; instead, through our own fault, they have become unbridled and are repugnant to the word of God. It is certain that man, at the beginning, was made in the image of God, and there is nothing more fitting for this image than liberty. But seeing that this image was almost blotted out in us, necessitating restoration by Christ, it is no marvel if our liberty is also for the most part taken away. When they argue that man is free, they do so as if saying that a man is a two-footed creature and therefore able to walk upright. If they were to conclude thus of a lame man, it would easily appear how much they are deceived, for the properties of man, which would be agreeable to his nature when perfect, do not agree when applied to that nature being corrupt.

Neither do our adversaries' opinions differ much from the Pelagians, who taught that nature, being helped by the grace of creation and the doctrine of the law, may live uprightly. These men say that nature, being helped by grace preventing and knocking, is able to do good works that may please God. The Catholic Church resisted the Pelagians, contending not about the grace of creation or of the law, nor about the grace preventing, but taught that without the grace of Christ, whereby we are justified, none is able to work aright. By the judgment of Augustine, who vehemently contended against these men, there is no difference between doing rightly without grace and doing rightly without the faith of Christ. He, upon the 31st Psalm, to show that there is no good work without faith, writes thus: "A good intent makes the work good, but faith guides that intent: wherefore consider not what a man does, but what he has respect to while he is doing."

10. And whereas in all the Holy Scriptures, there is not one sentence repugnant to our doctrine, yet they continually object to us the example of Cornelius, who, being not yet (as they think) regenerate, nor believing in Christ, yet did such works as were acceptable to God. Indeed, we grant that both the alms and prayers of Cornelius were pleasing to God, for the angel affirmed the same. But these men add their own belief that Cornelius, when he did these things, was not yet justified nor believed in Christ. They do not note that the scripture in that place called him religious and one that feared God; therefore, Cornelius believed, and in the Messiah he believed, being instructed in the Jews' learning. However, whether Jesus of Nazareth was that Messiah, he did not know for certain, and thus Peter was sent to instruct him more fully.

To deceive us, they say that Paul, in the 17th chapter of Acts, attributes some godliness to the people of Athens, even though they were idolaters. He says, "Ye men of Athens, I show unto you, that God, whom you ignorantly worship." Just as a man who can draw one letter well is not therefore a good writer, nor is someone who can sing one or two verses well considered a singer, for these names require consideration and art, and it may happen by chance that a man may draw or sing well once or twice. Similarly, none is to be counted truly good who performs one or two good works with some show of godliness. But Paul did not call the Athenians godly without adding terms that diminish their godliness: "Whom you ignorantly worship." What piety can that be which is joined with ignorance of the true God? Moreover, he had called them "very superstitious," diminishing their piety.

But Luke absolutely calls Cornelius religious and adds that he "feared God," which addition is so significant that in the book of Job, a man fearing God is translated by the Seventy interpreters as "a true and religious man." David says, "Blessed is the man that fears the Lord." If blessed is the man who fears God, how is not the same man also justified? Besides these things, which in a way declare the justification of Cornelius, we have another testimony of the effects: he gave alms, which were acceptable to God. We have already proven by many reasons that none can do works acceptable to God but he who is justified and regenerate.

Further, he distributed these alms to the Jews, from whom he had been instructed in the skill of godliness, and would impart to them some of his temporal goods. "It is meet," as Paul says to the Galatians, "that he who is instructed should communicate to him who instructs him in all good things." Moreover, the soldier sent to Peter declares that Cornelius had a good testimony from all the Jews. All these things show sufficiently that although we do not read that he was circumcised, he came so close to the doctrine of the people of God that all men commended his piety. It is also written that he prayed continually. If we diligently weigh the whole history, we shall find that he observed the same hour which the Jews had appointed for common prayer, for it says, "At the ninth hour he saw an angel standing by him, which gave him to understand that his prayer was heard." From the first chapter of Isaiah, the 15th of Proverbs, and many other places, we are taught that the ungodly and sinful are not heard by God. This must be understood as long as they would remain sinners and retain a will to sin.

11. Neither is what Augustine writes against the Donatists repugnant to this doctrine; namely, that the prayers of wicked priests are heard by God. He adds that this comes to pass by reason of the people's devotion. But Cornelius, when he prayed, was helped by his own faith, not through the faith of others who stood by. Augustine, in his epistle to Sixtus, says that God, in justifying a man, is wont to give his Spirit, whereby he may pray for those things which are profitable for salvation. Seeing that Cornelius prayed for such things, there can be no doubt that he was justified.

Additionally, no man can rightly pray to God unless he has faith. We are justified by faith, as has been sufficiently testified and declared already. Peter also, before he began to preach to him, said that he perceived in very truth that God is no respecter of persons, but that he is accepted by him from any nation who works righteousness. These words teach us plainly enough that Cornelius was already accepted by God before Peter came to him. I marvel that anyone dares affirm that Cornelius did not have faith in Christ, when Christ himself, in the eighth chapter of John, says that he who does not believe in the Son of God does not know God. In the 14th chapter, he admonishes his disciples, "If you believe in God, believe also in me," and "If you believed Moses, you would also believe in me."

These things assure us that Cornelius truly believed in God, and therefore also believed in the Messiah who was to come, as he had been instructed by the Jews, although he did not know that the Messiah had already come and that Jesus of Nazareth, whom the Jews had crucified, was the same Messiah. He had the same faith with which the fathers believed that Christ would come. Seeing that they were justified by the same faith, how dare we deny the same to Cornelius? Nathaniel, who believed that the Messiah would come and thought he was not yet come, is pronounced by Christ to be a true Israelite, in whom there was no guile. These two things cannot concur in a man who is not yet justified. Peter was sent to Cornelius so that he might more plainly and expressly know that which he had already intricately believed about Christ.

Gregory, in his 19th homily upon Ezekiel, says that faith is the entry whereby we come to good works, not the other way around. By good works, we cannot come to faith. Gregory concludes that Cornelius first believed before he could bring forth any laudable works. He cites Hebrews: "It is impossible to please God without faith." This sentence cannot be otherwise understood than of justifying faith. Bede, expounding the third chapter of Acts, shares the same view and cites Gregory's words. The Master of the Sentences, in his second book and 25th distinction, holds a similar judgment.

Our adversaries object to us Augustine's words in his 7th chapter De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, where he argues against those who taught that faith is of ourselves, while they confessed that the works which follow are of God but obtained by faith. Augustine confesses that the works which follow faith are of God but denies that faith is of ourselves. He says that Paul writes to the Ephesians: "By grace you are saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God." However, Augustine's hard saying is that the prayers and alms of Cornelius were accepted by God before he believed in Christ.

We must weigh the following: Augustine adds that Cornelius did not pray or give alms without some faith, for "how did he call upon Him in whom he did not believe?" These words plainly declare that Augustine did not take away all manner of faith in Christ from Cornelius but only an unfolded and distinct faith. This is shown by the epistle to the Romans: "How shall they call upon Him in whom they have not believed?" These words are written about the faith and invocation of regenerate men, as the next sentence plainly declares: "Everyone who calls upon the name of the Lord shall be saved," for we cannot attribute salvation to anyone except those who are justified. Peter was sent to Cornelius to build upon, not lay the foundation, for the foundations of faith were already laid in him.

12. But what Augustine adds seems to bring greater difficulty: "If Cornelius could, without the faith of Christ, be saved, that singular workman the Apostle should not have been sent to edify him." Yet, seeing that Augustine already attributed faith and invocation to Cornelius, after which salvation necessarily follows, as the Apostle speaks in Romans, how can he take salvation from him? Unless we understand that faith and salvation in justified men are not perfect while they live here. Our salvation does not in this life reach the degree or quantity Christ requires in his elect. No one may doubt that we will not attain perfect salvation until the resurrection and eternal salvation, although we have begun to enjoy it already. Paul to the Ephesians affirms that we are now saved by faith. Yet to the Philippians, he exhorts us to work out our salvation with fear and trembling. These places cannot be reconciled unless we say that the salvation begun in us through justification is daily made perfect in us. We are always being renewed, and our faith becomes more full, more expressed, and more effective.

These words of Augustine, unless interpreted in this way, either must be none of his, or he is repugnant to himself. That the book is Augustine's, we cannot deny; that he is repugnant to himself, is not likely.

If you say that these things may agree well enough if we grant that Cornelius was not yet justified, yet did works well-pleasing and acceptable to God, I answer that this can by no means agree with Augustine's meaning. In his 801st treatise upon John, in his fourth book and third chapter against Julian, and upon the 31st Psalm, Augustine proves by sure reasons that all works done before we are justified are sin. But that faith is more expressly set forth and made perfect in those justified, we can easily perceive by what Christ said to his apostles: "Many kings and prophets desired to see the things which you see and did not see them." These kings and prophets were godly and justified, although they did not know as expressly all the mysteries of Christ as the apostles did. Christ, when he prayed, said concerning the apostles, "The words which you gave me, I have given to them; they have received them and have known that I came from you and that you sent me." These things show that the apostles believed in Christ and therefore were justified. Yet the very history of the Gospel shows that they were ignorant of many things, for it is often shown that their eyes were closed, or they did not understand what was spoken.

Therefore, Augustine denies that Cornelius had perfect and absolute salvation before Peter was sent to him.

13. But they further object to the same Augustine in his Questions unto Simplicianus, in the second book and second question, where he plainly teaches that faith goes before works. After that, he places a certain mean between grace and the celebration of the sacraments: for he says that it may be that a Catechumen (one newly converted to the Christian religion), and he who is conversant among the Catechumens, may believe and have grace, and yet the same man is not yet washed by baptism. Moreover, he says that grace is more plentifully poured in after the sacraments. By these words, he signifies that it is one and the same grace, but is afterward made more abundant. And to show that he is speaking of justifying faith, he cites a passage from the epistle to the Ephesians: "By grace you are saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves; for it is the gift of God."

But our adversaries will say that they also teach that grace goes before good works, and that by this grace, some faith is bestowed upon men. But this faith at the beginning is so weak that it cannot have the power to justify; however, some works may be done which are acceptable to God.

We will recall what Augustine writes of Pelagius in his hundred and fifth epistle to Innocentius, Bishop of Rome. He says that Pelagius, in the council of Palestine, to avoid being accursed himself, did curse all those who should say that they could live uprightly without grace. But by grace, Pelagius meant no other thing than the gift bestowed upon us in our creation: free choice, reason, will, and the doctrine of the law. The Palestine bishops, being beguiled by this crafty deception, absolved him. Augustine excuses them because they dealt plainly and simply. When they heard that Pelagius confessed the grace of God, they could not understand it to be other than that grace which the Holy Scriptures set forth; namely, the same whereby we are regenerate and grafted in Christ. Wherefore it appears that those who feign another grace than that by which we are justified and grafted in Christ thrust upon us a thing imagined by man, or rather a Pelagian refuge, which the Holy Scriptures do not acknowledge.

Moreover, Augustine in the same place affirms that the Catechumen and such as believe, though they are not baptized, are nevertheless conceived; but those who are now conceived as the sons of God cannot be strangers from him or enemies to him. Therefore, it follows that they are already justified, though not in such perfect sort. This is also evident in that Augustine calls the grace following a more full grace, as that which differs not from the first in kind and nature, but only in degree and quantity. And seeing it is of the same kind as the other, it shall also justify.

14. The nature of faith is evident; justifying faith cannot be understood without faith. Bede, in his commentary on the tenth chapter of Acts, holds the same opinion and cites the words of Gregory. Neither does the Master of the Sentences in Book 2, Distinction 25, feel otherwise.

However, our adversaries object, citing Augustine in "On the Predestination of the Saints," Chapter 7, where he argues against those who taught that faith is from ourselves, while conceding that subsequent works are from God, yet still obtained through faith. Augustine indeed acknowledges that the works which follow faith are from God; however, he denies that faith itself is from us. For he states that Paul writes to the Ephesians, "Faith is not from you: By grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not from you: it is the gift of God."

This passage is difficult for those who assert it is from us. Moreover, they add that the prayers and alms of Cornelius were acceptable to God before he believed in Christ. Yet, one must consider what follows: Augustine adds that Cornelius prayed and gave alms not without some faith. For how could he call upon one in whom he did not believe? These words sufficiently show that Augustine did not deny Cornelius all faith in Christ but only a fully developed and distinct faith.

This is further evidenced by the cited passage from Romans, "How shall they call on Him in whom they have not believed?" For these words are written about the faith and invocation of regenerate men in Christ, as the subsequent sentence clearly indicates: "Everyone who calls on the name of the Lord shall be saved." We cannot grant salvation except to the justified. Peter, therefore, was sent to Cornelius to build up, not to lay a foundation. The foundations of faith had already been laid in him. Peter came to build on what was already there.

15. Yet what Augustine subsequently wrote seems to present a greater difficulty. He states that if one could be saved without faith, namely in Christ, the architect would not be sent to build up, nor the Apostle to lay the foundation. But since faith and invocation, which necessarily lead to salvation, had already been granted, as the Apostle writes in this Epistle, how can salvation be taken from him? Unless we understand that faith and salvation in justified men are not perfected while we live here. The salvation we have in this life has not yet reached the degree nor the magnitude that Christ requires in His elect. For no one can doubt that absolute salvation in this life does not exist until resurrection and eternal salvation are attained, even though we now enjoy it in its beginnings.

Paul affirms to the Ephesians that we are already saved by faith. Yet he exhorts the Philippians to work out their salvation with fear and trembling. These passages cannot be reconciled unless we say that salvation, initiated in us through justification, is daily perfected. For we are always renewed more and more, and faith becomes fuller, more explicit, and more effective. This daily perfection occurs through justification.

We cannot deny that this book is Augustine’s, nor is it likely that he contradicts himself. But if you say these things can rightly agree, we trust that Cornelius was not yet justified, even though he performed some works that were pleasing and acceptable to God. I respond that this cannot in any way agree with Augustine’s opinion. For he proves with very strong reasons in his Treatise on John 801, and against Julian in Book 4, Chapter 3, and in Psalm 31, that all works done before justification are sins. We can easily understand that faith in the unjustified can be explained and perfected from what Christ said to the Apostles: "Many kings and prophets desired to see what you see, and did not see it." Yet those kings and prophets were no less pious and justified, even though they did not know all the mysteries of Christ as explicitly as the Apostles.

When Christ prayed, He declared concerning the Apostles: "The words you gave me, I have given them; they received them and knew with certainty that I came from you, and they believed that you sent me." These words indicate that the Apostles believed in Christ and were therefore justified. Yet the Gospel history itself teaches us that they were ignorant of many things. Often it is narrated that they either had their eyes closed so they could not see or did not understand what was said.

Therefore, Augustine denies Cornelius salvation before Peter was sent to him, not universally, but in its absolute and perfect form.

16. But many suspect that this doctrine opens a window to many vices: for if all the actions of civil men, even when they seem to pursue virtue, are sins, they may easily be deterred from those good works. I answer that we do not teach that civil discipline should be neglected; for it is, by God's providence, like a bond that preserves civil society. God can tolerate cities and commonwealths as long as integrity of manners and honesty flourish in them; but when these things become wholly vitiated and corrupt, then God is so provoked to wrath that he will punish those things he had long overlooked. So long as men are without Christ, they sin, even when they show forth notable works. Yet they sin far less than if, setting aside all civil duties, they utterly abandoned themselves to all manner of sins. For we are not Stoics, who think that all sins are alike.

Further, if these men omit doing those things which by the very light of reason they acknowledge to be honest, they wrestle against their own conscience. And if we want to see more clearly whether our doctrine or our adversaries' doctrine opens a greater window to vices, let us compare them. They, when they teach that the wicked can do good works that may please God and can, through them, deserve grace (as they speak) of congruity, what do they do but foster and nourish miserable souls in their damnable state? For they cause them to approve of themselves for their works, hoping that, at least in the end of their life, they shall obtain of God, for those works' sake, to be truly and earnestly converted. Meanwhile, they live securely, neither turning away from their wicked deeds with just and true repentance. But we, on the contrary, admonish them daily to come to Christ and be reconciled by true repentance, for otherwise, good works shall profit them nothing at all. Though they may be goodly in appearance, they are sins before God. Do we not earnestly urge them to leave impiety and a corrupt life and convert themselves to the righteousness of God?

If you prudently consider these things, you shall easily perceive which of us makes the way more open to lusts. Doubtless, all who are touched with the desire for truth and godliness may judge this. Besides what I have said, they shall easily perceive that all the good works attributed to unregenerate men derogate from and rob the grace of God. For if we can do many things without the grace of God that may be grateful and acceptable to him, then we are not wholly redeemed and restored by him, which is a thing so impious and strange from the catholic truth as nothing can be imagined more impudent and wicked. For what godliness remains when Christ is deprived of his own honour? Or what honour is left to Christ if we teach that he has not brought to us all the power we have to live uprightly?

Some boast that, occasionally, many things happen to be done before regeneration which are as certain means to obtain it. And seeing it often comes to pass that by them we are justified, they cannot seem to be sins. Indeed, we grant that these are sometimes certain means whereby God leads us to justification. However, it is not proven thereby that these are not sins to those by whom they are done. Doubtless, concerning the nature of their works, to some they are occasions of greater destruction. For many, by reason of such works, become wonderfully puffed up and pleased with their own fancy, preferring themselves over others. When they are full and content with their own opinion, they refuse to proceed any further. In such men, works are preparations for everlasting death. But as for the elect, God governs and moderates their works, finding means that they work together for salvation. Although they are sins in their own nature and must be esteemed as corrupt things, they are made whole as the light of justification shines upon them. Wherefore we confess that works are certain preparatives for healthful conversion, but only for the predestinate and elect, whom God sometimes leads to justification. Not that they have this strength of their own nature to prepare for justification; for to the reprobate and castaways, they serve unto condemnation.

17. But let us see what works our adversaries so highly praise in unregenerate men. They say there is a certain acknowledgment of sins, from which springs a terror that pierces them deeply. Afterward, a sorrow is stirred up for the loss of the kingdom of heaven, and then they are moved with a lesser desire for wicked acts. They take less pleasure in sins and the allurements of this world and seem to endeavour to hear the word of God. And how, they ask, can these things seem to be sins? Yet they say these are not effective enough for a man to be converted and leave his old, sinful life.

Here I would ask these men, what manner of knowledge of sin is that which, while acknowledging it, prefers it over the righteousness of God? Surely, as it lacks the proper end, which is to forsake sin and embrace God's justice, it cannot be anything but sin. For to this end is knowledge given to us: that knowing sin, we should forsake it and embrace God's justice. Without this end, the work is corrupted and is made sin. All the Ethnic writers confess that an action deprived of its due end is sin.

Moreover, what manner of fear of hell-fire is that, when they proceed daily in casting themselves headlong into it? Or what sorrow is there for the loss of the celestial kingdom, when they continually refuse it, though it is offered to them by the Holy Scriptures and the preachers? If they are moved with less desire to sin and take less pleasure in their sins, yet they take so much delight in them that they cannot be pulled away from them. If they hear the word of God with any diligence, yet having heard it, they deride it, hoping that the promises will happen to them, although they live as they do. Wherefore we see that all these things wander from the mark and end appointed. Seeing that all these motions are of little efficacy and leave men under the wrath of God, nothing sound can be hoped for from them.

Let us hear what Isaiah pronounces concerning this kind of work in the 58th chapter: "Every day they seek me and want to know my ways, as if they were a nation that worked righteousness and had not forsaken the statutes of their God. They ask of me the ordinances of justice and want to draw near to God. 'Why do we fast,' they say, 'and you do not see it? We have afflicted our souls, and you do not regard it.' Behold, in the day you fast, you find what you desire, and you all seek and require your debts. Behold, you fast to strife and debate and to strike with the fist. Is this the fast I have chosen?" These words of the prophet plainly teach that it is sin before God to seek after his ways, to fast, and to afflict oneself if such works are done without true worship and piety. It cannot be denied that these are goodly and plausible works, yet God, the just judge, rejects them.

Augustine, in his Confessions, provides a plain example of this matter concerning himself. He shows the motions he suffered in his mind before he was converted to Christ. He writes in the eighth book, eleventh chapter: "I lived in my bondage until the whole was broken asunder, holding me now little, but still holding me. You, O Lord, by your severe mercy, doubled the scourges of fear and shame in my eyes. I said inwardly to myself, 'Behold now, let it be done. Now, in a manner, I know it, and did it not. It wanted very little, but I even now touched it and held it, and yet touched it not, nor held it not. And the worst that was grown in use, prevailed with me more than the better out of use. And the nearer it approached to me, the greater horror it drove into me. I was held back by trifles of trifles and the vanities of vanities, and my old wanton lovers whispered, 'Do you now forsake us? And shall we never be with you anymore after this time? Do you? And from this time forward, will you never use this or that?' I now began to hearken to them a great deal less than half."

He declares and accuses these thoughts before God as sins, which are so greatly commended by these men. These were indeed means by which God brought Augustine to salvation; yet in the meantime, they were sins in him, for he obeyed them not but corrupted them with many abuses so that he could not be efficaciously changed thereby. But whatsoever lacks due perfection is sin.

18. But these sophisters are like a kind of serpent called Hydra: for when one argument is cut off, as it were a head, another arises. They object to us the Publican, who prayed in the temple, saying, "God be merciful to me a sinner." It is said that he went home justified: wherefore (they say) he was a sinner when he prayed, for we read that he was afterward justified. But his prayer pleased God; therefore (they say) we may do works acceptable to God before we are renewed. But these men should remember that this man prayed, which could not be done without faith, as we declared concerning Cornelius. "For how shall they call upon Him in whom they have not believed?" Therefore, he was justified even at the same time that he prayed.

You must not understand those words as though he was first justified when he finished his prayer. Although it is said to be done afterward, it does not follow that it was not done in any sense before. He obtained a more perfect justification, a more ample spirit, and a nearer feeling of God's mercy. He called himself a sinner justly, partly because he still felt within himself that which he disliked (for we are always commanded to pray, "Forgive us our trespasses"), and partly because he pondered in his mind the grievous sins he had committed before he was justified.

Godly men ought chiefly to consider, while they are praying, how great the burden of their sins is. When they come to God with their prayers, they are moved with true repentance to say with David: "My bones are consumed in my crying out; continually day and night thy hand is heavy upon me; my moisture is dried up as in the summer heat."

"Innumerable evils have compassed me about; my iniquities have closed me in on every side, so that I cannot see; they are more numerous than the hairs of my head; my heart has failed within me. I acknowledge my wickedness, and my sin is always before me; against thee, against thee have I sinned, and done evil in thy sight." To ensure godly men beware of sins afterward, God stirs up in them the sharp feeling of his wrath, that they may know what they have deserved unless God had helped them by his Son. He opens their eyes so they may perceive his fatherly chastisement towards them, and to better feel this, he oftentimes withholds from them the taste and feel of his mercy. Therefore, they cry, "Make me to hear joy and gladness, that my bruised bones may rejoice; hide thy face from my sins, and blot out all my wickedness; create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me; cast me not away from thy presence; take not thy Holy Spirit from me."

Thus, those who are justified pray that any remaining infirmity may not be imputed to them. They call to mind their grievous sins and crave with tears some taste of God's mercy and the righteousness bestowed upon them. This is the natural meaning of such godly prayers. We must not think that the Publican prayed otherwise; he did not intend to retain his old purpose to sin but truly converted to God from his heart. Our adversaries imagine that those who persist in their sins, without intending to change their lives, yet do some good that pleases God. But we are taught from the Holy Scriptures that "He who believes in God has eternal life and is therefore justified," but other deeds are neither good nor pleasing to God. Therefore, seeing that the Publican prayed faithfully, it is certain that he had eternal life and was not destitute of justification.

19. To better understand all these things, it is important to know what is required for a good work to be acceptable to God. First of all, whoever does any good thing must be moved by the Spirit of God; otherwise, in us—that is, in our flesh—dwells nothing good, and those who are led by the Spirit of God are the children of God. Secondly, faith must be present, by which it is understood for certain that the work we undertake is of the kind of things that God wills and has commanded in his law. For "whatsoever is not of faith is sin." We ought not to act so that our own heart accuses us in what we do.

Thirdly, whatsoever we do must be wholly directed to the glory of God, with the chief aim being that the praise and glory of God may be set forth by our works. "Whether you eat or drink or whatever you do, do it all to the glory of God," says Paul. Fourthly, because of the infirmity that is grafted in us, there is always some deficiency in our works, even in those that seem well done. It is necessary that the grace and mercy of God, through Christ, be present with us to supply that defect or want.

For this cause, David says, "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven; blessed is the man to whom the Lord does not impute sin." Paul says, "There is now no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus." Again, "What the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God did by sending his own Son." These testimonies declare that our works fail in their perfection and just end and that it is through Christ and the mercy of God that the blame mingled with our works is not imputed to us. Lastly, it is required that no one glory in what he does uprightly but that he glories in God only and acknowledges that what he does, he does by God's goodness and not of his own strength. "Who has separated you?" asks Paul to the Corinthians. "What do you have that you did not receive? If you did receive it, why do you boast as though you did not?" When all these conditions are met, the work, without controversy, will be good and acceptable to God.

From these conditions of a good work, the diligent reader may gather the definition thereof. On the contrary, if we consider the nature of man not regenerate, we shall easily perceive that these conditions necessary for a good work cannot be found in him. He is altogether void of the Spirit of God and of faith and is so infected with the love of himself that whatever he does, he refers not to God but to his own profit. Moreover, being a stranger to Christ, he is necessarily left under the law, so that whatever defect or fault there is in his works (and there must be many), the same cannot be recompensed by any other means. To conclude, if he perhaps does any notable and goodly work, he does not glory in God but in himself, for he is ignorant of Christ and of grace. By these descriptions of a work good and acceptable to God and of a man who lives without Christ, I think it is now manifest that the works of a man out of faith cannot be good and acceptable to God.

20. But our adversaries endeavour to wrest from us two very strong points that we use to confirm this matter. The first is that we say, "An evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit"; the second is, "Everything that is not of faith is sin." Something must be said about these points here. Christ used the metaphor of an evil tree that cannot bring forth good fruit not only in the seventh chapter of Matthew but also in the twelfth chapter of the same Gospel. From this, he inferred, "You generation of vipers, how can you speak good things when you yourselves are evil?"

Before I address this argument, I think it is good to declare how Augustine, in the fourth book and third chapter against Julian the Pelagian, contended for this very same point. He sets forth a good work of an infidel, namely, clothing a naked man, and he asks whether this work may be called a sin. Surely, unless this work is of the kind that pleases God, I do not perceive that any other work of an infidel can be acceptable to Him. Augustine affirms and proves that the same is sin, and lest he seem to speak this without reason, he says, "It is therefore sin because the one who did that good work glories in his work; for he does not by faith acknowledge either God or Christ, to whom he should ascribe the doing thereof." Moreover, he says that to avoid the nature of sin, it is not enough that a good thing be done, but it must also be done well and uprightly.

Shall we then say that an infidel has done a good work and worked uprightly? If we do not grant this, then we confess that he sinned. But if we do grant it, then we confess the fruit to be good, whereas the infidel without Christ is an evil tree. By this means, we shall grant that an evil tree brings forth good fruit, which Christ expressly denies. Our adversaries, therefore, are driven to such a pass that now they fight not only against us but even against Christ Himself. Unless, perhaps, they will say that a man being faithless, an infidel, and a stranger to God, is a good tree. But if they affirm this, how do they deny that he pleases God, seeing that which is good cannot be but acceptable to our good God? But he who pleases God must undoubtedly have faith, for it is written to the Hebrews, "Without faith, it is impossible to please God." But these men, by their heresy, will impose upon us that which the same epistle denies can be done.

But a man (they say) in that he is a man, is no evil tree. Augustine says, "If we consider the natures only, then shall there be nowhere any evil tree; for both angel and man were created by God and received good natures." But these natures must not be measured by us according to what they were made by God, but according to the state which came upon them afterward. A man endowed with a good will shall be called a good tree; but an evil tree is a man endowed with an evil will. We say that after the fall of Adam and the first ruin of our kind, men are such that they are not moved with a good will but with an evil.

But to return to the alms of an infidel, where we began, we may ask whether this mercy, which is shown, is of faith or faithless. As it is done without faith, it must be faithless; therefore, it cannot be without vice and sin. It is not sufficient to have mercy on our neighbour unless it is also done faithfully and rightly. Mercy is not of itself alone good. God has disallowed many benefits bestowed upon our neighbours, as when the king of Israel spared the king of Syria, and Saul spared Agag, the king of Amalek. But faith, which works by love, is always good and can never be evil. As mercy is not of that kind, it is necessary that uprightness be used so that it may be done faithfully to receive commendation.

They cry out that this natural affection of showing mercy is good, which perhaps we will not deny. But they should consider that unregenerate men abuse the good thing when they do not direct it to God, who is the only end of all our actions. Surely, he commits no slight sin who perversely abuses so great a gift of God.

21. Furthermore, Augustine affirms that whatever good can be perceived in the work of an infidel is wholly of God. Therefore, in that our neighbour is helped, and some ordinance of reason observed, and some civil honesty retained, this comes not from any other source than God. But as far as it proceeds from an infidel and a corrupt man, it is sin and displeases God. By these and other reasons, Pelagius was led to confess that these men, who by nature behave themselves rightly, are good indeed but yet without fruit. Augustine replies against them, saying that such is the nature of barren trees that either they bring forth no fruit at all or else evil fruit. Pelagius endeavours to clear himself, saying that these men are to be called barren, for although the things they do are good, yet they help nothing to the attainment of the kingdom of heaven. But in saying this, he says nothing; rather, he hinders himself. Truly, the Schoolmen of our time have the very same opinion, which Augustine withstands by all his might. He says, "By this means the Lord, who is good, shall cut down and cast into the fire a good tree bringing forth (as you say) good fruit." What manner of justice is this, which you so severely defend everywhere? Upon this opinion of yours follow many vain and absurd things. Thus far out of Augustine.

But our men boast that they differ much from Pelagius. "We put," they say, "a certain grace preventing and knocking, whereby in the hearts of men may be enclosed some good treasure, by which they may work some good thing. Therefore, they are not utterly dead plants; for in a way, they bring forth fruit. And although what they bring forth cannot bud forth into flowers and into tried fruit, yet there are boughs that may and do come forth from some sap of the grace of God, of which even those who are strangers to the grace of God are altogether destitute."

Pelagius confessed the same things, for he did not dislike the name of grace. Yet, by that name (as Augustine prudently discovered), he understood what he wished rather than what he ought, a far different matter than what that word signifies among the catholic writers or in the church of Christ or in the Holy Scriptures. But these men, in their similitude, have small consideration, for they do not remember that the Lord in the Gospel cursed the tree that bore only leaves without fruit and commanded that it be cut off and cast into the fire.

There is nothing in the danger of God's curse and hellfire but sin. They have yet another argument to avoid this point: they say that these trees are indeed evil, but not utterly dead, for in them is found some sap of grace. They affirm that there is in man a certain grace, which knocks and prevents, whereby in the hearts of unregenerate men some good treasure may be enclosed, out of which may spring some blossoms from a man not penitent. Although they are not able to make what they bring forth prosper into perfect and ripe fruit or bear flowers, they at least bring forth boughs and leaves, which are a token of secret grace and life.

It is a wonder to see how these men stand in their own conceit concerning this knocking and preventing grace, of which we have declared before what is to be thought. But they who speak and judge this way are too inconsiderate, for they do not understand that this grace of theirs is no more than a certain invitation to Christ, but not efficacious, for men are left under the wrath of God, and their hearts are not changed. What good treasure then can be in them from which works acceptable to God may spring forth?

But to address their similitude: Whereas they say that there are plants that bring forth boughs and leaves, although they have no fruit, they should remember that Christ cursed such trees. When he sought fruit upon the fig tree and found nothing but leaves, he smote it with such an effectual curse that it dried up. We do not deny that men may do some civil and moral good thing, which proceeds through that power of God whereby all things are preserved. For as the pagans also confessed, "In Him we live, we move, and have our being." But that power, whereby God governs and moves all things, does nothing at all to further men to eternal life who are not regenerate.

The state of our cause is whether those who are as yet aliens from Christ can do anything that may be allowed and acceptable to God. That is what we deny, and they affirm. There has been sufficient discussion to show how much the place concerning the evil tree, which cannot make good fruit, supports our position.

22. Now let us examine the other passage that our adversaries attempt to wrest from us: "Whatever is not of faith is sin." Augustine frequently used this against Pelagius. Pelagius responded that this is merely a particular reasoning spoken only about meats and therefore should not be extended to other works, especially those of infidels. Indeed, we confess that the question first arose concerning meats. But let us consider how the reasoning is used in Paul’s words: "He who doubts is condemned if he eats, because his eating is not from faith; and everything that does not come from faith is sin."

Paul's meaning is that whenever we undertake anything, we should be thoroughly assured that it will be acceptable to God and is required by Him through some commandment of the law. Without this certainty, whatever we do is sin.

Paul’s firm argument can be constructed as follows:

1. Whatever is not of faith is sin.

2. To eat meats prohibited by the law while doubting their lawfulness is not of faith.

3. Therefore, it is sin.

Although the apostle proves a particular proposition, he uses a universal reason, which can be applied to all other actions. Thus, everything that lacks this faith is sin. Therefore, neither we nor Augustine abuse this passage when we apply it to the works of unbelievers. But many today argue that "faith" in this passage signifies the persuasion of the conscience and that Paul did not mean the faith that we say justifies.

These men assume too much by introducing a new meaning of faith without any scriptural testimony; thus, we might well deny this to them. However, even if we grant them their point, they are still compelled to return to our opinion, so we will not contend much with them about it.

Assume, as they wish, that "faith" means "conscience." But what persuasion should the conscience have concerning works to understand which are good and which are evil? Doubtless, if we are godly, we can have no other rule than the law of God, which judges good and evil. From there, the persuasion of our conscience must arise, so by faith it may understand a work to be good if it aligns with God’s law and evil if it opposes it. This is precisely what we previously discussed regarding faith.

Therefore, let us leave these men who, when they try to speak differently from us, inadvertently fall into the same opinion. We are taught here that in whatever we undertake, we must be assured of God’s will. Paul taught the same when he said, "Let us try what is the good will of God," and in writing to the Ephesians, "Let us not walk as unskilled, who do not understand what the will of God is."

This interpretation is not of our own devising; I urge the reader to consult Origen, Primasius (a disciple of Augustine), and the commentaries attributed to Jerome. They acknowledge no other faith than the one universally recognized.

23. To address the principal point of this controversy, I think it has been abundantly confirmed by the Holy Scriptures that all the works of infidels are sins. This view is held not only by Augustine against Julian but also by Ambrose in his book De Vocatione Gentium, the third chapter. He says, "Without the true worship of God, those things which seem to be virtues are sins." Basil, in his second book De Baptismo, seventh chapter, purposefully raises this question and supports our position. He cites scriptures such as Isaiah: "A sinner, when he sacrifices, is like one who offers a dog; and when he offers sweet cakes, it is like offering swine’s flesh." He adds, "He who commits sin is the servant of sin and serves it only. No man can serve two masters, God and mammon. What agreement is there between light and darkness, between God and Belial?" Finally, he cites the testimony, "An evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit." From these testimonies, he concludes the very same thing we teach.

From these points, it is now plain what we are to judge of the state of men not yet regenerate. First, they are free from the servitude of compulsion. Secondly, in moral and civil works, they can do many things by their free will. Lastly, among sins, they have some choice and sometimes embrace one sin over another as their will dictates. However, they are not free to do things that may please God and are bound to the miseries and calamities of this life, whether they will or not.

Now we must speak of the liberty of men regenerate, which, besides being no less than that of the wicked, surpasses it in that it can attain to good works acceptable to God. Who is ignorant that Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son was most acceptable to God? For he was highly commended by God Himself. Paul, writing to the Philippians, calls their alms "sacrifices of a sweet aroma." To the Hebrews, we are taught that God is marvellously delighted with such sacrifices. Paul warns the Philippians to work out their own salvation with fear and trembling.

What need is there for other testimonies when the Judge Himself, on the last day, will recount the good works bestowed upon the members of Christ? Seeing, therefore, that men regenerate are good trees, it is agreeable that they both can and do bring forth good fruits. However, those who are regenerate must never forget that they obtained this freedom not by their own merits but by the benefit of God. For He fashioned them anew and, instead of stony hearts, gave them hearts of flesh. It was not of themselves but of the heavenly Father that they were drawn to Christ. Unless they had been inwardly persuaded with great efficacy by God the Father, they would have fled from Christ like other men.

Wherefore, in that first change or impression of the Holy Ghost, our mind is passive, as they say. But after we are once persuaded and changed, we are so restored that we can work together with the Holy Ghost and with grace.

24. The restoration of free will must be considered by two principal points, from which we declared at the beginning (when we described the nature of will) that every sin and every error in election or choice arises. When we deliberate on any matter, either we are utterly ignorant of what is just or unjust, or, though we see what is just and unjust, lust and perturbation intermingle, causing us to prefer weaker reasons over strong and sure ones. Thus, the knowledge of what is right cannot prevail. The violence of affections and the mind's entire attention are fixed on reasons that serve pleasure and lust, while the more honest arguments are not considered and therefore do not come into effect.

By the benefit of regeneration, both these issues are remedied. Concerning the first, the light of faith is present, which, by adding the rule of God's law, clearly understands in practice what is just and unjust. Furthermore, by the power of the Holy Ghost, although all corruption of affections is not removed, it is so broken and weakened that it cannot hinder the making of a right choice as before. However, since this lust cannot be completely eradicated while we live here, the liberty given to the godly to do things that please God is not perfect and absolute but weak and maimed. This is how it is set forth in the Holy Scriptures.

Regarding works acceptable to God, many people are greatly hindered in many ways, preventing them from doing them as they would and as the law requires. They always feel a law in their members fighting against the law of the mind, leading them captive to the law of sin whether they will or no. As we read in Galatians, "The flesh lusts against the spirit, so that you do not do the things you wish." Paul laments that he did not do the good he earnestly desired but rather the evil he hated. Godly men, no doubt, serve the law of God in their minds but the law of sin in their flesh. This is a notable gift of God that they exceedingly bewail and lament these impediments. Although they doubt not that they have the first fruits of the Spirit, they groan and fervently wish for perfect restitution.

Moreover, daily fallings remind us of how weak our liberty is. For this reason, John says, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." James says, "We all offend in many things." The Lord has taught us in our daily prayer to cry unto the Father, "Forgive us our trespasses." Nevertheless, we are not hindered by this imperfection of liberty from working together with God and framing ourselves as apt instruments for the Holy Ghost. Paul warned Timothy to stir up the grace that was in him. In his first epistle to the Corinthians, he admonished them to apply themselves to the free gifts of God and to gifts more excellent, as though their diligence were required to be able to use rather this gift of the Spirit than that.

Those said to have these things are not simple and bare men, but when they are endowed with the grace and the Spirit of God, they are called the men of God. Because they are men of God, they are also called perfect and instructed in every good work. Therefore, we grant that men born anew in Christ have all the freedom granted to the ungodly. Moreover, they are also able to do works acceptable to God, although they are not free from sin nor from the calamities and miseries of this life. Now we should also speak of the fourth state of man, but we may answer in one word: In our heavenly habitation, we shall enjoy the chief felicity, and no kind of liberty will be lacking. Unless one calls the ability to sin and fall away from God a liberty, which it cannot be. Because that is a chief liberty, we hope that in that country we shall be most free.

25. Another question must now be addressed: whether the concupiscence and corrupt motions that remain in the regenerate are sins and ought to be called such. Paul calls these "the law of sin" and "the law of the members." By his own example, he taught that they remain in godly men after regeneration. Whether these are sins cannot be rightly defined unless we first understand what sin is. Augustine says that sin is "whatsoever is spoken, done, or coveted against the law of God." But whether this definition applies to all sins or only those commonly called actual sins is uncertain due to the ambiguity of the word "coveted."

If "coveted" refers to the full assent of the will to corrupt desires, then the definition applies to actual sins. But if "coveted" is taken as broadly as in the last precept, "Thou shalt not covet," the definition may be universal and comprehend all sins. The Master of the Sentences, in his second book, 35th distinction, cited this definition after discussing original sin and moving to other natural sins, suggesting that he thought the definition pertained only to actual sins. However, I will not contend much about this. Ambrose, in his book De Paradiso, chapter eight, sets forth a broad definition of sin: "Sin is nothing else than a transgression of the law of God and disobedience to the heavenly commandments."

But to pass over the sentences of the Fathers, the matter must be brought to the trial of the Scriptures, so we may certainly know and understand what sin is. John, in his first epistle, chapter three, says, "Sin is ἀνομία," which is translated as "lawlessness." The Greek word is compounded of the privative particle ἀ- and the word νόμος, meaning "law." Here the nature of sin is very well declared; it is a privation or lack, whereby the good that ought to be present is taken away. If you inquire what that good thing is, the Greek word νόμος expresses it: it is the law of God. Therefore, we may say that sin is whatever withstands the law of God.

Now we are to see whether this definition, taken from the Holy Scriptures, corresponds to the corruption that remains in the godly after regeneration. We affirm this, but our adversaries deny it. However, the Scripture is clearly on our side. Paul expressly says that "the law of the members wars against the law of God and of the mind" and that "the wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God, so it is neither subject to the law of God, nor can it be." It wholly strives against the first and greatest commandment: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy mind, with all thy heart, and with all thy strength." If all our strength and ability yielded to God, this coveting would never reside in us. Furthermore, this very coveting or lusting also wrestles against the last precept: "Thou shalt not covet." Augustine testifies that these two precepts cannot be fully observed and provides good reasons for why they are given, even though they cannot be kept, which shall not need to be recited here.

26. We have declared by the definition of sin that this coveting, of which we speak, is sin. Now let us consider other arguments. One is taken from the institution of man: "Man is made in the image and likeness of God" and "We are predestinated to be conformed to the image of the Son of God." We are commanded to "put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him," and "which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness" (Ephesians 4:24, Colossians 3:10). The image of God, which we are commanded to put on, consists, as Tertullian says, in having the same motions as God. Paul, to the Philippians, exhorts us to be of one mind with Christ. But these motions and lusts most shamefully corrupt and blot the image of God in us.

Furthermore, that which we ought to crucify, mortify, and put off must be sin, for if they were good things, the Holy Ghost would have admonished us to nourish and maintain them. Paul says to the Colossians, "Mortify your members which are upon the earth" (Colossians 3:5). To the Galatians, he says, "They that are Christ's have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts" (Galatians 5:24). In another place, he says, "Put off the old man" (Ephesians 4:22). If these motions displease God, it is because they are sins, for God is so very good that nothing displeases Him unless it is sin.

Lastly, death is due as a reward for sin; where there is no sin, there can be no death. Only the Son of God died innocent, for He died for our sins. We die because we are not without sin. Let us see what our adversaries can allege as to why infants, who are born anew in Christ, die. They have no actual sins, and the guilt of original sin is taken away. Only lust and corruption of nature remain, not wholly amended. Augustine, in his eleventh book of Confessions, says corrupt motions are found in infants, and he both confesses and accuses them as sins. Seeing these are sins, they do not unjustly die for them.

Since it appears by substantial reasons that the corrupt lusts remaining in us after baptism are sins, it remains to see to what kind or part of sins they belong. Sin may seem to be divided thus: there is one sin that may be forgiven and another that cannot. Transgression against the law of God, which is never forgiven, is sin against the Holy Ghost. If sin can be forgiven, it can be forgiven in two ways: it is forgiven in such a way that we must altogether depart from it, as with grievous sins that separate us from the kingdom of God and are commonly called mortal; or it is forgiven in such a way that we do not depart from it, partly through ignorance and partly by reason of infirmity. These are called small or venial sins, without which man's life cannot be led. Paul put a notable difference between these sins when he exhorted us not to let sin reign in us. Paul complained of this third kind of sin when he said, "O wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" (Romans 7:24).

We mean these sins when we teach that the works of godly men are not without deadly sins, for nothing is done without this kind of defect. Such defects are deadly because they deserve death: "The wages of sin is death" (Romans 6:23). Further, as long as we carry these blemishes of corruption, we cannot enjoy eternal life; we are excluded from it until death puts off all corruption. It is written, "Cursed be everyone who does not continue in all things written in the book of the law, to do them" (Galatians 3:10). He who complains with Paul that he does not do the good he desires does not perform all the law requires and is not utterly without curse, though through God's mercy, it is not imputed unto eternal destruction.

27. The men of our part speak of the good works of godly persons not because we deny good works or think they are not pleasing to God, but to acknowledge our uncleanness and impurity, to which we are more than blind. Setting aside sin against the Holy Ghost, other sins are divided into three degrees. In the first is coveting or lust, which is engrafted in us; secondly, the first motions and impulses toward various sorts of wickedness continually spring from it; thirdly, the consent of the will leads to actual sin. Paul assigned these three degrees when he said, "Let not sin reign in your mortal bodies, that you should obey its lusts" (Romans 6:12). Sin, which ought not to reign in us, is the engrafted lust and corruption of nature. The first motions are the lusts of concupiscence, which we are admonished not to obey. Then comes obedience, which consummates and makes perfect the sin, commonly called actual sin.

There is no doubt that the corruption of nature pertains to original sin. Again, the sin to which the consent of the will is given is called actual sin. But there is doubt regarding those first motions. By Christ's benefit, we are not tied to a new blame and bond of God's judgment. Whether they are to be referred to original sin or actual sin is uncertain. They lie between both and take somewhat from each. As we work, covet, or desire anything through them, they have some consideration of actual sin. Paul uses the word πράττειν (to do), which undoubtedly signifies some action. But on the other hand, because we suffer this kind of motion against our wills, they communicate with original sin, for that sin is not taken by choice or of our own accord.

Jerome, upon the seventh chapter of Matthew, makes a distinction between πρᾶξις (praxis) and πάθος (pathos). Πρᾶξις signifies the first motions after the consent of the will has come to them, and πάθος when they stir from the beginning. Although they have a fault in them, they are not held for great faults, but the passion is counted as sin. Jerome confesses that the first motions have the blame of sin, though they are not counted as crimes, and by Christ's benefit, they are not imputed unto death, or in man's judgment, they are not counted as crimes.

Sin is again divided into that which is only sin and that which is both sin and the punishment of sin. Augustine mentions this distinction upon the 57th Psalm: "The first falling away from God is sin only; but those sins that follow are both sins and the punishments of sins until men come unto hellfire." Whatever evils are committed between the first apostasy and hellfire are both sins and punishments for other sins. Paul declared this well to the Romans: first, he says the Gentiles knew God but did not glorify Him as God. For that cause, they were given up to wicked desires, filled with all corruption and covetousness. At last, he mentions the condemnation of hellfire, saying, "But you, according to your hardness and unrepentant heart, treasure up for yourself wrath in the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God, who will render to every man according to his deeds."

Many do not think these sins are the punishments of sin because men take pleasure in them. However, unless they were blind, they could easily understand from the apostle that they are punishments and such as are most grievous. He says their heart was blinded, they were made fools, though they boasted of wisdom, and they were given over to a reprobate sense to defile their bodies with shamefulness. What are these but most grievous punishments? If a thief’s hands were cut off or his eyes plucked out, we would say he was grievously punished by God. Paul says these men were deprived of their minds, made foolish, and their bodies defiled. Are these not punishments?

How can we consider our mind to be safe, sound, and uncorrupt if sin reigns in it? Solomon says, "Can a man take fire in his bosom, and his clothes not be burned? Can one go upon hot coals, and his feet not be burned?" (Proverbs 6:27-28). Therefore, sin is called a punishment because it hurts and corrupts nature. The unhappiness of original sin has marred nature so much that it can scarcely seem half alive. The corrupt motions and violent rages that spring from that unhappiness must be kept in check and mortified, or they will become more raging. If you give consent to them, they grow stronger, and nature runs headlong to the worse.

28. All these considerations lead us to understand that the lust grafted in us and the corrupt motions that still remain in our minds belong to this kind of sins. Yet they are also punishments for another preceding sin, namely, original sin, if not for some other more grievous sin. Nonetheless, it is crucial to note that the first falling away is in itself a sin and a punishment. As we have said, there is no sin that does not grievously harm human nature, and so, at least, it has a punishment of itself joined with it. However, not every sin is the punishment of another preceding sin. But the sins we now discuss are indeed the punishments of preceding sins, and we firmly hold that they are sins. It seems a wonder to many that these can be sins since they are necessary.

Regarding this matter, let us consider what Augustine says in his third book De libero arbitrio, chapter 18: "Some things done of necessity are not to be allowed, as when a man would do well and cannot. Otherwise, why were these words spoken: 'The good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do. To will is ready with me, but to perform the good, I find no ability.' And this: 'The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.' For these words are contrary to each other, that the things which you would not do, those you do. But all these things belong to men and proceed from that condemnation of death. For if they are not a punishment of man, but nature in man, then they are no sins. For if we do not depart from the state in which man was naturally made, so that he could not be better, then, when he does these things, he does what he ought to do. But if a man were good, it should be otherwise. But now, since it is thus, he is not good, nor is it in his power to be good, either because he does not see what manner of person he ought to be, or because, seeing it, he is not able to be such as he perceives he should be."

In these words, many things are worth noting. First, Augustine confesses that many things happening necessarily are to be disallowed. Secondly, he gives a reason why they are called sins: because we depart from the state in which we were naturally made. Thirdly, he says that a man is not good, nor has he the power to be good. Fourthly, he gives two reasons why a man cannot be good: either because he does not see what is to be done, or because, seeing it, he cannot perform it due to infirmity. Lastly, it should be noted that Augustine speaks of regenerate men, for he cites Paul's words to the Galatians and those places we have now mentioned, which we have shown cannot be understood otherwise than of the regenerate.

But against Augustine’s saying, there is Jerome's writing in his interpretation of faith: "We say that they err who say with Manichaeus that a man cannot eschew evil."

29. These things can be easily reconciled. Jerome speaks of nature as it was instituted by God, writing against the Manichees, who taught that we cannot resist sin because we were created evil by an evil god. Yet none of us doubts that man, when created at the beginning, was most free. But Augustine speaks of nature after the fall, as is evident when he says, "All these things pertain to men and come from the condemnation of death." He confesses this is the punishment of fallen man. If these things refer to the regenerate, Jerome's saying pertains only to grosser kinds of sins that separate us from God's kingdom, from which we doubt not that men born anew in Christ may abstain. Augustine speaks more broadly, understanding sins also as those we cannot avoid in this life. The Master of the Sentences cites this latter solution in his second book, distinction 36.

They may object that we injure baptism by saying sin is not taken away thereby. But we cannot be justly accused of this. We affirm that guilt or imputation of fault is taken away by regeneration. Although these vices remain, as both Scripture declares and experience teaches, their bond of punishment and guilt is discharged. Augustine frequently says that concupiscence remains, but the blame is taken away by Christ. He adds that sometimes the act and work of sin pass away, as in theft and adultery, but the guilt remains. Sometimes the blame is taken away, but the fault remains, as is clear regarding this lust. Though it remains, we cannot be accused of eternal destruction for it. If you ask why it is called sin when the blame is taken away, I answer that it is because it deserves death and damnation by its nature. This is changed by the mercy of God through Christ.

Everything should be judged as it is in itself and according to its nature. Sin's nature is to strive against the law of God, which occurs in lust and these first motions, so they are to be called sins. This does not lead us into the folly the Pelagians reproached Augustine and other Catholics with, as though they said that by regeneration, sin is not blotted out but only shaved. When hair is shaved, roots remain under the skin, allowing it to grow back. Although we affirm that lust and corrupt motions remain in regenerate men, we do not deny that God is perfectly reconciled to us. Although these, by their nature, are sins, the mercy of God wipes them out so they are not imputed to us at all. If we consider imputation, nothing of them remains.

30. Lastly, they object that we do Augustine an injustice by claiming he affirms these are sins when he himself interprets that they are called sins improperly. For, as a script or writing is called a hand because it is done with the hand, so these things are called sins because they come from original sin. And as cold is called slothful because it makes us slothful, so these motions are called sins because they stir us up to sins. However, properly, they are not sins. Augustine, they say, not only interprets himself as to why he calls these sins but also shows us how we ought to understand Paul when he calls them sins.

We answer that if Augustine or any other of the fathers denies that these are sins, it must be understood by way of comparison if they are conferred with actual sins, but not that the nature of sin can wholly be taken away from them. Augustine clearly declares this in another place. In his sixth book against Julianus, chapter eight, he writes: "For neither is it any equity when in one man either the superior parts are after a vile sort servants unto the inferior parts, or the inferior parts after a vile manner resist the superior parts, although they be not suffered to get the upper hand." Seeing he calls this sin iniquity, he plainly teaches that it agrees with the nature of sin, which we described before.

In his fifth book against the same Julianus, chapter three, he writes: "The concupiscence of the flesh, against which the good spirit lusts, is sin because it is a disobedience against the government of the mind, and it is a punishment of sin for it is rendered unto the merits of the disobedient person; and it is a cause of sin through the falling away of him that sins." Here we see that concupiscence or lust is by Augustine in three ways called sin. Neither can it be said that he writes these things of a man not regenerate, for he expressly says, "against whom the good spirit lusts," for the Spirit of God is not in the wicked, with whom he might strive.

Thus, we have three places from Augustine—one from his fifth book De libero arbitrio, and two against Julianus—where he expressly confesses that concupiscence is sin, and he provides reasons for this belief. Our adversaries should not run to a figure to say that this is not properly to be called sin when interpreting Paul. For both from Paul and from other scriptures, good reasons are brought to show why concupiscence or lust is truly and properly called sin. It is astonishing that these men, who are so eager to use figures elsewhere, in this one proposition—"This is my body"—disdain all figures, where a figure is most appropriate for the sentence.

If you desire other testimonies from the fathers to prove that lust is sin, we have cited Jerome upon Matthew. In Augustine against Julianus, many other sentences of the ancient fathers are found, all of which support us. These things that follow are taken from a similar place at the end of the second chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians.

31. Now we must search out whether the liberty of the will is completely taken away by the things we have discussed. Paul’s affirmation that "a natural man cannot know the things of God" seems to argue against free will. For if we cannot comprehend spiritual things through our natural power, how can we express them in our actions? Experience shows that doing is much more laborious than understanding. Moreover, predestination or foreknowledge seems to be a hindrance to free will. If God has known all things before they happen and cannot be deceived, it seems the liberty of our will is entirely gone, and all things happen out of necessity.

Additionally, the power of God, by which all things are wrought, complicates this matter. Paul says to the Romans, "Who can resist His will?" Furthermore, the scriptures affirm sin's great force, which corrupts and despoils almost everything in us. The strength left to the will is very feeble, not able to do as reason dictates. Moreover, divine oracles attribute so much to the grace of Christ that, without it, we can do nothing acceptable or pleasing to God. Since this grace is not equally given to all, it seems their liberty is destroyed, as they do not have this grace in their power.

Astrologers also extol the powers of the celestial bodies, almost persuading that things happen because of them, thus seeming to remove the perfect liberty of future events from us. Finally, some affirm that there are definite causes of things to be done, linked with such certainty that they create an inescapable necessity and destiny.

32. We need not dwell much on the argument from knowledge since it is clear from what we have discussed that this liberty is not judged to be in unregenerate men regarding works that are truly good and pleasing to God. Thus, that reasoning need not be weakened, as it confirms the apostle's doctrine. The next reason poses more difficulty: few can perceive how God's providence or foreknowledge can coexist with free choice in our will. The matter is so challenging that many old writers, when reasoning about it, concluded that all things done arise out of necessity and even believed God Himself is bound by this necessity. This led to the proverb that even God cannot withstand necessity, implying He dares not attempt anything against it.

Because of this liberty, poets have suggested that many things happen whether the gods will it or not. Homer portrays Jupiter sad and lamenting the necessity or destiny preventing him from saving his beloved son Sarpedon from death. He depicts Neptune grievously affected by his son Cyclops's fate, desiring to keep Ulysses from home but complaining that destiny prevents him. Virgil’s Juno similarly laments, unable to remove the Trojan fleet from Italy despite her efforts.

But we Christians do not speak of God in such a way. We learn from the holy scriptures that nothing is impossible for God, and Christ teaches us that all things are possible for God. Our faith, following Abraham's example, clings to the belief that God can do whatever He promises. We must not think that Christ was condemned to death or forced to the cross against His will or His Father’s will. God willed these things, not out of inevitable necessity but out of superabundant love for humanity. The scripture says, "God so loved the world that He gave His only Son," and "He who did not spare His own Son but gave Him up for us all." Christ, moved by the same love, died for us and taught us that "greater love has no one than this: to lay down one’s life for one’s friends." He showed even greater love by dying for His enemies. That He willingly accepted death is clear from His words at the last supper, "I have eagerly desired to eat this Passover with you."

33. By these passages, we perceive that the Lord's death was thoroughly foreknown and understood and did not in any way infringe on the liberty of either Christ or the Father. Therefore, it is greatly to be wondered at that Cicero, otherwise a very learned man, is earnestly disputed against by Augustine in his fifth book De Civitate Dei, especially in chapters nine and ten, concerning this question. The controversy hinges on the fact that in the latter book De Divinatione, Cicero refutes everything brought by Quintus, his brother, in the former book. Cicero endeavours by all means to overthrow all predictions of things to come and the prescience of God.

Therefore, Augustine affirms that the astrologers had reasons better to be borne with than Cicero’s because, though they attribute too much to the stars, they do not deny all divination and prescience. As Augustine declares in his Confessions, a certain physician, a grave man who detested astrology, when asked how it came to pass that mathematicians prophesied so many truths, dared not (contrary to all histories and experience) deny every divination but answered that a certain destiny was spread over things and affirmed that it was not incredible that reasonable souls somehow felt it. Surely, there is nothing more contradictory than to affirm God's existence and yet deny His prescience of things to come. The prophet Isaiah would have these things so firmly knit together, saying, "Show us what things shall come to pass, and we will declare you to be gods."

That Cicero had little knowledge and no good judgment of God is evident from his book De Natura Deorum, wherein, disputing under the persona of Cotta, he strives utterly to deny the nature of God. It is indeed to be lamented that such a notable man is charged with what the Psalm of David ascribes to fools, as it is written: "The foolish man has said in his heart, There is no God" (Psalm 14:1).

Upon what occasion he appointed those parts in the dialogue to Cotta, a bishop, is unclear unless perhaps he considered that none speak more freely and worse of God than those entrusted with ceremonies and holy things. Cicero, knowing it is odious to profess an opinion denying God, when he had disputed as much as he thought proper, showed his opinion at the end of his book, siding with Lucius Balbus and acknowledging that Cotta's opinion is to be allowed. Cicero, very studious of all kinds of learning and especially civil law, thought the state of man's actions would be overthrown if free will were denied. Not knowing how to reconcile this liberty with the prescience of things to come, he preferred to strip God's wisdom than to deprive us of our will's freedom.

From this, we see the darkness and obscurity into which the sin of the first man has driven humanity. What madness is it to seek to dethrone God, the creator of all things, from the fortress of His wisdom to preserve man? This is the self-love condemned everywhere in the scriptures: we would rather everything perish than ourselves. This is not what godliness requires. Therefore, taught by the Spirit of God, we declare that both must be confessed: that God foreknows all things and that the freedom of our mind (as we have shown before) must be retained. The holy scriptures instruct us, wherein we read: "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son" (Romans 8:29) and that "We were chosen by God before the foundation of the world" (Ephesians 1:4). In them, we learn that "The hairs of our head are all numbered" (Luke 12:7) and that "Not even a sparrow falls to the ground apart from the will of our Father" (Matthew 10:29). Believing that God does all things rightly and justly, we cannot think He acts without reason and understanding.

34. Let us closely consider Cicero's reasoning. If, he argues, things to come are certainly foreknown, they must have a certain order, and since nothing happens without a cause, there must be an order and connection of causes. This will result in everything happening of necessity, thus overthrowing just and wholesome laws, eliminating admonitions and rebukes, and leaving no place for religion or prayers. Therefore, he argues, one must choose between divination and prescience of God or the free power of man's will. Both cannot coexist; they are mutually exclusive. Cicero finds it necessary to defend one and reject the other. Augustine astutely observes that Cicero, while striving to maintain our freedom, makes us impious and wicked by robbing God of His foreknowledge.

It is important to note that Cicero's arguments also undermine the prophecies of our prophets, not just the divinations of the pagans. To address Cicero's reasoning, we concede that for God's prescience, there is a certain order of things and causes. However, we deny that this necessitates that all things happen inevitably. Despite an appointed order of causes, some causes may retain their liberty or contingency. Here, Cicero errs more than the Stoics: he would eliminate all order of causes and foreknowledge to preserve human liberty, stripping God of essential attributes. The Stoics, however, introduce destiny to preserve God's nature and our free will, removing it from the order of causes.

35. Let us join issue with him and steadfastly deny that the knowledge of God hinders our will, even though it comprehends things to come. The will of man will never bring anything to effect unless God has both foreknown it and willed it to be brought to effect. When He knows beforehand that tomorrow I will either run or read, indeed, I shall run and read, yet not driven thereto by any necessity but contingently; for, as far as it pertains to myself, I might do neither.

But if you urge further and say, "Nevertheless, you shall do it in such a way as God knew you would," I grant it. However, it does not follow that I could not do otherwise, because we do not always do what we can do. Many things might be done, which in no way are done. In that I shall read or run, it proceeds entirely from my own choice, for it is most within our power to will or not to will.

Therefore, when they say, "Because God knew beforehand that you would read or run, you must necessarily read," we must ask them again whether under the name of necessity, they mean a compelled and repugnant will. If this is their meaning, we utterly deny it, for it is possible that God foreknew I would do something willingly and not with a constrained mind. But if by necessity, they mean that this must be done by me, we do not deny it, as the controversy is not about the thing done or not done but about the manner and form of doing.

Neither, as Cicero thought, are admonitions, laws, rebukes, or religious prayers rendered void. These things will be effective, even more frequently than he could persuade himself, because God not only has man's safety in His foreknowledge but also comprehends the ways and means by which He will help them. Therefore, if we perceive our brother to need the remedies we have mentioned, we must boldly use them, as they have appeared so far as God beforehand knew and willed them to be profitable.

We must not desist from our duty, even if all mortals affirm that we labour in vain. We must follow the law prescribed to us, not the secret prescience of God, of which we have no certainty about what He has decreed for things to come. Since the prescience of God is not the nature or essence of our mind, we must judge the actions proceeding from it according to their nature and will, not by what is external to them. Therefore, since the nature of will is that it is moved neither unwillingly nor by constraint, it cannot be excluded by any outward means. It may be easier to abolish the will altogether than to remove its voluntary action, just as it may be easier to strip us of being human than to make us devoid of a reasonable soul while being human.

36. If you further ask whether it is necessary that I shall read tomorrow, seeing God has foreknown it, we answer that upon condition or supposition, some necessity may be granted, but not perfect and absolute. With the necessity we grant, the choice of free will may very well agree. Aristotle, in his Ethics, disputes whether the casting forth done in the sea during a shipwreck is to be considered voluntary. Although he acknowledges a certain action mixed with willingness and unwillingness, he concludes that such actions belong to the voluntary sense, as the shipmen, in danger, will and choose them at that time.

If that notable philosopher did not hesitate to place willingness in such actions, where men are forced to choose something they would otherwise never have done, then how much more shall we attribute willingness to our usual actions when we perceive ourselves willingly doing what we think is good, despite knowing that God foreknew it?

Chrysostom plainly shows that the necessity we have taught by supposition does not overthrow the free power of our will. He writes on the first epistle to the Corinthians, interpreting these words: "It must needs be that heresies come, that they which are approved may be made manifest among you" (1 Corinthians 11:19). He says, "Christ used a similar form of speech when He said, 'It is necessary that offenses come, but woe to that man by whom they come.'" Also, Christ said to His apostles, "It behooved Christ to suffer and enter into His glory" (Luke 24:26). All these things in holy matters are to be expounded as necessary without taking away from the nature of man's will. This is called among the Schoolmen, "A necessity not of the consequent, but of consequence."

37. Some commonly say that these distinctions help us nothing at all; if God has foreknown things, they must inevitably come to pass. Yet, verily, they are profitable unto us, and that not meanly; for thereby we understand that man's will is not compelled, but that willingly and without compulsion it desires whatsoever it will.

Otherwise, I will ask thee again, wouldst thou be saved against the will and consent of God? I suppose not. But if thou wouldst be saved according to His will, He of necessity is not ignorant of thy salvation; for it is ordained that none wills that which he is ignorant of.

It happens to us very often that we together behold players; yet we do not say that the sight and knowledge which we have brings any necessity to them which play. And yet, while we see them in play, it is of necessity that they do play. Wherefore, as that necessity infringes not the nature of their will, even so the excellency of God compels not the will of man.

Some brawl at us, and say that this similitude is far from the question proposed; because none at any time do behold players which be not and play not indeed. Whereas it is ascribed to God that He has had knowledge beforehand of all our doings even from the beginning, when as yet neither we nor any of our actions appeared to be. To these men, I might answer that unto God all things are no otherwise present than they which do play are conversant in the sight of them which behold.

Let everyone, therefore, take heed to himself that he cast not the causes of his sins upon God; and when such a kind of cogitation enters into his mind, let him have respect unto lust, voluptuousness, wrath, hatred, and other perturbations of the mind, wherewith he is sore diseased; and out of these fountains let him seek for the causes of his sins.

Neither must there be much credit given unto the Peripatetics in this matter, who deny that God has understanding of particular affairs, lest they should seem to think that the mind of God is abject and vile if He should draw His knowledge from frail and transitory things. This thing is not agreeable unto our doctrines; for we do believe that God of Himself has a perfect knowledge of all things, and that He has no need to challenge knowledge elsewhere to Himself.

38. As touching the third point, it was judged that the power of God is a hindrance to our will: the argument is neither perfect nor strong. For although God, by His infinite power with which He is endowed, does what His pleasure is, yet He suffers the state and nature of things to stand whole. Neither does He violate them or wrest them any other way than the condition of them does bear.

Wherefore, it is said in the Book of Wisdom, that God does mightily reach even from one end to another and does pleasantly dispose all things: or, as the Greek text says, εὐστάθιος (eustathios), that is, profitably. This might not be said if by the high power of God the natures of things were disturbed. The sum is that God here moderates His power in ruling the world so that He may fitly apply His action unto all manner of things.

In the fourth place, sin seemed to be a hindrance to the liberty of the will, as if it so weakened the powers of man that after a sort they might be able to do nothing anymore. But there need not now be many words about this matter; because there has been plenty enough spoken in those things which we have declared, showing how much our liberty has been diminished by reason of sin, especially concerning very perfect and good actions which might be acceptable and well-pleasing unto God. Besides, it has been declared that our liberty is not by this means utterly taken away, but rather that there is as yet a great deal of it remaining.

39. Moreover, concerning the celestial powers, there shall be no great need to treat; seeing the Astronomers do glory in their own books, that "The wise shall bear rule among the stars." But if these things which they pronounce might not be escaped, all their gains would fall away: for no man would bestow cost upon the skill of those things which he thought he should neither be able to avoid nor change, either by endeavour or study. This would undoubtedly ensue if they ascribed a mere necessity to their foretellings. By this means, all prayers, piety, and worship of God would be taken away: for who would pray to God for obtaining anything if he were already persuaded that the same should not be granted unto him? Wherefore Augustine said; "They which thus think do great wrong unto heaven: for they believe there is a court appointed wherein notable acts are decreed which cannot be avoided. If it were so on earth, it should needs be taken away. How much less must we think that the same is done by God in the celestial parts?" I beseech you, what judgment would be left if we did all things upon constraint?

This matter some excuse, saying that from heaven is only signified what shall come to pass, yet that we be not thereby driven by any necessity. And they bring forth a place out of the book of Genesis, wherein it seemeth to be spoken that the stars be put as signs. But that place is to be understood concerning seasons, winds, rains, tempests, and such like sorts. But how can they affirm that in heaven they see certain signs of things to come? They shall hardly prove it, especially touching man's affairs. For what answer can they make of twins, who being conceived at one time and have all one aspect of the heavens, yet (as experience teaches) have altogether differing fates and success?

Augustine, in his fifth book De Civitate Dei, and second chapter, is worth the reading; where he writes that sometimes there happened two brothers to be so similarly affected that when one sickened, the other also was diseased; and when one recovered, the other was also eased. Concerning this, Hippocrates being demanded of his opinion, answered that he thought them to be twins, and therefore they had the temperature or complexion of their bodies all of one nature. But Posidonius the Mathematician ascribed the whole cause to the stars because in their nativity they occupied all one aspect of the heavens. But what (saith Augustine) will these men say of twins and innumerable living creatures which are born in hours and moments alike, and yet attain to such diversity of fortunes? Augustine witnesses that this example was taken out of Cicero, which nevertheless we read not in his extant books today, unless perhaps he found the same in his book De Fato, which remains amongst us all torn, mangled, and diminished.

40. Moreover, destiny, which the Stoics appoint to have mere necessity, hinders not our matter, for we admit not the same to be. They severed it from the wills of men because they thought that all things would go to naught if, together with other causes, they comprehended will under destiny. However, it seemed not good to them to utterly sever man's will from destiny, except in respect of the first choice, which they would have to be wholly in our will. But while we shall choose any cause that might be under destiny, they would have it follow of necessity; that whatever things they were, they should be joined unto it. Even as Euripides said unto Laius, "It was free for him not to procreate; but when he had procreated, then of necessity he should suffer even those things which Apollo prophesied to be contained under destiny."

But we, as we declared at the first, deny not that things are knit together, as God ordained and knew beforehand; yet so, as the nature and condition of them remain whole and sound. For unto whomsoever a thing contingent (as the School-divines speak) is due, they have the same: and to whomsoever necessity belongs, with necessity they be constrained. But indeed, grace, which finally seems to resist free will, does not take the same away, but rather helps and restores it. But now we will cease from these matters, lest we dispute more curiously of them than befits Christians. Let everyone follow their own vocation; and let us leave inquiring, more than is requisite, about the secret and hidden will of God, touching prescience and predestination: and let us follow that doctrine of God, which is plainly laid out before us in the holy scriptures.

Look in another place of the same argument in the addition at the end of this book. Now we think it convenient to join unto this disputation certain other discourses; namely, of Voluntary and Not Voluntary, and also of man's choice, and such like.

Of Voluntary and Not Voluntary

41. Aristotle, in his first book of Ethics, treats at length the concepts of what is voluntary and what is not voluntary. The reason is that praise, dispraise, pardon, and sometimes mercy are voluntary. The argument is taken from the consequences. Praises and dispraises serve moral knowledge; for as commendable manners and actions are to be desired, so those which are blameworthy are to be avoided. However, such praises and dispraises cannot be judged unless we know whether they are done with a willing or unwilling mind. Further, he added another cause: that this doctrine is a part of the civil faculty, whereto belongs the making of laws. And laws set forth rewards and punishments to the observers and transgressors of them. Therefore, it is necessary to know which things are voluntary and which are not voluntary. For men that are unwilling do not obtain rewards, and they who sin by compulsion should not suffer punishments.

Some wrest this reason of lawmakers hereunto, as though they ought to regard this, that they command not those things which of necessity must be done, nor those things which are impossible to be done, but only those which are in our own power: and that therefore it behooves them to know what is the nature of voluntary and not voluntary. I know indeed that this is the definition of law: that it is a reason commanding honest things and calling back from things that are dishonest. But what these men avouch, namely, that it commands things which are possible, I would only grant it as touching civil laws, but not divine laws: for those require things that are impossible, especially in respect of the state of nature, corrupt and defiled. However, Aristotle used not this reason; he only touched on these things which I have mentioned regarding punishments and rewards.

But why did he speak of the affections, since those are not voluntary but are naturally planted in our minds? The Greek scholia answer that although, in substance and root, they are of nature, yet they may be called voluntary in some sense, insomuch as by use and exercise they may be enlarged or repressed. Or else we will answer that Aristotle mentioned both affections and actions, but "voluntary" must only be referred to actions. By doing this, it will also pertain to the virtues, which are concerned with the affections: for those are also acquired by actions, which, when they are right and commendable, must be accounted as voluntary. Moreover, why does Aristotle say that sometimes pardon and sometimes mercy must be shown? Because we do not always take mercy on those whom we pardon; for a man in defending himself may kill someone who attacks him; he did not do it willingly, he is forgiven, but we do not take pity on him.

42. How the knowledge of what is voluntary and not voluntary may help to moderate the punishments which laws appoint can be shown in many ways. Those who have committed anything against their wills or under compulsion are not punished. And in the civil laws, there are many provisions that provide remedies in the case of ignorance or compulsion, just as they do concerning those things which are done out of fear, by crafty collusion, and concerning those who are under 25 years of age, etc. Also, someone who is taken with madness or frenzy is forgiven; even a madman, although he kills his father, shall not be punished. The laws of God acquit the hewer of wood who, by chance and not willingly, kills another, because perhaps the axe might fly out of the handle, and certain cities were appointed for refuge. Also, Plato in his ninth book of laws shows that many things are to be forgiven where the will did not consent. Therefore, it greatly benefits lawmakers and judges, because of giving punishments and rewards, to know what is done voluntarily and what is not done voluntarily.

We will first speak of what is not voluntary, for in this matter, the privation seems to be better known than the thing itself. Light is better known by darkness, and the goodness of health by sickness. This definition of "not voluntary" appears by the enumeration of its parts, so that it is rather a division than a definition, albeit that just and full divisions sometimes take the place of a definition. We then chiefly use them when that which is common to the parts cannot be expressed by any one certain point thereof. However, we must understand that it is called "not voluntary" of these two forms or kinds, which are of one signification: for even that which is done violently and unwittingly is not voluntary. And we prove that the division of these two parts is rightly made: for "voluntary," which is contrary to "not voluntary," consists of two things: knowledge and desire. First, we must know that which we must desire; then are we stirred up thereto by a motion of desire. But either of these two may be hindered: ignorance takes away knowledge, and violence hinders desire. For good cause, therefore, are these two put contrary to that which is voluntary.

Violence is defined after this manner: It is a vehement enforcing, which either cannot be resisted at all or can be resisted only with great difficulty. But some may marvel how two things may be set against one: for against "voluntary" is set that which is done by violence, and also that which is done unwittingly. Hereunto we answer that there is but one set against one: constraint or "not voluntary" is set against willingness or "voluntary." But this unwillingness or "not voluntary" is afterward distributed into two parts: for it is one thing that is done by violence and another that is done by ignorance.

43. As touching violence, Aristotle says that the beginning of its motion must be outward, for those things which are moved by an inward beginning are moved naturally, not violently. However, some cut off the latter particle that Aristotle includes, asserting that what suffers or acts does not bring any help to that beginning. Those who say this are mistaken. Consider a shipwreck caused by a great tempest: the winds, waves, and storms are external beginnings. Yet the wreck would not occur unless the shipmen themselves chose to cast away certain items from the ship. Similarly, those forced by a tyrant to commit shameful acts have the commandment of the tyrant as an external beginning, but these acts would not be performed without the individuals' own compliance. Therefore, these actions have their beginnings outwardly but still involve some internal cooperation.

Others argue that "doing" is added in vain, asserting that if the beginning is an outward motion, it should be enough to call it suffering, not doing. We counter that the same things moved violently may also act as instruments: for example, a staff moved by us moves a stone. In a dense crowd, a person might be crushed by others who, although not acting of their own will, are driven by the crowd's movement. Aristotle's examples include a living creature being carried away against its will by others and inanimate objects like a person carried by the wind while sailing. If asked whether "voluntary" and "without constraint" are the same, we answer that "without constraint" extends further than "voluntary." "Without constraint" can apply to inanimate things, whereas "voluntary" does not.

Knowledge arises from an outward object, though the same motion brings the sense to pass by the object in another order. The beginning Aristotle mentioned is the cause, specifically the efficient cause, sufficient to move by itself.

44. A question arises about certain actions that seem intermediate, wondering whether they are voluntary or not. The question might be simple, asking whether actions taken out of fear of greater evils, rather than for obtaining good, are voluntary. This situation occurred with Socrates, who refused to obey the thirty tyrants who demanded he kill an Athenian citizen under threat to his family. The question can also be twofold: whether actions taken out of fear of greater evils or for obtaining something otherwise unattainable are voluntary. For instance, a lie told to save a life, although inherently wrong, raises the question of whether it is voluntary.

Adultery is another example. If someone commits adultery to gain the tyrant's wife's favour to kill the tyrant, is this act voluntary? We know the great pains merchants endure, and the ambitions and pleasures pursued for their ends, which they wouldn't face without a perceived benefit. Therefore, whether these actions are voluntary is questioned.

For instance, death, breach of chastity, bondage, ungodliness, and similar great evils drive people to commit shameful acts to avoid them. Notable examples include Cato, who chose death over subjugation, Regulus, who returned to Carthage to face death to keep his word, and Virginius, who killed his daughter to preserve her honour.

Scriptures provide examples too. Lot offered his daughters to protect his guests, while his daughters later committed incest to preserve humanity. Abraham endangered Sarah’s chastity to avoid death, and Judith risked hers to save her people. We do not debate whether these actions were right but question whether they were voluntary.

There is a difference between wicked individuals who commit evil for personal gain and those who, driven by a sense of duty, commit acts under dire circumstances. Some claim they are compelled to act to achieve great good, while others attribute their actions to tyrannical oppression. Today, many renounce Christian truth under persecution. An analogy is the casting forth of goods during a storm: done under compulsion, it serves to clarify our understanding of voluntary actions in the face of extreme necessity.

45. The actions we have discussed are mixed actions. Since they can be omitted and are not of such necessity that they must be done, they seem voluntary. However, because no one would choose them for their own sake, they seem not voluntary but rather close to the nature of voluntary actions because they involve a comparison of evils. Two evils are proposed: poverty with the loss of goods or death while retaining those goods. The will chooses the lesser evil to avoid the greater. Therefore, when the will plays a part in these actions, they must be called voluntary.

Furthermore, Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, notes that the lesser evil has the consideration of the good and is greatly to be desired, since what is desired is good. There is no doubt that it is the will that chooses the end. The end of these actions is related to the present moment. For instance, mariners cast goods into the sea to ensure their safety, which they cannot achieve otherwise. Therefore, the will chooses to cast the goods away.

Thus, we must judge these actions according to the present time while they are performed. No one would choose these actions before or regret them afterward, but at the moment, a choice is made. Since the original decision lies with the doer, who can choose to act or not, these actions are said to be voluntary. Although generally, these actions are not voluntary because no one desires them for themselves, they are desired in context, with knowledge and present will. Hence, they are voluntary actions.

46. These mixed actions are proved to be voluntary for two reasons: they must be judged according to the present time, and they are within the power of the doer. Without the will moving the instrumental parts, these actions would not occur. A third reason is taken from praise and dispraise: since people are sometimes praised or dispraised for suffering vile and shameful things, these actions must be voluntary. Praise and dispraise apply only to voluntary actions.

Aristotle notes that praise or dispraise is given depending on the context: either for not enduring shameful things for great and excellent causes or for enduring them for light and unworthy causes. Aristotle mentioned the former but not the latter. Great and honorable causes include one's country, parents, children, wife, justice, and similar values.

For instance, Zopyrus the Persian mutilated himself to betray Babylon to King Darius, and Ulysses disguised himself to spy on the Trojans. Conversely, Dolo was dispraised for revealing his country's secrets to avoid torment. It is essential to clarify that when shameful things are to be endured, it does not mean committing wickedness or crimes, which must never be done for any utility or honor. It means enduring actions that bring some grief and reproach.

For example, if a magistrate is asked to run like a servant through the streets or wear a woman's garment for great preferment or lawful gain, he might do so. These must be significant matters for which one endures such things to be praised. The examples from the Scholies suggesting lying or committing adultery to kill a tyrant are not valid, as Aristotle did not mean sinful actions. Praise corresponds to virtues, and dispraise to vices.

Some people, due to their abject and vile minds, are rightfully dispraised for not enduring anything for a just and honest matter. Soldiers who abandon their posts or surrender strongholds without constraint are dispraised. Similarly, those ready to do anything to avoid paying money are dispraised.

47. It is evident why Aristotle said that sometimes praise follows the suffering of grievous things, because this does not happen continually. For sometimes, neither praise nor dispraise occur in such cases, but pardon is given. This happens when a person, under extreme duress, acts in a way that is beyond the power of human nature to withstand. Aristotle states that we pardon someone in such circumstances. If a person is threatened with being burned or cut asunder, and they yield by disclosing secrets or suffering any vile thing, they are pardoned. Some even believe that in such cases, it is lawful to lie.

Aristotle adds that there are certain things which no one ought to endure, and they should rather face anything than submit. Therefore, our martyrs hold the right opinion, choosing to endure anything rather than abandon godliness. Aristotle gives an example from Euripides' tragedy, where Alcmaeon is not pardoned for killing his mother because the cause was trivial or ridiculous.

Since the actions we discuss are mixed—both voluntary and not voluntary—when the voluntary aspect prevails, praise or dispraise follows. However, if the involuntary aspect predominates and it seems the person acted against their will, they are forgiven. Mixed actions consist of two elements: one can dominate over the other. Aristotle rightly makes exceptions for grievous crimes that cannot be pardoned. For instance, who will forgive someone who condemns an innocent person, commits adultery, betrays their country, or denies godliness under torture?

Anaxarchus, to avoid pleasing the tyrant, was beaten in a mortar with iron pestles, saying, "Beat on, Anaxarchus's bag." He refused to change his will or yield to torment. Zeno bit off his own tongue during torture to avoid betraying his fellow conspirators. Aristotle thus categorizes four kinds of people: those praised for enduring grievous things, those dispraised, those pardoned, and those who receive no pardon.

48. Aristotle discusses two difficult issues regarding suffering or not suffering grievous things for an honest cause. The first pertains to judgment, as it is often unclear what should be suffered for a cause. Should one suffer in matters of the mind, body, or fortune? What kind of things should or should not be suffered? Aristotle rightly says this can be hard to judge, though it is sometimes clear that wickedness should never be suffered.

For instance, Achilles doubted whether to seek a long, obscure life at home or a short, glorious life at Troy. A son might wonder whether to stay silent or betray a father who robs his country. David might question whether to feign madness or be slain by a barbarous king. Comparing sorrowful and dishonest things is challenging, and virtue lies in difficult matters, bringing either praise or dispraise. The variety of circumstances increases the difficulty, preventing clear rules.

The second difficulty arises from a lack of strength, not judgment. When safe and free from sorrow, we see clearly what to choose and often discern rightly. However, experiencing grief, pain, and torment changes our perspective. Thus, we may advise the sick well when healthy, but not ourselves when ill. Those who maintain their good intentions despite adversity are commendable, while those who falter are to be dispraised.

Themistocles is greatly praised for preferring death over bearing arms against his country. Conversely, those who deny godliness to avoid torment or death are most worthy of dispraise.

49. When Aristotle had set down two kinds of actions that are Not Voluntary, he then refuted the opinion of those who proposed a third kind. These individuals claimed that wicked actions committed for the sake of pleasure and profit are violent, and that only actions rightly consenting to reason are truly voluntary. Aristotle refuted this view with several reasons:

1. First Reason: If this were true, all our actions would be violent, as we often act for pleasure and profit.

2. Second Reason: Violence is accompanied by sadness, but those pursuing pleasure are glad, not sad; thus, these actions are not violent.

3. Third Reason: If this were the case, every evil person could excuse their actions by blaming external factors like pleasure and profit, claiming they were forced by these things—an absurdity.

4. Fourth Reason: If their opinion were true, no sins or wicked acts could be held accountable, as they could always be excused as done against one’s will or violently.

Aristotle argued that it is laughable to blame external factors rather than oneself for being swayed by pleasure and profit. One should resist these temptations and not be diverted from just actions. If people attribute honesty to themselves, they must also take responsibility for dishonest actions, as both types of actions originate from within us. Aristotle’s view contrasts with Plato, who said good men are good by will and choice, while evil men are unwillingly evil. Aristotle asserted that both good and evil actions are voluntary, driven by our own choices in response to external stimuli.

50. Having discussed Not Voluntary actions due to violence, let us now consider those arising from ignorance. Aristotle asserted that actions done out of ignorance cannot be called voluntary because voluntary actions require knowledge of what is done. He distinguished between those who, upon realizing their ignorance, feel remorse and those who do not.

1. Remorseful Ignorance: Those who repent after realizing their mistake are termed as acting against their will.

2. Non-remorseful Ignorance: Those who do not regret their actions are described as having acted without willingness but not against their will.

In the initial division of actions, some were voluntary and some not voluntary. We began with Not Voluntary actions, further divided into those done by force (violence) and those done by ignorance. Violent actions are those whose origin is external and where the doer or sufferer does not contribute to the action. Actions done through ignorance can be with or without repentance. The former are simply against the will, while the latter, upon realization and lack of remorse, are closer to voluntary actions.

Examples:

- Oedipus: According to the myth, Oedipus killed his father and married his mother unknowingly. Upon learning the truth, he was so remorseful that he blinded himself. Hence, his actions were against his will.

- Tiberius: Tiberius tortured his host at Rhodes unknowingly, and upon realizing his identity, he executed him without remorse. Initially, his action was not willing, but as he did not regret it, it cannot be said to be against his will.

Another example is a person who kills a man, mistaking him for a wild beast, and feels sorry afterward—this is against his will. Conversely, someone who receives gold instead of owed brass and rejoices in the error did it not willingly but also not against his will.

Thus, the principle can be summarized: Actions done violently or against the will involve sorrow or repentance, but not all actions done out of ignorance involve these emotions. Therefore, not all ignorant actions are violent or against the will.

51 There is also another distinction used. It is one thing to act through ignorance and another for the doer to be ignorant. Actions done through ignorance occur when ignorance is in some way the cause of the action. Conversely, many act while ignorant due to some severe perturbation, which they themselves have caused, thereby bringing error upon themselves. These situations differ as the general and the specific kind, as something spread out and something drawn together. Whoever acts through ignorance is indeed ignorant, but not everyone who is ignorant acts through ignorance.

Aristotle provides examples, starting with drunkenness. Many things are done by drunken individuals where they are unaware of their actions, yet they are not properly said to act unwittingly because they could have abstained from excessive wine. Those who drink more than necessary bring ignorance upon themselves. Thus, such a vice does not cause actions to be deemed against their will. Another example is anger: those greatly enraged often do not know what they are doing, but they do not act against their will. They should have tempered their anger and achieved the virtue to moderate such perturbation. Since they did not, they are not excused for their misdeeds done in anger. In short, ignorance of this kind does not constrain the will but indicates wickedness; otherwise, every wicked person would be excused. That evil people are ignorant is evident because they do not know what to pursue or avoid. They are deceived by their own lusts, misunderstanding what is truly pleasant and profitable and what is truly grievous and damnable. Therefore, their judgment is corrupt, and they do not understand the nature of the end for which they act.

52 The reasoning can be framed thus: Not every evil person acts through ignorance, but every evil person acts while being ignorant. Therefore, acting while ignorant and acting through ignorance are different things. The major proposition is clear; if evil people acted through ignorance, they could be excused. We have already explained that they are ignorant. General ignorance does not excuse because it pertains to the entire matter, not just the circumstances. For example, if someone is ignorant that fornication or adultery are sins, they are not excused because they should have known this. In fact, they are more grievously accused for such ignorance. However, particular ignorance, related to circumstances, does excuse and deserves pardon because the circumstances could not be known.

Sometimes such cases arise where no one can know the circumstances for certain. But general ignorance, which could have been remedied, does not obtain mercy. If someone remains ignorant, it is their fault for not knowing, suggesting a desire to remain ignorant. If the excuse of universal ignorance were valid, no wicked person could be accused. The error arises because they seek only pleasure and profit, neglecting virtue and honesty.

Plato, in his dialogue Meno, explains this well. He assumes no one wishes to be miserable and unhappy. Given this, he concludes no one desires evil things, as being miserable and unhappy involves engaging with evil things and finding delight in them. Thus, evil people unknowingly choose evil things. Cicero notes that this error is ingrained in us from our upbringing.

General ignorance does not cause one to act against their will because it does not hinder their choice. In fact, it is joined with it; evil people choose to steal rather than labor, to be idle rather than practice any art, and to indulge rather than abstain. Sometimes the entire matter may be generally unknown, other times it is generally known but specifically unknown. For instance, someone may know adultery is a sin but be ignorant that a specific act of adultery is forbidden. Neither form of ignorance is worthy of pardon.

However, if someone does not know the circumstances in general and believes that the end, place, time, or matter of their action does not need consideration, they are not worthy of mercy or pardon. General perception belongs to universal knowledge, which is essential. But ignorance of specific circumstances can be excused since no one can perfectly know all such particulars. Thus, only ignorance of particular circumstances makes the action against the will.

53 Because such circumstances are of great importance (as they obtain pardon and mercy when unknown), Aristotle enumerates them so they can be thoroughly examined and understood. There are seven or eight of these circumstances, often remembered by a common verse in the schools:

Who, what, where, whereby: Wherefore, how, and when.

These are seven, but one is missing, namely, "Whereabout," which signifies the matter or subject of the action. Aristotle's "Wherein" signifies two things: place and time. Thus, if we want the complete number, there are eight circumstances. This can be explained as follows: either we consider the causes of the action, or we consider the nature or substance of the action itself. If the cause is efficient, it is addressed by the circumstance "Who." If it is the end, it is considered under "Wherefore." If it concerns the matter, it falls under "Whereabout." If it involves instruments or means, it pertains to the efficient cause, "Who."

When we consider the action itself, its nature is expressed by the circumstance "Whereby." When considering its measure, we look at time and place, addressed by "When" and "Where." Lastly, we regard the manner, which pertains to quality and is the circumstance "How."

Aristotle states that no one is ignorant of all these circumstances simultaneously. A person may be ignorant of one or another individually, but not of all collectively unless they are utterly foolish. For instance, it is not generally true that someone could be ignorant of the efficient cause. If they themselves are the efficient cause, it is harder to be unaware of oneself. Yet, it can happen that someone might steer a ship without noticing, being preoccupied with another matter. This discussion is to be understood mostly as concerning moral actions.

The matter is clarified by examples. Did the circumstances excuse Aeschylus the tragic poet? He appeared to reveal sacred mysteries of Ceres in a tragedy, causing a great tumult in the theatre, nearly resulting in his death. He fled to the altar of Bacchus and was brought to judgment before the Areopagites. He pleaded that he did not know those things were mysteries and was acquitted because of his ignorance.

Another man built a war engine that cast stones. Demonstrating its effect, he accidentally killed someone. He excused himself, claiming ignorance of what he did. The circumstance "Whereabout" (the matter or subject of action) is exemplified by Merope, who mistakenly killed her son, thinking he was her enemy. This error pertains to the circumstance "Whereabout," as seen in Euripides' tragedy "Cresphontes," which is no longer extant.

Sometimes we are ignorant of "Wherewith" (the means), such as thinking one is using a blunt spear when it is actually sharp, or throwing a stone instead of a pumice, resulting in harm. Ignorance of the end also excuses; for example, a man might administer medicine or perform surgery for health reasons, only to have an adverse effect, excused by ignorance of the outcome.

The manner of the action, if performed unwillingly, can also excuse. For example, in a wrestling match, if one competitor unintentionally injures another while intending a light strike, he is excused. Ignorance of principal circumstances such as "Wherefore," "Whereabout," or "Wherein" often excuses an action.

Aristotle's omission of place and time as circumstances needing examples is not surprising, as these might be considered self-evident. Yet, it is possible for someone to be unaware that their actions occur in a sacred place or on a holy day.

54 If actions done against the will are attributed to ignorance of particular circumstances, additional criteria include the discovery of the error and resulting grief or repentance. Without such grief, the action may be termed "not voluntary" but not "against the will."

Understanding how ignorance can cause an action to be against the will is essential. Ignorance deprives one of knowledge, which would otherwise prevent the action or make it voluntary. Thus, ignorance either removes the knowledge necessary for a voluntary action or the knowledge that would prevent the action altogether.

It is possible for someone acting unwittingly to be ignorant of their action's specifics but not unwilling in their desire, leading to no subsequent sorrow. Such ignorance does not excuse nor make the action against their will. For example, if someone kills their enemy, believing them to be a deer, and rejoices afterward, they acted through ignorance but not unwillingly.

Certain willful ignorances, such as avoiding knowledge to continue sinning, are highly blameworthy. Another type occurs when someone neglects to consider right action due to intense perturbation or bad habits, which also do not excuse the person since they fail to act as they should.

Ignorance arising from neglecting to learn or avoiding effort also does not excuse since everyone should know general laws. This form of ignorance prevents actions or the will's movement, making the action "not voluntary" rather than "against the will." The ignorance that excuses and obtains mercy is specific to unknown circumstances, combined with subsequent grief and sorrow.

Of that which is Voluntary

55 As for the voluntary, the definition consists of two parts. First, says Aristotle, the origin of the action must be internal. Secondly, the circumstances must be known. If voluntary is contrary to that which is against the will, and that which is against the will consists of two parts, then the opposites of these parts must be included in the definition of voluntary. Hence, we see the excellent method of Aristotle: for without previously explaining the nature of violence and ignorance, he could not so easily have defined what voluntary was.

Moreover, Aristotle was further motivated to write on these matters because actions performed by angry men or those driven by desire fall under the definition of voluntary. Both the origin of the action is within the person who acts, and they understand and know the particulars well; for they deliberate and make sharp judgments, either to seek revenge or to achieve their desires. Such deliberation would not occur if they were ignorant of the circumstances. Thus, it is concluded that these actions are voluntary, and those who think otherwise are mistaken.

What led them to think such actions are against the will is clear. They observed that it is extremely difficult to resist anger and desire, which are more powerful than other emotions, and thus thought men are compelled by them. Heraclitus said, ὀργὴν χαλεπὸν μαχεῖσθαι (It is hard to fight against anger). Plato, in his second book of the "Republic," said, ὀργὴν οὐκ ἔστι μαχέσθαι οὐδὲ κρατεῖν (Anger is neither to be striven with nor subdued). If anger cannot be resisted or conquered, it seems to compel, making actions appear against the will. Plato, in his ninth book "De Legibus," stated, ὀργιζόμενος ἐοικὼς ἀκουσίῳ ὄντι (An angry man is like one acting against his will). He didn't say such actions were completely against the will but like it. Cato the Censor claimed that an angry person differs from a madman only in the duration of their condition. Others, such as Evenus, boldly stated that anger is much worse than madness. In his treatise "Cratylus," Plato compared desire to a very strong bond.

We also recognize that these two emotions are intense and powerful, but not so overpowering that they cannot be controlled by reason, as evidenced in temperate individuals and those endowed with meekness and other virtues. However, I would not deny that actions done without such affects are more voluntary, but this does not exclude the others from being voluntary.

56 Aristotle states that none of the other living creatures do anything against their wills, not even children. This proposition is confirmed: those things done by enforcement or desire are voluntary. This was previously demonstrated by the definition. Now, additional reasons are provided. The first reason is if these actions were against the will, neither brute beasts nor children would act of their own accord. But they do many things willingly, so these actions cannot be against the will. The argument is a conditional of the consequent, taken to overthrow the antecedent.

Brute beasts and children, being without reason, act through these affects. However, it is absurd to think they do nothing willingly, as we see they do certain things against their will when confined but act willingly when freed. They choose food, enter chambers or dens at will, and defend their young. Alexanders' horse Bucephalus admitted no rider but Alexander, not by constraint. Elephants love their masters and obey them. Dogs in a house fawn on their masters and bark at strangers.

Many similar examples from birds, fish, and other animals show actions done willingly. Some have even attributed reason to them due to their industrious actions.

While we won't grant them reason, we affirm they act willingly. If they are called wild beasts because they are led violently, they still have an inward appetite driving them. Hence, their actions are of their own accord.

Aristotle groups children with brute beasts because both lack mature reason and are driven by affects like anger and desire. Yet, who would deny children act willingly? They play, run, and fawn on parents.

It would be unjust to punish children if they did not act willingly. Teachers expect them to abstain from misbehaving, implying they can do so.

There are two types of appetite: one following sense and the other reason. Brute beasts and children are driven by sense-based appetite. Brute beasts lack reason, so their desires never obey reason. Children have potential reason, which develops with age to guide their desires. The Greek word ἑκούσιος is broader than "voluntary" and applies to brute beasts and children, who lack a proper will.

57 Moreover, some who opposed Aristotle affirm that actions driven by anger or lust are done against the will. If this were true, it would imply that either all such actions are against the will, or that good actions are voluntary and evil actions are involuntary. However, neither of these propositions can be accepted. Aristotle refutes this by stating: "Is it not ridiculous to assert that good actions are voluntary and evil actions are done by compulsion and against the will, considering that shameful acts performed through anger or lust originate from the same source as virtuous acts influenced by the same emotions?"

Clearly, actions sharing the same origin must be classified similarly. Further, Aristotle argues that it is just and appropriate to be angry in certain situations, particularly against vices and wicked individuals. If private citizens did not rebuke, and magistrates did not punish such individuals, they would be culpable. Additionally, there are many things, such as health and knowledge, which it would be negligent not to desire and strive for earnestly.

Should we then claim that the laws of honesty and justice demand actions that are against our will and done under compulsion, or actions from which we cannot abstain? This notion would be absurd in the context of civil laws. Moreover, actions done against the will bring grief and sorrow, but actions driven by anger and lust are often pleasurable rather than distressing. Regarding lust, this is evident. For anger, Aristotle references Homer in his "Rhetoric," describing anger as sweet to Achilles like honey melting under his tongue. Anger, essentially, is a desire for revenge.

Furthermore, Aristotle asks, "What difference is there between actions done against the will that align with reason and those wickedly executed out of anger, given that both can be avoided?" This question hinges on the nature of sin: since sin involves actions that should or can be avoided, and this applies equally to rational errors and those driven by anger or desire, both should be considered voluntary. Why, then, do adversaries deem the latter involuntary?

58 Aristotle continues, reasoning about human emotions: "Because unreasonable emotions are human and arise from anger or desire, they too are voluntary and done without compulsion." Human emotions, like reason, are part of the human experience. Therefore, if actions stemming from reason are human because reason is part of our mind, so too are actions from anger or desire, for these emotions exist in the human mind.

An objection might be that actions driven by anger or desire come from the irrational part of the mind. True, says Aristotle, but these are still powers of the human mind, making the resulting actions human. Although these powers are irrational by nature, they can be influenced and governed by reason, unlike in brute beasts.

Additionally, these emotions and actions originate from the will, meaning they can be restrained by it. This is unlike the involuntary processes of nourishment and growth, which occur regardless of will. Therefore, it is absurd to claim that actions driven by anger or desire are against the will or done under compulsion.

59 Now let us see how these things, which we have here treated of, agree with the Holy Scriptures. Aristotle said that he would treat of voluntary and not voluntary actions because praises and dispraises, rewards, punishments, and mercy, accompany those things which are voluntary. Similarly, in Psalm 111, the faithful are praised because they are a willing people. Eunuchs are commended, not those who became eunuchs through violence or were born so, but those who willingly chastened themselves for the kingdom of heaven's sake.

A woodcutter who accidentally kills his fellow is forgiven because that action was not voluntary. The devil, constrained to speak the truth and compelled to depart from those possessed, does not deserve praise or rewards. Balaam is compelled by the angel with a sword not to curse the people of God; he receives no praise because he did it unwillingly. The definition of violence, as having an outward beginning and not giving any help, indicates that original sin is not a violent thing because it is an inward corruption in us, which we further by the naughtiness we daily add to it.

If anyone argues that we are without knowledge and understanding when such are acquired, and that it comes from the initial naughty motions of our mind, where there is no choice or deliberation, we answer that Aristotle's points must be understood concerning moral and actual deeds: for these sins did not he know. However, it suffices us that such things cannot be called violent, seeing they have their beginning from within.

We also grant that there are mixed actions, and we affirm that they ought to be reckoned among those which are voluntary. Therefore, the Holy Scriptures exhort us to them, persuading us that we must endure anything rather than run into sin. Paul says, "We must never do evil, that good may come of it." We must rather obey God than men. We are called to take up our cross and follow the Lord. He is said to have found his soul who has lost it. The denial of oneself has no other respect. These actions are of the mixed sort because no one would choose these things, except by chance: but we will and do these things partly to avoid sins and partly to be joined to the Lord.

However, you might say that these things have an outward beginning, and therefore they are rather violent. For unless the Lord did these things in us, none of us would do them. We grant that the beginning, whereby our wills are changed, is from without: but our wills being changed by the Spirit of God, are inward to us, and at their command, we are moved to these actions. Therefore, they ought to be called voluntary, for they are not done by God without us.

Indeed, we are praised and dispraised for these mixed actions. Christ says that He will deny before His Father those who deny Him before men. He will not be ashamed of those who are not ashamed of Him before men. They are commended who, for Christ's sake, suffer grievous vexations: "Blessed are they who suffer persecution, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." In such things as these, Aristotle says pardon is given, as when David feigned madness before King Achish to avoid being slain.

However, there are certain things we should never be led to commit, and these are sins. There is an old saying, "Usque ad aras," meaning "saving a man's conscience and religion." Job is an example to us, who in adversities could never be driven, either by the reproachful speaking or bragging of his wife, to blaspheme God. Those driven to these things find no mercy, as they fall from the hope thereof, as stated in the Epistle to the Hebrews about those who departed from the known truth. This happened to Spiera the Italian and those who killed themselves after abjuring the Gospel.

Aristotle propounds two difficult questions. The first is what a man should suffer for anything. The answer is easy: we must suffer anything rather than depart from Christ and His holy commandments. "What does it profit a man if he gains the whole world and loses his own soul?" "Do not fear those who kill the body but are not able to kill the soul," says the Lord. The second difficulty we experience in ourselves: we often see followers who only believe for a time. "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak." However, we comfort ourselves with the thought that "all things are possible to him who believes," and Paul said that he was able to do all things through Christ who strengthened him.

Justly did Aristotle reprove those who thought that honest and just things are voluntary but dishonest things are not voluntary: we must not think so in any wise. Paul said, "I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwells no good thing." If we have anything good, it must be altogether attributed to God. For to the Philippians, we read, "It is God who works in us both to will and to perform."

60 Now let us see what is to be said regarding ignorance. There is a certain ignorance, after which repentance follows immediately upon perceiving the error; and sometimes no repentance follows at all. Regarding the latter, the Lord says, "Forgive them, for they know not what they do." Stephen prayed the same. Among those for whom prayer was made, some repented afterward, and some never did. Jonathan tasted honey, being ignorant of what his father had decreed; and upon knowing his father's decree, he did not sorrow but was rather angry with him. But Paul, when he perceived his error, was sorrowful. Likewise, those of whom Peter spoke in the Acts, "I know that they did it in ignorance," also sorrowed. Their words, "Men and brethren, what shall we do?" show their repentance.

The sorrow that follows does not always indicate that there was no sin, for both those who crucified the Lord and Paul sinned because they were ignorant of what they ought to have known. If, however, there had been a certain ignorance of the circumstance, which could not have been known, as in Noah when he was drunk, not having seen the wine before nor knowing its strength and property; or as it happened to Jacob, who lay with Leah instead of Rachel, both of them were excused due to their ignorance. But he who does not know the general and principal points of the laws is not excused. Thus it is said of Paul in the first epistle to the Corinthians, "He that is ignorant, let him be ignorant." This ignorance, which does not excuse, is sometimes laid upon men by God as a punishment, while He punishes sins with sins. As written to the Thessalonians in the second epistle, "Because they have not received the love of the truth, that they might be saved, therefore God will send upon them strong delusion, that they should believe lies." And in Ezekiel, "If the prophet be deceived, I the Lord have deceived that prophet." Also, Ahab was seduced by the evil spirit, with God permitting it. Thus, we see what ignorance excuses and what does not.

Aristotle adds that those things done by drunkenness and anger are voluntary, which we also affirm. Concerning these, we have received a law: "Be angry, but sin not. Let not the sun go down upon your wrath." And we are forbidden to say to any man, "Thou fool." Concerning drunkenness, the Lord says, "Beware that your hearts be not overcharged with surfeiting and drunkenness." Paul also says, "Be not drunk with wine, wherein is excess." Therefore, things done through anger and drunkenness do not excuse, as these could either be avoided or controlled.

But all the wicked and ungodly are ignorant, though they are not excused. The Scriptures declare everywhere, "The fool has said in his heart, 'There is no God.'" In Proverbs 7, regarding those led by lust and pleasures, "He is led as an ox to the slaughter, and like a fool to the correction of the stocks." In Romans, "They professed themselves to be wise, but became fools, and their foolish hearts were darkened." To the Ephesians, "You shall not walk as other Gentiles walk, in the vanity of their minds, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart." And Isaiah, as all the Evangelists testify, says, "Seeing they shall see and not perceive; hearing they shall hear and not understand," because being in darkness, they know not whither they go.

Among the circumstances, which when unknown excuse, Aristotle specifically mentions the end and the purpose. David sent Absalom to Hebron but could not know his intent or purpose and is thus excused. Similarly, Abimelech took another man's wife but did not know she was married and thus could say to God, "I did it in the integrity of my heart, for I did not know." The church is excused for baptizing Simon Magus because it was unaware of his ill and fraudulent intentions. However, in cases of ignorance that excuse us, if no sorrow follows, we are guilty because we do not condone what was done.

The man who shot an arrow and by chance killed King Ahab would not have sorrowed had he been aware of the deed; thus, it would not have been evident that the act was against his will. David sorrowed for the deaths of Absalom, Abner, and Amasa, showing these events happened against his will. Voluntariness encompasses two things: the beginning must be from within, and there must be no ignorance of what is done. Original sin begins from within, and we know such corruption is against God and righteousness, although we do not choose it, making it voluntary. This applies even to young children lacking knowledge, but our concern here is actual sins, not original sin.

That sins done through lust and wrath are voluntary has been shown by various reasons, which we admit. We have received laws concerning both vices: "Thou shalt not lust." We are commanded not to be angry with our brother without cause. Aristotle argued that brute beasts act voluntarily; Isaiah similarly said, "The ox knows his owner, and the ass his master's crib." Jeremiah said, "The stork in the heaven knows her appointed times." We also believe this of children; in the time of Elisha, they were punished by bears. Isaac, oppressed by Ishmael, was commanded by Sarah to be cast forth. Aristotle affirms that we are sometimes required to be angry. "The zeal of Your house has eaten me up," and Phinehas is commended by God for avenging the impure fornicators.

Where it is said that actions done against the will bring sorrow, Paul testifies, "O wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Aristotle states that actions committed through wrath and lust, as well as those done by reason and will, are to be avoided. We correct this by stating that they may be avoided if God's grace is applied; without it, who can guard against the motions of anger and lust? We can temper ourselves from outward actions, but the motions of the heart are not in our power. Actions proceeding from lust and wrath are human actions for which we shall give account.

Of Man's Election or Making of Choice

61 Aristotle says that making a choice is most proper to virtue. In the definition of virtue, he first placed the general kind, namely habit; then he added the difference, namely mediocrity. After that, he joined the two properties: that through virtue we do things of our own accord and that we do them by making a choice. However, of these two properties, making a choice is the more proper, not only when compared with acting of our own accord but also when compared with the other properties of virtue, which are many.

For this reason, actions proceeding from virtue are commended because they come from making a choice. Aristotle says, "Manners are more judged by making a choice than by actions." It is true that manners are known by actions, as a tree is known by its fruit, but that judgment can be deceiving. Hypocrites often make a counterfeit show, and at times actions are done with far different purposes than they appear. The Manichees abstained from wives and from eating flesh, not because of chastity or sobriety but because of their erroneous and blasphemous opinions. Tyrants sometimes treat their subjects courteously, but to deceive them. Wicked men sometimes abstain from wickedness out of fear of punishment, not out of love for justice. Thus, in judgments, when the fact is apparent, there is often an inquiry into the will, mind, and purpose of the doer. Making a choice is never subject to fortune as action is. Those found guilty of a crime often say they meant to have acted differently and did not intend for such things to happen.

Actions are more apparent since they are visible to everyone, but they do not make the judgment either surer or more certain. Men judge manners by what follows, namely by the work, but the judgment of choosing proceeds from the cause, from what went before. Sometimes a person does no action, so it cannot be judged by actions whether they are good or evil. However, once they show their choice, even without action, people judge them for their goodness or naughtiness.

But how can it be said that young children and brute beasts lack the making of choice when they choose one food over another, play over discipline, and avoid some things more than others? We must answer that making a choice is of two sorts. One is common, where one thing is preferred over another or more avoided than another. Brute beasts and children do not lack this kind of choice. The other is the proper choice, which has counsel going before and is directed by the judgment of reason. This kind of making a choice is not possible for brute beasts or children, as they are led by sense, not by reason.

Also, things done in haste and upon the sudden are without making a choice, not because reason is absent but because there is no time to deliberate. The counsel, judgment, and deliberation of reason are hindered by the vehemency of perturbation.

Three things lack the making of choice. First, brute beasts, because they are not capable of reason. Second, young children, who, although endowed with reason, cannot use it due to their tender age. Third, sudden and hasty motions of the mind, where despite having reason and years, there is no time for deliberation. Thus, those who act under the force of any affection often say they did not act purposely or advisedly.

Since making a choice belongs to the mind, it is either of the power of knowing or the power of appetite. All appetite is divided into three parts. It is either of the more noble part of the mind, joined with reason and called the will; or it is of the grosser part, divided into the desiring power and the angry power. Aristotle said that some thought choice to be the will, others thought it to be anger, and others thought it to be desire. If it belongs to knowledge, then those who affirm choice to be an opinion, possibly the Stoics, come into play.

First, Aristotle treats of desire and anger, reasoning that their opinion is foolish because then we should yield that brute beasts have choice, for they are moved by both desire and anger, which he rejects as absurd. Thus, it is clear that Aristotle removes desire from choice because we cannot say desire is choice. Willingness differs from choice but cannot be separated from it, as every choice is according to the will.

Aristotle's argument is this: If desire were choice, anything acting by desire would act by choice. But not everything acting by desire acts by choice. The incontinent person acts by desire but not by choice because they do not follow it. They determine to do well but do not stand by their determination, thus not acting according to the choice conceived in their mind. Choice is an appetite guided by counsel, but the incontinent person, carried away by desire, heeds no counsel. Conversely, the continent person ignores desire and follows their right choice.

The same applies to anger. One acting by anger does not act by choice, as seen in angry people. It suffices to say that an incontinent person is not entirely without choice but does not follow their choice.

Finally, to prove that choice is not opinion

Finally, to prove that choice is not opinion, which was set down in the fourth place, the reason is drawn from the objects. Opinion is of all things; but choice is not of all things; therefore, choice is not opinion. The argument is in the second figure, taken from the nature of relatives: for the power is referred to its object.

Now let us see what opinion is. It is an assent of the mind, whereby we take upon ourselves to maintain one part of a thing that is gainsaid. Yet we do not assert it without all fear, but with some doubt, lest perhaps the other part of the contradiction should be found true. And herein opinion differs from knowledge: for knowledge is a most sure and immovable assent. Therefore, let no man go about to persuade one who has knowledge, or is a professor of the mathematical sciences, that a thing is otherwise than he knows it to be: for it is impossible to persuade him otherwise.

But chiefly do orators endeavour to root opinions out of the minds of men when they see that judges or hearers do otherwise judge than they themselves would have them. Aristotle proves that opinion is of all manner of things because men hold opinions even of things eternal. Men have opinions of many things concerning God, concerning angels, concerning heaven, and such like things, which philosophers consider eternal. Also, men have an opinion of things which cannot be, such as Chimeras, Centaurs, and such like monsters, and that the diameter is equal to the side lines of the quadrangle, which cannot possibly be.

Also, things necessary are otherwhile subject to opinion: for it may be that what one has perceived by knowledge, another believes by opinion. But when it is said that opinion is about all things, this must not be understood as concerning simple motions or single words but as touching propositions, which consist of many motions or words and show that either a thing is or is not. Neither is there an opinion about all these things: for there are certain things, which of themselves are known either to the senses or to the mind.

For example, that fire is hot, we know certainly by the experiment of the senses, we do not have an opinion thereof; and that the whole is greater than its part, or that we pronounce of everything either that it is or is not (which things are called principles), we are not led by opinion, since they are known to our understanding. Opinion, therefore, is of all things; that is to say, of all propositions, which of themselves are not known to us.

Also, opinion is distinguished from divine faith: for faith signifies a firm assent given to the word of God, by the persuasion of the Holy Ghost, so that it neither staggers nor wavers as opinion does.

The minor proposition of the argument aforesaid is thus proved: because choice is only of those things which may be done by us, wherefore it is not of all things, as opinion is.

Aristotle has another argument drawn from the parts. These two whole things, choice and opinion, do not have the same parts into which they might be divided; therefore, they are not the same. For the parts of choice are evil and good; but the parts of opinion are false and true opinion. Yet this argument may seem weak; for we commonly say there are many evil opinions; as if a man thinks that our souls are mortal, or that God does not by His providence care for men's actions. Whoever thinks these things is said to have ill opinions.

First, we answer that "ill" is understood here as it pertains to manners: and therefore Aristotle says that opinion is neither evil nor good because it is not reckoned among manners. But the common sort calls opinions evil because what is false is evil, just as what is true is good. For those things commonly called transcendent are so joined together that true is good, and false is evil.

Also, these opinions may sometimes be called good or evil in a moral sense; because through those false or true opinions, men are stirred up either to good or to evil manners.

The next argument is taken from the effects, to prove that it cannot be particularly said that any kind of opinion is the same as choice. Here we have to deal with the particular part because it has already been declared in general that opinion and choice differ.

Wherefore, lest anyone might say; they differ generally, and yet it may be that some opinion is a particular choice; Aristotle proves that this cannot be: because, he says, this is the effect of choice, that through a just cause we shall become men denominated of that quality; to wit, just men. But this does not happen in opinion; and therefore they are by no means the same.

What is said here is most evident in an incontinent man: for he, because he makes an ill choice, is said to be an evil man, whereas in other matters he may hold an opinion correctly. For concerning virtues, he judges rightly and thinks it is good to temper himself from unchastity and drunkenness, yet does not choose this: he is not called a good man.

But none can deny that even by conceiving an opinion, we become endowed with some certain kind of quality, since opinion itself is a quality, and even opinions give rise to some affects of the mind. But Aristotle is to be understood as touching that quality, whereby we conceive an opinion and make our choice: for in choosing chaste things, we become chaste; by choosing strong things, we become strong; by choosing just things, we become just.

But it is not likewise true in general as touching opinion: for in conceiving an opinion of eternal things, we are not made eternal; nor yet in conceiving an opinion of anything touching justice, are we made just. However, this is true, that by true opinions we become more apt for virtues, and through false opinions, more prone to vices. But opinion itself does not immediately of itself communicate to us such forms or denominations; but yet it behoves that there be a choice had therein.

Moreover, choice is occupied in pursuing or avoiding, but so is not opinion: for when anything is offered to us, we begin to conceive an opinion of what it is, what commodity may be gained thereby, and how it must be used. But we do not so much conceive in our opinion whether the thing should be shunned or followed: for that rather pertains to choice. Indeed, between these things, there seems to be a certain order: for first, as I said, we conceive in opinion what it is, what profit it brings, and how it will serve our turn. These things being conceived in opinion, we then proceed either to pursue or to eschew the matter.

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MONERGISM BOOKS

Of Original Sin and Free Will by Peter Martyr Vermigli, Copyright © 2024

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Table of Contents

CHAPTER I: Of Sin, especially original sin; and of the universal corrupting of man's nature

-- How by Sin all things are subject unto vanity.

CHAPTER II: Of Free Wil

-- Of Voluntary and Not Voluntary

-- Of that which is Voluntary

-- Of Man's Election or Making of Choice