


A
WOUNDED
CONSCIENCE
CURED

WILLIAM BRIDGE

1877 ATLAS & CO. BOSTON: 25 NASSAU ST. N.Y. 1877



A Wounded Conscience Cured

And the Doubting Satisfied

By way of Answer to Doctor Fearne. Where the main point is rightly stated, and Objections thoroughly answered for the good of those who are willing not to be deceived.

By WILLIAM BRIDGE, Preacher of God's Word.

1 TIM. 1:19

*Holding faith and a good conscience, which some having put away;
and concerning faith, have made shipwreck.*

*Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the
things that are God's.*

It is ordered this 30th day of January, 1642, by the Committee of the House of Commons in Parliament, concerning printing, that this Answer to Dr Fearne's Book be printed.

John White.

The second edition, corrected and amended. Whereunto are added three Sermons of the same Author: 1. Of Courage, preached to the Volunteers. 2. Of stoppage in God's mercies to England, with their remedies. 3. A preparation for suffering in these plundering times.

London, Printed for BENJAMIN ALLEN, and are to be sold at his shop in Pope's-Head Alley. 1642.

This treatise was once before sent abroad into the world, until it came unto the author, who could not look upon it without much indignation, to see how it, and in it himself also, was so much wronged and abused; being so perverted and misplaced (besides other errata) in the printing, that it was nothing like the book that was intended; so falsely, and so contrary to his meaning, that the author may truly say, as Martial to one:

*Quem recitas meus est, O Fidentine libellus,
Sed male dum recitas incipit esse tuus.*

O Fidentine, a book of mine,
Thou printed'st with my will:
And yet not mine, but it is thine,
Because it's printed ill.

Much wrong and damage accrued to many by it; but such be the times, that all suffer in one thing or another, and so this may be the more easily borne. It is now corrected and much amended, by the care and industry of a friend, who desires to commend the book unto thy view and serious thoughts upon it.

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To the Reader

It is God's wont to warn before He smites a people, thereby walking Himself after His own rule, *Deut. 20:10, 13*, who would have no city destroyed until peace has first been offered to it. The sword of the Lord is ever drawn, His bow bent, His arrows prepared, His instruments of death made ready, His cup mingled, yet He does not use to pour down His plagues until He has rained a shower of mercy before them. He does not surprise men unawares; God never discharges His murdering pieces until He has first discharged His warning ones, *Pax Domini*—"Peace to this house" was sounded at every door where the Apostles came (*Luke 10*). All ages and nations will bear witness to this truth—the old world, Sodom, Pharaoh, etc.—but no nation or age can better subscribe to God's goodness and fair

dealing in this than we, who have been warned sometimes by prodigious signs, as by the appearance of that wonderful comet in the year 1618, as importing some strange changes, which we have seen and heard since. And as if its last influence might seem to end in this island, when it blazed over England, it was seen no more. Herlicius Stargardensis (a noted astrologer) held that its influence was likely to continue between twenty and thirty years.

Sometimes by His ministers, by His administration of justice, and dealing with other nations—how long has the sword walked circuit in Germany and in Ireland? Sometimes by lesser and lighter judgments—how long has the plague continued in this city without intermission? Sometimes by taking many godly out of the world, and the removing of many others out of the kingdom, who were wont to stand in the gap. Sometimes by a general withdrawing of Himself, pulling down His hangings, not assisting His ordinances, etc. And unless we will wilfully shut our eyes, how has the goodness, patience, bounty, mercifulness, and powerful dealings of God towards us, and for us of late, been as a hand put forth to lead us home unto Him? To cause us to meet Him and take warning that we might prevent these wasting calamities that are gathered together in a black cloud, as though they meant to empty themselves in a shower of blood upon our heads.

But we are so far from taking warning that we study to hasten our own ruin. Almost everyone, instead of bringing his bucket of water to quench the fire that is already flaming about our ears, brings their bellows in hand to blow up these coals of dissension in all places. So that now, not only is there a kingdom divided, but the head and the members are divided, and the members among themselves: cities and towns divided, yea families divided, parents against children, brother against brother, and familiar friends become bitter enemies

one to another. This is the most sure symptom and presage of a fearful desolation to fall upon all, unless some speedy remedy be applied to this desperate disease, and the great God Himself become our physician and heal our distempers.

I shall desire to commend these two sermons to thy serious consideration. In the one, thou shalt see there is a stoppage made of God's mercies (who was coming to heal us, but we would not be healed). The causes are discovered, and the remedies prescribed, that could we so go to work to open these stoppings, and bring God again into the way of His mercies; could we see our sins removed, and God returned, I might then truly say that there would be yet hope for England. The other sermon is a preparative to bear that cross which so many have already on their backs, viz. of being turned out of all our earthly comforts—a sad calamity indeed, but now too usual. And when so many of our neighbours' houses are on fire, why should we think to escape scot-free, who are as deep in sin as they? Being therefore forewarned, let us be forearmed, and get into God and His favour, as that one necessary thing for us all to look after, as the only means to keep us from sinking under the waves that flow in upon all, especially on God's people.

Experience shows that if we will live in the power of godliness, and not walk in the same excess of riot with the world, we shall make ourselves a prey, and we need to have our helmets on to receive the blows that fall upon us, and resolve to sit loose from the world, that we may suffer the spoiling of our goods with joy. Let us be able to say with that noble Spartan, who being told of the death of his children, answered, "I know well they were all begotten mortal." 2. That his goods were confiscated, "I knew what was but for my use, was not mine." 3. That his honour was gone, "I knew no glory could be everlasting on this miserable earth." 4. That his sentence was to die,

"That is nothing; nature has given the like sentence to both my condemners and to me."

Now should we get a stock of faith and learn how to use it, to live by it when our lands, our stocks, our trades, our friends, our wit, our shifts (as the ordinary means of our livelihood) shall fail us. That we may live not only above our fears, troubles, and doubts, but above the world, above ourselves, in God and in Christ, in whom we may see supply for all our wants, satisfaction to all our desires, and have recompense for all our losses, and everything that may make for our good and welfare: light in our darkness, life in our death, strength in our weakness, riches in our poverty. Let us comfort ourselves that we serve a master who will one day right all our wrongs, reckoning the injuries that are done to His as done to Himself. Thus, we should not think much to part with our country, our children, our possessions, or our life if the world will take them from us for Christ and His gospel's sake.

All these, and much better than these, shall be restored to us one day, and we may say thus to ourselves: "Yet I am not miserable so long as my Redeemer is happy; He lives, and I shall live with Him. Men may take from me my goods, but they cannot rob me of my grace. They may banish me from my country, but not from heaven. Take from me my life, but not my happiness; no, my faith, my heaven, my soul, my happiness is in His keeping, who will safely preserve them for me, and me for them."

But I fear I have held thee too long in the porch. I shall now open thee the door and let thee in, praying God to make these lessons as profitable to thee as the author's desire was that they might be, both in his preaching them, and in his willingness to have them published for public good.

I. A.

AN INTRODUCTION

Unto the Treatise Necessary for All Good Subjects to Understand, &c.

I have perused Doctor Fearne's book entitled *The Resolving of Conscience*, wherein I find that he has exceedingly mistaken the question. The question in truth is whether the Parliament has justly taken up arms; we affirm it, he denies it, and withal slips into another question: whether it is lawful for the subjects to take up arms against their king. But if he will so propose the question, then I must preface with these two or three distinctions, and one caution.

First, the subject is considered in two ways, either:

- Unitive, conjunctively, or
- Divisive, divisively.

The subject considered divisively has always applied himself to prayers and tears, using no other remedy; and of this we do not speak. But conjunctively considered, as the state is now, it is lawful for him thus to take up arms.

Secondly, the subject may be said to take up arms either as an act of:

- Self-preservation, or
- Jurisdiction exercised towards his prince.

In the first way, we say it is lawful; in the second way, we do not contend for it.

Thirdly, the subject is said to take up arms against the king either:

- Against the king's person (and of this we do not speak), or
- Against the king's commandment for their own preservation.

Thus, we affirm it, and then our position is:

That it is lawful for the subjects, conjunctively considered, to take up arms for self-preservation against the king's commandment, where two things are to be cleared:

First, that this is the case of the Parliament.

Secondly, that it is lawful for them to do so.

First, this is their case; for, as any reasonable bystander may observe, there are three grounds of this proceeding:

1. To bring in delinquents and such persons as are accused before them to be legally tried in that highest court of the kingdom.
2. To defend the state from foreign invasion, which poses as much danger to them as to us.
3. To preserve themselves and the country from the insurrection and rebellion of Papists.

And that this is lawful, we prove by various reasons, some drawn from nature, some from Scripture, some from the fundamental laws of the kingdom, some from the very being of Parliaments, and some from the common trust reposed on princes.

First, from nature: It is the most natural work in the world for everything to preserve itself. It is natural for a man to preserve

himself; natural for a community. Therefore, when a commonwealth shall choose a prince or a state officer, though they trust him with their welfare, that act of their trust is but by positive law, and therefore cannot destroy the natural law, which is self-preservation. *Cum humana potestas supra jus naturae non consistit*—seeing that no human power is above the law of nature.

Secondly, from Scripture: The Word of God says expressly in 1 *Chron.* 12:19 that David went out to battle against Saul. Yet he was Saul's subject at that time, for the lords of the Philistines sent him away, saying, "He will fall to his master Saul." I bring this text not to prove that a subject may take up arms against the king's person, but that a subject may take up arms against those who are malignant around the king's person, notwithstanding the king's command to the contrary. Because this of David is said to be against Saul, and that David's heart smote him for cutting off the lap of Saul's garment, the meaning must needs be that he went out in battle against those who attended upon Saul, strengthened by Saul's authority, notwithstanding Saul's command to the contrary.

In the New Testament, *Rom.* 13:1, we are commanded to be subject to the higher powers. Now, the Parliament being the highest court of justice in this kingdom (as King James says in his *Basilicon Doron*), must needs be the higher powers of England. Though the king is supreme, they have the high power of declaring the law (as Doctor Fearne confesses), being most fit to judge what is law. Therefore, declaring this to be the fundamental law of the kingdom for the subjects to defend themselves by forcible resistance, notwithstanding the king's command to the contrary, it is the duty of all the subjects to be obedient to these higher powers.

Thirdly, from the Fundamental Laws of the Kingdom: It is according to the fundamental laws of the kingdom (indeed, written and not unseen laws) that the Parliament is trusted by the commonwealth with its welfare and security. Hence, I reason thus: If it is the duty of the King to look to the safety of the kingdom, and that because he is trusted therewith by the commonwealth, then if the Parliament is immediately trusted by the commonwealth with its safety, as well as the King, though perhaps not to the same extent, then they too are to look to it and use all means for its preservation, just as the King is obliged to do.

But so it is that the Prince is bound to look to the safety and welfare of the kingdom, as agreed by all; and secondly, he is bound to it because he receives this power originally (I speak not in opposition to God) but I say originally from the people themselves, as is apparent from the government of the Judges and Kings of Israel, which government, this Doctor says, was monarchical, the best platform for England. For in *Judges 8:22*, the men of Israel come to Gideon to make him their king; and in *Judges 9:6*, they gathered together and made Abimelech their king; and in *Judges 11:8–11*, the people covenanted with Jephthah and made him their king. As for Saul, although he was designated by God to the kingdom, yet the people themselves first chose the form of their government when they said, “Give us a king to rule over us after the manner of the nations.” After God had anointed Saul, it is said in *1 Samuel 11:15*, “And all the people went to Gilgal, and there they made Saul king before the Lord in Gilgal.”

As for David, though he was anointed king by Samuel, yet we find that he continued a subject to Saul afterward; and in *2 Samuel 2*, he came to Hebron, where the men of Judah were, and they anointed David king over the house of Judah (v. 4). After he was thus anointed

by Judah to be king over them, yet he did not rule over Israel until the other tribes also came out and made him king over them (*1 Chronicles 12:38*). It is said that all these men of war came with a perfect heart to Hebron to make David king over all Israel.

As for Solomon, though he was designed by God for the kingdom, it is said of him also in *1 Chronicles 29:22*, “All the congregation did eat and drink before the Lord, and they made Solomon the son of David king the second time, and anointed him to the Lord to be the chief governor.” After Solomon's death, in *2 Chronicles 10:1*, it is said that Rehoboam went to Shechem, where all Israel came to make him king.

In *2 Samuel 16:18*, it is said: “And Hushai said unto Absalom, God save the king, God save the king!” And Absalom said unto Hushai, “Is this thy kindness to thy friend? Why didst thou not go with thy friend?” And Hushai said unto Absalom again, “Nay, but whom the Lord, this people, and all the men of Israel choose, his will I be, and with him will I abide.”

Thus, we see that these monarchs, both Judges and Kings of Israel, were chosen and entrusted by the people, and had their power of governing from them.

Thirdly, the Parliament is immediately trusted by the people and the commonwealth with the safety thereof, as well as the King, though not to be king. They are the officers of the kingdom, and therefore chosen immediately by the people, not designed by the King. This kind of officer existed in David's time as well. There were some officers who were the King's officers, such as his cooks, bakers, and the steward of his house, and the like. Others were the officers of the kingdom, called the Elders and Heads of the Tribes. Though they were under the king, yet they, together with him, were entrusted in

the affairs of the kingdom, and he consulted with them in the great affairs of the state (*1 Chronicles 13:1*).

Therefore, seeing that the King is to look to the safety of the kingdom, and because he is trusted therewith by the people, and the Parliament is equally trusted by the people with the safety of the land, it is their duty in times of danger to attend to it. They are unable to do this and fulfil their trust unless they have the power to take up arms against an enemy when the Prince is misled or defective.

Fourthly, from the Being of a Parliament: As it is a Parliament, it is the highest court of justice in the kingdom, and therefore has the power to enforce by force the attendance of those accused before them so that they may come to trial. Inferior courts have this power, much more so the highest. It is agreed by all that the Parliament has the power to send a Sergeant-at-Arms to bring up someone accused before them. If they have the power to send one Sergeant-at-Arms, then 20 if 20 are accused, or 100 if 100 are accused, or 1,000 if 1,000 are accused. Ten thousand if there are 10,000 accused, and so on, more or less as the occasion requires. There is the same reason for two as for one, for four as for two, for a hundred as for 20, and for a thousand as for a hundred. If this power is taken away from the Parliament, it ceases to be a Parliament. But the King and his forefathers have, by law, settled these liberties of Parliament, and therefore, according to the laws, they have the power to send for by force those accused to be tried before them. This they cannot do unless they raise an army when the accused are kept from them by an army.

5. From the Common Trust Reposed on Princes and the End Thereof:

The purpose of the trust placed in a prince, as indicated in *Psalms 78:70*, where it says, "He chose David his servant and took him from the sheepfold to feed his people, Jacob, and his inheritance in Israel," is to care for and protect the people. The reason the people have entrusted the prince with power is for the safety and security of the kingdom, for the welfare of the state—not so that the king might become great while the subjects become slaves. Now, if a people should have no power to take up arms for their own defence because they had entrusted the prince with that responsibility, then, by that trust, they would intend to make themselves slaves. For suppose the king were to allow a common enemy to invade or take his own subjects and make them slaves in galleys—if they were not allowed to take up arms for their own defence because they had trusted their prince, what could this be but making themselves slaves to him through that trust?

2. The Caution That is to be Premised is This:

Notwithstanding all that I have said, I do not say that the subjects have the power to depose their prince, nor does our assertion or practice enforce such an inference.

Objection: But if the power of the prince is derived from the people, then they may take that power away again.

Response: It does not follow, nor should the people need to think of such an inference. Indeed, if the power were firstly derived from the people to the prince, and the people were so tightly bound that they had no power left to defend themselves in case of danger when the prince is misled or unfaithful, then they might be inclined to think of deposing their prince. But although the power of the prince originates from them, if they still retain enough power to look to

their own preservation in times of danger, there is no need for them to consider such measures.

Objection: But if the people give the power, then if it is abused, may they not take it away?

Response: No, that is not necessary, as they never gave away the power of self-preservation. Thus, this position of ours is the only way to prevent such upheaval, and thereby the power of the prince is more fully established. For if the people were deprived of the power of self-preservation, which is natural to them, it would be the surest way to cause everything to collapse. For *Nullum violentum contra naturale est perpetuum*—no violent thing against nature is perpetual.

Thus, I have clearly explained our opinion and proven our point. Allow me now to address the Doctor.

Section I:

The Divine Right of Resistance

The Doctor states that in the proposition or principle, by the word "resistance" is meant not a denial of obedience to the prince's command, but rather a rising in arms—a forcible resistance. Though this is clear in the question, I thought it necessary to clarify, to remove the false accusation laid upon the divines of this kingdom and upon all those who appear for the King in this cause.

Here, the Doctor would suggest, at the very outset of his book (so that he might curry favour for his following discourse), that the divines of England are of his opinion. But if they are, surely their opinion has recently changed. Indeed, which divines are of his judgment? Not the divines of Germany, not the divines of the French Protestant churches, not the divines of Geneva, not those of Scotland, not of Holland, nor of England.

Not the divines of Germany, who say thus: "Governors, therefore, in such things that are repugnant to the law of God, have no power or immunity above other private men, and they themselves, commanding that which is evil, are as much bound to fear the ordinance of God, bearing the sword for the punishment of vice, as other private men. For Saint Paul, in *Romans 3*, says that God instituted and ordained a power both of defending that which is good and punishing that which is evil, and he commands that every soul (including the governors themselves) be subject to this ordinance of God. If they wish to be defended by this ordinance of God, they must do good, and not, by their wicked deeds, make themselves liable to punishment."

Not the divines of the French Protestant churches, as evidenced by their taking up of arms in defence of themselves at Rochelle.

Not the divines of Geneva, for as Calvin says in the 4th book of his *Institutes*, chapter 10: "For though the correcting of unbridled government be the vengeance of the Lord, let us not immediately think that it is committed to us, to whom then is given no other commandment but to obey and suffer. I speak always of private men. For if there be at this time any magistrates on behalf of the people (such as in old times were the Ephors, set against the kings of

Lacedemonia, or the tribunes of the people against the Roman consuls, or the Demarchs against the Senate at Athens, or the same power which, peradventure as things now are, the three states have in every realm when they hold their principal assemblies), I do not forbid them, according to their office, to withstand the outraging licentiousness of kings. I affirm that if they wink at kings wilfully ranging over and treading down the poor commonalty, their dissembling is not without a wicked breach of faith, for they deceitfully betray the liberty of the people, of whom they know themselves appointed protectors by the ordinance of God."

Not the divines of Holland, for we know their practice towards the King of Spain.

Not the divines of Scotland, for Buchanan says: "I can number twelve or more kings among ourselves, who for their sins and wickedness were either cast into prison for life or else escaped punishment through banishment. But this is what we contend for: that the people, from whom kings have all that they possess, are greater than the kings, and the whole multitude has the same power over them as they have over particular men from among the multitude." Witness also their recent taking up of arms when they came into England, which both the King and Parliament have judged not to be rebellion.

Not our English divines, whose judgment Dr Willet was as well acquainted with as our present Doctor, who says thus: "Touching the point of resistance, certain distinctions must be observed. For when there is an extraordinary calling (as in the time of the Judges), or when the kingdom is usurped without any right (as by Athaliah), or when the land is invaded by foreign enemies (as in the time of the Maccabees), or when the government is altogether elective (as in the

Empire of Germany), in all these cases there is least question of resistance to be made by the general council of the states. Yet where none of these conditions concur, God forbid that the Church and Commonwealth should be left without remedy, provided that the former conditions (as alleged by Pareus) are observed, when havoc is made of the Commonwealth, the Church, or Religion."

Thus also says **Doctor Bilson**, whose book was approved by public authority and printed at Oxford: "If a prince should go about to subject his kingdom to a foreign realm, or change the form of the commonwealth from an empire to tyranny, or neglect the laws established by common consent of prince and people, to execute his own pleasure, in these and other cases which could be named: if the nobles and commons join together to defend their ancient and accustomed liberties, regiments, and laws, they cannot well be accounted rebels." The title of that page is: *The Law Sometimes Permits Resistance*; and the margin note reads: *In Some Cases, the Nobles and Commons May Stand for their Public Regiment and the Laws of their Kingdom.*

The Judgement of Protestant Divines on Arbitrary Government

All these judgements of various divines I do not present as if I agreed with their opinions regarding the deposing or punishing of princes by the people, which we do not advocate for hereditary princes. Rather, I bring them forth to show how the Doctor's judgement differs from that of the divines of all Protestant countries, despite his insinuation that the divines of England share his views. Furthermore, to demonstrate that our judgement is no new or sudden opinion, consider the opinion of the divines in the Council of Basel, where one of them states: "In every well-ordered kingdom, it

ought especially to be desired that the whole realm be of more authority than the king; if this happens otherwise, it is not to be called a kingdom, but tyranny.” Similarly, he expresses the same regarding the Church, and so on.

Another divine of the same council declares: “For the Pope is in the Church, as the king is in his kingdom. And for a king to be of more authority than his kingdom would be too absurd. Therefore, neither should the Pope be above the Church. Just as kings who wickedly rule the commonwealth and exercise cruelty are often deprived of their kingdoms, so too may the Bishops of Rome be deposed by the Church, that is, by the General Council. Nor do I approve of those who attribute such vast and ample authority to kings that they are not bound under any laws. Such people are mere flatterers who speak otherwise than they think. For although they say that the moderation of the law is always in the prince’s power, I understand this to mean that, when reason persuades, he ought to deviate from the strictness of the law. For he is called a king who cares for and provides for the commonwealth, who takes pleasure in the benefit of his subjects, and in all his actions considers the good of those over whom he rules. If he does not do this, he is not to be accounted a king, but a tyrant, whose nature is only to pursue his own advantage. In this respect, a king differs from a tyrant: the one seeks the good and profit of those whom he rules, the other only his own.”

To make this clearer, we must consider the reason kings were first instituted. In the beginning, as Cicero says in his *Offices*, it is certain that there was a time when people lived without kings. But afterward, when land and possessions began to be divided according to the custom of every nation, kings were ordained for no other reason than to execute justice. For when the common people were oppressed by the rich and mighty, they turned to some good and

virtuous man who would defend the poor from injury and establish laws by which the rich and poor could live together. However, under the rule of kings, when the poor were still often oppressed, laws were instituted which would judge impartially, neither out of hatred nor favour, and give equal care to the poor as to the rich. This indicates that not only the people but also the king are subject to the laws.

The Doctor then tells us that he is opposed to arbitrary government. For, he says, we may and ought to deny obedience to such commands of the prince as are unlawful by the law of God, and even by the established laws of the kingdom.

Answer: This reasoning in no way abolishes arbitrary government but rather supports it. For government is not considered arbitrary merely because the subjects may deny in word, and are thus left to suffer. If that were the case, then the Turkish government would not be arbitrary. When the Sultan commands his subjects to do something, they may deny obedience and suffer for it, as they sometimes do. If there are laws by which a king is to rule, and if he commands his subjects to break them, and the subjects are neither bound to obey him nor suffer punishment from him, then his government is not arbitrary. But if laws are made, and he has the power to force his subjects either to keep or break them, and to punish them at his pleasure for refusal, and if the whole kingdom is bound in conscience to endure whatever punishment he inflicts for not breaking those laws, then his government is arbitrary. Arbitrary government is when a prince rules *ex arbitrio*—that is, by his own will—either because there is no law to govern by but his own will, or because he has the power to break those laws at his will and punish the subjects at his pleasure for not breaking them. In truth, this latter case is more characteristic of arbitrary government than the former, as it demonstrates greater liberty in the will, with the power to act

when reason persuades otherwise, than if there were no reason dissuading at all. Otherwise, there would be no arbitrary government in the world, for no state exists without some laws by which they rule and are ruled, even the very Indians. The arbitrariness of a government lies in the fact that, despite the existence of laws, the ruler may force his subjects to act according to his own pleasure, irrespective of the law.

The Doctor then says, “We must consider that those who plead for resistance in such a case as is supposed, agree that it must be concluded upon *omnibus ordinibus regni consentientibus*—that is, with the general and unanimous consent of the two houses.”

Answer:

1. First, these words are poorly translated. For *omnes ordines regni* may *consentire*, and yet there may not be unanimous and general consent of the members of the two houses as of one man.
2. If the Doctor grants this to be our position, why then does he object that the Christians in the primitive times did not take up arms for their defence against the emperors? They did not have the consent of all the orders of the empire, and therefore their case is not comparable to ours, as the Doctor later pretends. But if they had the whole Senate of Rome with them, the representative body of the empire, then their case would have been more like ours, and there is no doubt that they would have taken up arms for their defence.

The Doctor then says, “We suppose that the prince must be so disposed, bent on overthrowing religion, liberties, laws, and so forth.”

Answer: Here he assumes what has never been conceded. We do not claim to suppose, but rather that we see and find through experience that a prince is misled by those around him who seek to overthrow religion, liberties, and laws. In such a case, it is lawful to take up arms to deliver the king from them and to bring them to just punishment.

Then the Doctor proceeds to propose three general principles, which he endeavours to prove in his following discourse, and I shall respond to them in order.

Section II:

The Justification of Resistance

The Doctor states that the principle upon which those who resist rely is untrue, and that conscience cannot find clear ground to rest upon for making resistance, for it hears the Apostle expressly say, "Whosoever resists shall receive damnation."

Answer: In his attempt to resolve the conscience, the Doctor seeks to frighten the tender-hearted with the word "damnation" and forbids resistance on pain of damnation. However, the word in the Greek is more accurately translated as *judgement* or *punishment*. As Piscator observes, it does not refer to eternal damnation, but rather to the punishment of the magistrate in this life, as is clear from the Apostle's reasoning in the following verses: "They that resist shall

receive to themselves judgment, for rulers are not a terror to good works, but to evil.”

The Doctor then proceeds to address examples from Scripture which we bring forward to support our doctrine. However, he picks and chooses what suits his argument, while leaving out what does not.

The first example given is that of the people rescuing Jonathan from the hands of Saul. The Doctor responds by saying that the people did not take up arms on their own, but being present by Saul’s command, they hindered the execution of a particular, passionate, and unlawful command by means of loving violence and importunity.

Answer: First, the Doctor admits that the people used violence, which is precisely the point we seek to prove. However, he does not substantiate from the Scripture that this violence was *loving*, which is the very thing he ought to prove. There is nothing in the text to suggest that Jonathan was delivered by love, for it is stated that “the people rescued him,” and what is a rescue by men in arms if not an act of violence?

Second, according to the Doctor’s own position, they should not have rescued Jonathan, but only defended themselves by prayers and tears, leaving Jonathan to suffer. Therefore, although the Doctor grants that a rescue was performed by “loving violence,” he undermines his own argument at the outset of his work.

The second example the Doctor addresses is David’s resistance to Saul. He responds by saying that David’s guard was only meant to secure his person against Saul’s cruelty, who had sent men to take David’s life.

Answer: By this reasoning, a Parliament may indeed take up a guard to secure their persons against the “cut-throats” surrounding the King, which is far more than the prayers, tears, and passive suffering that the Doctor advocates for in the remainder of his discourse.

Furthermore, in this instance, the Doctor also concedes his argument. If David’s guard was to secure him against Saul’s men, as the Doctor admits, then they could not have secured David without resisting those messengers of the King. If the Doctor grants that messengers sent by the King may be resisted with arms, he grants all that his opponents contend for.

The Doctor adds that David’s actions were merely defensive, without any violence offered to Saul.

Answer: What, then, do you make of David’s words to Achish in *1 Samuel 29:8*? “And David said unto Achish, ‘What have I done, and what have you found in your servant from the day I have been with you until this day, that I may not go fight against the enemies of my Lord the King?’” Among those enemies was Saul and his men (whom the Doctor calls “cut-throats”).

Furthermore, David’s opponents desire no more from his example than a defensive posture with arms. Even if there were no blows struck, the fact that David was prepared for armed resistance demonstrates that he would strike if the need arose. Otherwise, why was he armed?

David, moreover, was just one subject. If it was lawful for one subject to defend himself through armed resistance, how much more so for the representative body of the whole kingdom?

Finally, according to the Doctor's principles, David ought to have done no more than seek God with prayers and tears, and surrendered himself to Saul's fury. Therefore, even if David's defence was purely hostile in nature, it is still more than the Doctor's doctrine allows. In conceding this point, the Doctor contradicts his own argument later in his discourse.

David's Defence and Scriptural Examples of Resistance

Regarding the matter of Keilah, the Doctor responds to our supposition (as he calls it) with his own opinion. But whether David would have defended Keilah against Saul, I leave to the conscience of the reader. Consider that David's departure from Keilah was solely because the men of Keilah would not be faithful to him. He did not inquire of the Lord whether it was lawful for him to stay in Keilah, but rather asked whether Saul would come down against him and if the men of Keilah would deliver him into Saul's hand. David left Keilah because the Lord revealed that they would betray him, not because it was unlawful for him to hold the city, but because the city would prove disloyal.

The Doctor further claims that David's example was extraordinary since he was anointed and chosen by the Lord to succeed Saul.

Answer: Though David was God's anointed, he was still Saul's subject. While God did indeed offer extraordinary protection to David, this does not imply that David's actions were unlawful—rather, it suggests they were all the more lawful and commendable. God does not give extraordinary protection to unlawful deeds. If David's actions were extraordinary, then they were commanded by God in a special way. For it is not lawful for anyone to deviate from God's ordinary commands without a special directive from Him. If David did have such a command, how can it be true, as the Doctor

later claims, that Scripture gives no command for this kind of resistance?

The Doctor previously stated that David's actions were purely defensive, without any violence toward Saul. But if this was so, how could his resistance be considered extraordinary? If it was indeed extraordinary, then it was not merely a non-violent defence, for such defence is the ordinary duty of subjects toward their king.

The Doctor then moves on to other examples brought forward by his opponents, which they use to argue for resistance, such as the High Priest resisting the King in the Temple, and Elisha shutting the door against the King's messenger, who came to take his life. Regarding the High Priest, the Doctor claims that he did no more than what every minister should do if a King attempted to administer the sacrament: reprove him and prevent him from accessing the elements.

Answer: If this were all that happened, the priests should not have been praised for their valour, but for their faithfulness. In *2 Chronicles 26:17*, it is said that Azariah the priest followed the King, and with him were eighty priests of the Lord, described as "valiant men." The fact that they were praised for their valour suggests that their actions involved not only reproof but also resistance.

The Doctor also argues that the priests thrust the King out of the Temple because God had already struck him with leprosy, which he claims discharged the King from his rule as well.

Answer: How does this conclusion—that being struck with leprosy was an actual discharge from his kingship—follow from Scripture?

The Doctor then moves to Elisha's example, which he claims is of little significance. However, he concedes that personal defence is lawful against sudden and illegal assaults by messengers—even those sent by the Prince himself—such that one may ward off blows, restrain his hand, and the like.

Answer:

1. If it is lawful to ward off the King's blows and restrain his hands, this goes beyond simply praying, weeping, and suffering.
2. If the King comes with an army, how can you restrain the hands of an entire army without an army of your own? By the Doctor's own reasoning, it is therefore lawful for subjects, as a body, to raise an army in self-defence.
3. Furthermore, Elisha's example clearly shows that messengers sent by the King to take someone's life may be taken captive. Is that not resistance? Elisha said, "Do you see how this son of a murderer has sent someone to cut off my head? Look, when the messenger comes, shut the door and hold him fast at the door" (*2 Kings 6:32*).

The Natural and Political Body's Right to Self-Defence

The Doctor responds to the analogy of the natural and political body, where it is argued that just as the natural body may defend itself, so too may the political body. The Doctor answers by stating that while the natural body defends itself against an external force, it does not cause internal strife or contention within itself. Likewise, the political body may defend itself against an external power, but not, as is currently the case, by one part of the body set against the head and another part of the same body.

Answer: The Doctor thus concedes that it is lawful for the natural body to defend itself against an external force. And what is the militia for, especially, if not to defend against foreign invaders?

The Doctor then distinguishes between personal defence and general resistance by arms. He claims that personal defence can occur without offence and does not challenge the order and authority over us, whereas general resistance by arms strikes directly at the order which is the life of the commonwealth. He argues this makes a significant difference between Elisha's shutting of the door against the King's messenger and resisting the King with armed men.

Answer: Why was Elisha's defence considered personal? Was it because he was just one individual defending himself? In that case, if one man defends himself against 1,000 armed men, is that also a personal defence? Or was it personal because only Elisha, the prophet, made the defence without assistance? Not so, because Elisha instructed the elders to shut the door and hold the messenger fast. If this act of Elisha contradicted the King's command, why does it not strike at the order and power over him just as our resistance does now? If private individuals, without any authority, were to gather in a disorderly mob to oppose laws and governors, such an act would indeed strike at the order and power, undermining the state. However, when the state sends an army to bring delinquents to trial in the highest court of the kingdom, allowing justice and judgment to flow once more like a stifled river, it strengthens and affirms the order and power of authority. This is precisely the case in our situation.

The Doctor then refers to some Scriptures that he believes support his position. Let us examine them.

First, he cites *Numbers 16:3*, where the 250 princes of the congregation gathered the people against Moses and Aaron, and perished in their sin.

Answer: Moses and Aaron had not neglected their trust, and our question is whether, setting aside any personal feelings towards our sovereign, a prince who neglects his trust and, through ill counsel, acts in a way that may ruin the state, may not be resisted by the entire state. Now consider how far this example diverges from our question.

1. The 250 princes of the congregation did not represent the entire people, nor were they the representative body or appointed by the whole people.
2. Moses and Aaron had done no wrong and were innocent.

The Doctor responds that the other princes *supposed* Moses and Aaron were guilty, and that, he suggests, is enough.

Answer: It seems, indeed, that suppositions are sufficient for the Doctor to charge Parliament. But for us, suppositions are not enough to charge our Prince.

Second, the Doctor references *1 Samuel 8:11*, saying that although the people were warned of the oppression they would face under a king, all the violence and injustice they might suffer would still not justify resistance. Their only recourse, he argues, was to cry to the Lord (v. 18).

Answer: In this passage, Samuel describes what the King *would* do, not what he *should* do. When Samuel says in verse 18, “You shall cry out in that day because of your King whom you have chosen for yourselves, and the Lord will not hear you in that day,” he is not

outlining the people's duty, but rather their punishment. Samuel does not say, "Then you shall cry to the Lord, and He shall hear you," as is typical in Scripture when a duty is enjoined with the promise of God's response. Instead, he says, "You shall cry in that day, and the Lord will not hear you," thus portraying the punishment for their choice.

Third, the Doctor argues that, according to Scripture, the people were not to gather for civil assemblies or war except by the King's command, as the power of the trumpet was vested in the supreme authority, as with Moses in *Numbers 10*.

Answer: The Parliament has sounded no trumpet for war that was not commanded by the supreme authority. As the Doctor himself says in Section 1, page 2, in the established laws of the land, we have the King's will and consent given after careful deliberation. To obey him contrary to the laws would be to obey him against himself, following his sudden will rather than his deliberate will. Therefore, if there are any established laws wherein the King has given his deliberate consent to the sounding of the trumpet that now echoes, this objection is nothing but a false alarm.

The Power of Parliament and Resistance to Unlawful Rule

Now, though I am no lawyer and must refer much to what Parliament has declared, as they are the judges of the law, I can still tell you this much, as it is consonant with right reason: unless the Parliament has the power to summon delinquents and accused persons to be tried in the highest court of justice, it cannot truly be called a Parliament. The King has often declared his intention to maintain the liberties and privileges of Parliament. Now, suppose a man is accused before Parliament of some notorious crime—everyone agrees that Parliament has the authority to send a Sergeant

at Arms to apprehend him. If the individual refuses to appear, that Sergeant at Arms has the power to call for further assistance. If the delinquent gathers 20, 30, or 100 men to resist, Parliament has the authority to send additional forces to bring him in. If they can send 100, why not 1,000 or even 10,000 if needed? And if the King chooses to protect these delinquents, that is merely his sudden will, while, as the Doctor says, his deliberate will as expressed in the law should take precedence.

This is the established law of the kingdom, as well as the consistent practice of all Parliaments: they have the power to summon delinquents. Indeed, how could they be a court of justice if they could not compel the accused to appear before them? Therefore, according to the Doctor's own principles, the King's deliberate will, expressed in law, has already sanctioned this action. Though by his sudden will (as the Doctor calls it), the King may attempt to halt the process, Parliament's authority remains clear.

Although the Doctor claims that Parliament is taking up arms against the King, this is a misunderstanding of the situation and a misrepresentation that deceives many. The truth is that the current army, under the command of the Earl of Essex, is merely enforcing the summons of delinquents who have been harmful to the state. To deny Parliament this power is to deny it the very essence of what it means to be a Parliament. If they can send one Sergeant at Arms for one man, they can send 1,000 for 1,000.

The Doctor then poses a question: it is remarkable, he says, that among all the prophets who rebuked the kings of Israel for idolatry, cruelty, and oppression, none called upon the elders of the people to resist.

Answer: I am astonished at the Doctor's amazement. What could be more evident than the text in *2 Kings 6:32*? Elisha was sitting in his house, and the elders were sitting with him. The King sent a messenger to Elisha, and when the messenger arrived, Elisha said to the elders, "See how this son of a murderer has sent someone to take off my head. Look, when the messenger comes, shut the door and hold him fast at the door." The Doctor wonders why no prophet ever called upon the elders to resist. Here we see the prophet Elisha instructing the elders to imprison the King's messenger.

Finally, the Doctor cites *Romans 13*, "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers," and verse 2, "Whosoever resists the power resists the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation." He claims this Scripture provides the clearest evidence on this point.

Answer: Let us now address this directly. If this passage, which the Doctor makes the central point of his argument, does not clearly support his case, then let the consciences of men be satisfied in what he says. But if it contradicts him, then let them reject all that he affirms.

The Doctor argues that it is unlawful to resist a King's command, even if it is unjust, because this command was given to Christians under the Roman emperors, whose commands were destructive to the Christian religion and subverted all that was good and just.

Answer: There is no such instruction in this Scripture, as I will demonstrate with the following reasons:

1. The power that every soul is commanded to be subject to, and not to resist, is the power that is not a terror to good works but to evil. Verse 3 provides the reason for the instruction in verse 2:

“Whosoever resists the power resists the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive judgment.” The explanation follows in verse 3: “For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to evil.” Therefore, the subjection commanded, and the resistance forbidden, applies to matters consistent with God’s law. It does not refer to unlawful commands that contradict God’s law.

2. The power that we are commanded to be subject to is described as the ordinance of God, and the minister of that power is the servant of God for our good (v. 4). The Apostle says of the ruler we are to obey, “He is the minister of God to you for good.” But when a ruler commands something unlawful and contrary to God’s law, he is no longer a minister of God for good. Therefore, this Scripture does not command us to submit to or refrain from resisting ungodly commands of rulers.

Objection: Some might argue that, though a ruler’s commands are unlawful, he remains a penal ordinance of God for our good.

Answer: In this passage, we are not commanded to submit to a penal ordinance. The submission enjoined by the Apostle applies to all times and places, yet not all authorities in all times and places function as penal ordinances.

The Nature of Subjection to Authorities in Romans 13

In this Scripture, the Apostle commands us to be subject and not to resist when magistrates act as God's ministers. However, when they issue unlawful commands, they are not properly and actively serving as God's ministers, though God may still make use of them. While they may hold their position as God's ministers, their authority in regard to the command itself is void when the command is evil and

contrary to law. Therefore, we are commanded to obey them insofar as they act as God's ministers in lawful actions.

In verse 6, the Apostle says, "For this cause pay you tribute also, for they are God's ministers, attending continually to this very thing."

From this, it is clear that the subjection and obedience commanded in the first verses of Romans 13 is active, not passive. The Apostle says in verses 1 and 2, "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, and not resist." He then follows with verse 3: "Why wilt thou not then be afraid of the power? Do that which is good." In verse 6, he adds, "For this cause pay you tribute also." But if the King commands something unlawful or sinful, as the Doctor claims, we are to be passively subject. Therefore, the subjection commanded and resistance forbidden in Scripture refers to lawful commands, not to unlawful ones.

As Jerome comments on this passage, "The Apostle shows that we must obey rulers in what is right, but not in what is contrary to religion." Furthermore, the Doctor himself admits, on page 11, that this prohibition is not temporary but perpetual. Thus, it applies to times when the Prince commands what is right, which confirms that the subjection here commanded is active subjection, not merely passive.

The Doctor then attempts to free this passage from all objections, saying first, "I may suppose the King supreme, as St. Peter calls him, or the higher power, as St. Paul does here, though this is now being questioned by some."

Answer: Is this truly only now being questioned? What shall we make of Dr. Bilson's statement? He writes, "By superior powers ordained of God, we understand not only princes, but all public

states and regiments, in some cases the people, and in others the nobles, who share the same right to the sword that princes have in their kingdom." From Romans 13, we are commanded to be obedient to those in authority. Suppose we are in a country without a king but governed by states—does this Scripture not command subjection there as well? How then can the Doctor claim that by "higher powers," the Apostle means only the King? The Doctor acknowledges that Parliament is the highest court of justice in the kingdom, and the highest court of justice must surely fall under the term "higher powers." Therefore, by the Apostle's command, we are to be obedient to Parliament as well. How can the Doctor maintain that by "higher power" is meant only the King, in opposition to Parliament?

But the Doctor argues, "For St. Peter's distinction encompasses all in authority: the King as supreme, and all who are sent by him," citing *1 Peter 2:13*, which refers to "those who are sent by him," implying the two Houses of Parliament, as they are called together by the King's writ.

Answer: Calvin and other interpreters disagree with the Doctor on this point. Calvin writes, "Those who refer the pronoun 'him' to the King are much mistaken. This is a general reason for obedience to all magistrates, because they rule by God's commandment and are sent by Him." Here, the pronoun "him" refers to God, according to many interpreters, while the Doctor attributes it to the King.

The Doctor then argues further, saying that in this text, all persons under the higher powers are expressly forbidden to resist: "For whosoever," in verse 2, must be as inclusive as "every soul" in verse 1.

Answer: The Doctor seems to imply that the entire Parliament is subject to the King. But who denies that Parliament members are subjects of the King? As men and as Englishmen, they should indeed

be subject to the King. However, if the Doctor means that Parliament, as a body, must enact and do whatever the King commands, how does that align with his own statement on pages 25 and 26, where he acknowledges the "excellent balance" of the three estates in Parliament? He notes that each has the power of denial. What might happen, he asks, if the King and Lords acted without the Commons, or vice versa? He recognises the need for balance.

If the Doctor means that Parliament, when acting as a joint body, must passively submit to the King's unlawful commands, and that passive obedience is the only kind of obedience referred to in Romans 13, then he narrows the text in a way that no one else has ever done. No one can reasonably believe that when the Apostle commands subjection to higher powers, he means only passive suffering under unlawful commands, and not active obedience to lawful ones.

The Nature of Resistance and Obedience in Christian Doctrine

Thirdly, the Doctor states that the Roman State might have claimed more authority by the fundamentals of that state than our Great Council (he thinks) will or can.

Answer: But what of it? Does this mean it is unlawful for subjects today to resist the higher power when it commands unlawful things, simply because the Apostle instructed that we should not resist lawful commands from the higher powers? Here lies the Doctor's persistent mistake: he assumes that the Apostle's command was given to Christians to obey Nero, even in his unlawful commands. However, the Apostle's command applies to all times and is directed at all Christians, not just those living under Nero. It does not follow

that the Apostle commanded them to be subject to Nero in matters of unlawfulness.

If Nero's commands had been entirely unlawful, and if the Apostle's instruction had been directed only at the Christians of that time, and if the subjection required had been only passive suffering, then this Scripture might support the Doctor's argument. But although Nero was an enemy to Christians, some of his commands were lawful, and the Apostle's instruction was a general rule for all Christians at all times. The obedience and subjection commanded in this passage was not merely passive, but active, as I have already demonstrated. I appeal to the Doctor's own conscience: does not this Scripture command active obedience and subjection to the prince? Therefore, his interpretation is exceedingly broad, and his argument is void.

The Doctor continues by stating, "If it be replied that this prohibition was temporary and suited to those times," as some have said, he offers a response.

Answer: Here, the Doctor creates a straw man and argues against his own invention. He refutes various other objections, though it is not my intention to defend every pamphlet. My purpose is to satisfy the consciences of men. However, I cannot help but point out that the Doctor professes to oppose arbitrary power, as he did in Section 1, where he expressed strong disapproval of arbitrary government. But I wish the Doctor would consider his own principles as laid out in these papers. He claims that the Roman Emperors were absolute monarchs, ruling absolutely and arbitrarily, and that they became such absolute monarchs through conquest. He then asserts that the Crown of England has been passed down through three conquests. Therefore, if one conquest justifies the Emperor's arbitrary

government, the Doctor must—whether or not he admits it—believe that England’s government should be even more arbitrary.

What remains in this section, I have either already addressed or will cover more appropriately in the following discourse.

Section III:

The Power of Resistance and the Role of Fundamental Laws

The Doctor claims that much is said about the fundamentals of the power of resistance, and because these fundamentals are hidden from common view and not written laws, people are led to believe that they are whatever those in power claim them to be.

Answer: Here, the Doctor pushes the metaphor of "fundamentals" too far. He implies that because the foundations of a house are unseen, fundamental laws must also be invisible. However, fundamental laws are not called "fundamental" because they are hidden underground, but because they are essential—the foundational principles upon which all other laws are built. Just as fundamental points of religion are clearly seen and understood, so too are fundamental laws.

Secondly, the Doctor asserts that these fundamentals are not written laws. However, Parliament states that they *are* written laws and presents several legal texts in support of their actions. The Doctor, along with those who agree with him, claims they are not written. In

such a case, who should the people trust, if not Parliament, especially since the Doctor himself admits that no one is better suited to judge the laws than Parliament?

The Doctor then says that those who argue for the power of resistance base their argument on the premise that power originally resides with the people. If a prince, entrusted with power by election, fails to discharge his duty, the power reverts to the people or, in this kingdom, to the two Houses of Parliament, the representative body of the kingdom. The people, or their representatives, may then re-assume the power. This, he says, is the foundation of their argument, as it is now presented to the people.

Answer: We, like the Doctor, distinguish between the power itself and the qualifications and designation of the person who holds it. The power, in the abstract, comes from God, not the people. But the qualifications for how that power is exercised, according to the form of government, and the designation of the person who holds the power, come from man. Therefore, we do not claim to take the power itself out of God's hands—it remains where we found it. However, if the person entrusted with that power fails to discharge their duty, then it falls to the people or their representatives to step in. They do so not as an act of jurisdiction over the prince, but as an act of self-preservation.

It is important to distinguish between acting to preserve the state temporarily and fully re-assuming the power, which would involve removing the prince from office. For example, suppose a ship is full of passengers at sea during a storm, and the ship is in great danger of sinking due to the negligence of the steersman. The passengers may, for their own safety, ask the steersman to step aside and temporarily appoint someone else to steer the ship. This does not mean they are

removing the steersman from his position permanently. This is our case: we do not argue that if the prince fails in his duties, the people and Parliament should remove him from office. The Doctor, by failing to make this distinction, misrepresents us as seeking to depose the king, which we do not contend for, nor can it be inferred from our principles.

If the prince is misled by those around him and fails to properly discharge his duties, the people or their representatives may step in temporarily, just as someone might take the helm of a ship during a storm, ensuring safety until the danger has passed. In this, the Doctor wrongs us greatly by disputing as if we seek to depose the king, which is not our argument, nor does it follow from our principles.

The Fundamentals of Government and the Origin of Power

The Doctor says that while the fundamentals of government are much talked about, this is, according to them, the fundamental principle in all kingdoms and governments. For they claim that power originally came from the people everywhere, but this would serve no more for the power of resistance in England than it would in France or Turkey.

Answer: If this is indeed the fundamental principle in all kingdoms and governments, then it clearly does not lie so low and unseen as the Doctor previously suggested, because it is visible to the entire world.

Secondly, when the Doctor says that this argument holds no more weight for the power of resistance in England than in France or Turkey, he seems to imply that there is no such power of resistance in France or Turkey. Yet, who does not know that the Protestants in

France share this view with us? Their stance is evidenced by the events surrounding the defence of Rochelle.

The Doctor then says he will clarify two points: whether power originates so primarily and chiefly from the people as is claimed, and whether the people may, upon just cause, re-assume that power. He first addresses the question of the origin of power, which some claim comes from the people, with God's role being merely one of permissive approval.

Answer: If the Doctor is referring to power as the concept of magistracy itself, and the sufficiency of authority to command or coerce in the governing of a people—considered abstractly, separate from the manner in which it is qualified according to different forms of government and the designation of a particular person—then I do not believe there is anyone in Parliament, or among those who write in support of Parliament, who holds that power comes from the people with only permissive approval from God. Neither can they hold this view. The fact that they contend so much for Parliament suggests that they believe authority and power, in the abstract, come from God himself. As for the designation of a person or the form of government, the Doctor himself concedes in this section that these are inventions of man, with God's permissive approval.

The Doctor then attempts to prove this point with three arguments, claiming that power, when distinguished from its qualification and designation, is of divine institution.

Answer: He need not have troubled himself with these three arguments, as no one denies this. Nevertheless, we will examine what he says. First, he argues that the Apostle explicitly states that "the powers are of God" (*Romans 13:1*) and refers to them as the "ordinance of God" (*Romans 13:2*). By "power," he means the

authority of magistracy itself, distinguished from its qualifications or the designation of any particular person.

1. If this is the case, then how can it be true, as the Doctor said earlier in Section 2, that the "higher power" in *Romans 13* is the same as "the King as supreme" in *1 Peter 2:13*? He previously admitted that the rule of a king or prince is a qualification of the power, and the Apostle himself refers to it as a "human institution" (ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις).
2. If "power" in *Romans 13* refers to magistracy and authority in the abstract, then when we are commanded to submit to it, it cannot mean that Christians at that time were to submit to the Emperor's unlawful commands, as the Doctor previously claimed. Since the rule by an emperor or prince is merely the qualification of the power, it follows that if "power" refers to magistracy and authority in the abstract, the command in *Romans 13* to submit is simply a command to acknowledge the existence of magistracy. In that case, all of the Doctor's arguments, and the strength of his case for prohibiting forcible resistance to unlawful commands from *Romans 13*, collapse.

The Nature of Power and Its Divine and Human Aspects

The Doctor then tells us, within the same argument, that this power is called an ordinance of man in a subjective sense. He offers a distinction, stating that power is considered in two ways: either as it is subjectively amongst men, and in that sense it is ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις (a human ordinance), or as it is considered causally, and in that sense it is θεία τάξις (an ordinance of God).

Answer: This distinction is too narrow. The term ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις refers not only to power being exercised among men, but also to it

being *a human institution* in four respects:

1. *Causally*, because the forms of various governments are human inventions.
2. *Subjectively*, because the power exists among men.
3. *Objectively*, because the power operates over human affairs.
4. *Finally*, because it is ordained for the benefit of man and the common good. Yet, the power itself, in the abstract, is the constitution and ordinance of God.

The Doctor then attempts to prove that power is of God by referring to *Romans 13:4*, where the magistrate is called the "minister of God."

Answer: However, here the Doctor shifts from discussing the power itself to discussing the person appointed to that power. The power itself is not called the minister of God—this title refers to the person who holds the office, not to the power in the abstract, which was the point he set out to prove.

Similarly, in his third argument, the Doctor cites other passages, such as "By me kings reign" and "I have said ye are gods." Yet, he previously admitted in his first argument that the forms of government, such as kingships and empires, are human inventions.

But suppose the Doctor had indeed proven that power in the abstract is of divine institution, and had granted that the specific forms of governing power and the designation of individuals to office are human inventions. What would he have gained against his imagined adversary? If his adversary were to argue that the people may depose a prince who neglects his trust (which is not our argument) because the power originates from the people, how does anything the Doctor has said undermine that claim? For even if he has proven that power in the abstract is from God, by admitting that the forms of

government and the designation of persons are from the people, one could still argue that the people may alter the government or depose the ruler, since they were the ones to establish both the form and the officeholder.

The Doctor goes on to say that the accusation made against divines by those pleading the other side—that they exalt monarchy as the only form of government ordained by divine right—is baseless and ignorant.

Answer: Setting aside the reproachful language, how can we think otherwise if we are to believe all that the Doctor says? He argues that the power mentioned in *Romans 13* is ordained by divine right (*Jure Divino*), yet in Section 2, he states that the "higher power" there is the same as the "Supreme" or "King" in *1 Peter*. This aligns with the nature of monarchical government, which we shall consider more thoroughly in the sections that follow.

The remaining part of this section is devoted to proving that the power itself is of God, while the qualification and designation of rulers is of human origin—a point which we all agree upon.

Section IV:

The Re-assumption of Power and the Right to Resist

The Doctor now addresses the idea of forfeiture, saying that if the Prince fails to discharge his trust, then, according to some, the power falls back to the people or the two Houses of Parliament (the

representative body of the people) to take control and resist. This, he says, is believed to follow from the principle that power originates from the people through election, based on the stipulation or covenant between the Prince and the people, and because every state should have within itself the means for its own safety. He proposes to examine these arguments in order.

Answer: Here, the Doctor accuses us of holding the opinion that it is lawful for the people to re-assume their power if the Prince fails to discharge his trust, thereby leading the world to believe that we are advocating for the deposition of Kings, or that Parliament seeks such an end. What else, he implies, could it mean for the people or Parliament to re-assume power from the Prince? We want the world to know, however, that we are taking up arms solely as an act of self-preservation, not with any intention of removing the King from his office. For the present, the State has placed some under the King at the helm until the storm passes, as we have stated before.

The Doctor then says that concerning the derivation of power, we answer first: if power does not come from the people, as is claimed, and as he has supposedly demonstrated earlier, then the people cannot re-assume that power.

Answer: How does this follow? All the Doctor "cleared" earlier was that power in the abstract is from God, not from the people. Now, let us see whether this clarification leads to the conclusion that the people cannot re-assume power. If this is to be the logical consequence, the syllogism would look like this:

- If power, magistracy, and authority itself come from God, while the forms of government and the designation of persons come from man, then the people cannot re-assume power.

- Power and magistracy come from God, while the forms of government and the designation of persons come from man (as the Doctor stated in Section 3).
- Therefore, the people cannot re-assume power (as the Doctor concludes in Section 4).

Answer: Would not his imagined adversaries easily deny the conclusion? Indeed, if the Doctor had proven that neither power, nor its qualification, nor the designation of rulers came from man, but only from God, then he would have removed the argument from his adversaries. However, since he has admitted that the forms of government and the designation of persons are human decisions (even though power itself is from God), he has not stopped the arguments or actions of those he opposes.

The Doctor then seeks to show the logical inconsistency, arguing that even if the people were to claim that the power is entirely in their control—leaving only God’s approval—they still would not have the right to reclaim that power. Many things, he says, are entirely under our control before we relinquish them, but once parted with, they are no longer within our power to reclaim.

Answer: Here, the Doctor assumes that we seek to take power away from the Prince, which we do not, as has already been stated.

The Nature of Power and Trust in Governance

The Doctor claims that if a prince does not discharge his trust, the power falls back to the people or the two Houses of Parliament (the representative body of the people) to reclaim it, enabling them to resist. This, he says, follows from the belief that power originates from the people through election and is based on the covenant or agreement between the prince and the people. Additionally, it is seen

as necessary for the safety of the state, which should have means of self-preservation. He promises to examine these arguments in order.

Answer: The Doctor accuses us of holding the view that it is lawful for the people to reclaim power if the prince fails to discharge his trust, thereby suggesting that we advocate for the deposition of kings, or that Parliament intends to undertake such action. What else, he asks, could it mean for the people or Parliament to reclaim power from the prince? However, we want it known to all that we have taken up arms solely for the purpose of self-preservation, not with the intent of removing the king from his office. For now, the State has placed some individuals under the king at the helm, until the tumult subsides, as we have previously stated.

The Doctor then addresses the derivation of power, asserting that if power does not originate from the people, as some claim, then they cannot reclaim it.

Answer: How does this follow? The only point the Doctor has made so far is that power in the abstract originates from God, not the people. Now, let us examine whether this clarification leads to the conclusion that the people cannot reclaim power. If this conclusion is valid, the syllogism would be as follows:

- If power, magistracy, and authority in themselves are from God, and the forms of government and the designation of persons are from man, then the people cannot reclaim power.
- Power and magistracy are from God, while the forms of government and the designation of persons are from man (as the Doctor admitted in Section 3).
- Therefore, the people cannot reclaim power (as the Doctor concludes in Section 4).

Answer: The Doctor's imagined adversaries could easily reject this conclusion. If he had proven that neither power, nor the qualifications for power, nor the designation of rulers came from man, but solely from God, he would have undermined his adversaries' argument. However, since he has conceded that the forms of government and the designation of rulers are human inventions (though power itself comes from God), he has not refuted the arguments or actions of those he opposes.

The Doctor continues by arguing that even if power originated entirely with the people, leaving only God's approval, they still would not have the right to reclaim that power. He likens this to cases where things entirely under our control before we relinquish them are no longer within our power to reclaim once given away.

Answer: Here, the Doctor assumes that we seek to take power away from the prince, which, as we have already clarified, we do not.

Trust vs. Donation

The Doctor's argument hinges on the difference between the irrevocable transfer of power (as in a donation or sale) and the revocable delegation of power (as in a trust). When something is disposed of by way of trust, if the trustee fails in their duty, the one who granted the trust retains the right to intervene and oversee the matter themselves. This applies to government: when the people establish a government, they do not surrender their rights or liberties outright, but rather entrust them to the governor. If the governor fails to perform his duty, the people, or their representatives, may act in self-preservation (not as an act of jurisdiction) to ensure their own safety. In this case, they do not reclaim anything they gave to the king, but rather exercise the inherent power of self-preservation that they always retained.

Anointed by God

The Doctor argues that even if the people had given the power, and God had approved, once the Lord's hand is upon the elected monarch, that monarch is the Lord's Anointed and God's minister. Therefore, the people who lifted him up to the crown may not raise their hands against him again, either to take the crown from his head or the sword from his hand.

Answer: If this is true, then even princes who are elected and not hereditary, and whose ascension to the throne is purely by contract with the people, could never be deposed. They, too, are the Lord's Anointed and ministers of God. Yet this contradicts the Doctor himself, who states in this same section, "Although such arguments (speaking of the forfeiture of the prince's power) may seem to have some force in states that are purely elective and contractual, they cannot apply in this kingdom." Dr. Philip Pareus, in his commentary on *Romans 13*, excuses what his father wrote about resistance, explaining that it referred to elective and contractual governments. But are not the princes of such governments also the Lord's Anointed and ministers of God?

Conquest and Inheritance

The Doctor then questions how the conscience can be satisfied with the argument that power derives from the people and their right to resist, given that the Crown of England descends not only by inheritance but has often been settled by conquest, through the lines of Saxons, Danes, and Normans.

Answer: First, how can the conscience be satisfied with what the Doctor himself writes in this book, where he acknowledges in this section that "it is probable that kings were originally chosen here, as

elsewhere"? In Section 5, he also states that the forms of various governments (including monarchy) are human inventions, and therefore derive from man.

Second, the Doctor's frequent references to conquest suggest that his true aim is to portray our King as a king by conquest. In Section 3, he says that God's vicegerents on earth come into their office either by immediate designation, by election of the people, by succession and inheritance, or by conquest. Now, he cannot claim that our King came into power by immediate designation, and he does not assert that our princes claim the crown by virtue of election. If the King holds the crown by inheritance, this inheritance could only come from an initial election or by conquest. Since the Doctor disclaims election and denies the derivation of power from the people, he must conclude that the King's right to the crown is based solely on conquest. This implies that any individual with a stronger or longer sword than the King could just as easily claim the crown. This dangerous opinion of the Doctor's, I must personally abhor. What danger does it not expose our sovereign to? Did not Athaliah reign as a conqueror for six years? And was she not lawfully removed from the throne by a stronger hand? Conquest is nothing but unjust usurpation, and if a conqueror rules the kingdom by force alone, why should the people not rise up and take arms to free themselves from such slavery? In this way, the Doctor opens the door to greater resistance than those he disputes against.

The Nature of Royal Right and Covenant

The Doctor argues that although a prince may hold his right to rule through conquest (the most immediate right), if he also holds it by derivation from the people (the more remote and natural right), then arguments based on this remote right may hold greater validity than

those based solely on conquest. This is the case with our prince, who, while succeeding the conqueror, also takes in the voluntary and free consent of the commonwealth to his crown—a consent that a mere conqueror does not obtain, as he rules without the approval and often against the wishes of the people.

The Doctor then says, "We tell them that the Roman emperors were not to be resisted; they reply that the emperors were absolute monarchs. How did they become such if not by force and arms, the same way that the Saxons, Danes, and Normans made themselves masters of this people?"

Answer: In these words, we plainly see the Doctor's belief in arbitrary government. On page 11, he admits that the emperors ruled absolutely and arbitrarily, and here he suggests that they became absolute monarchs through force and arms, just as the Saxons, Danes, and Normans did when they made themselves masters of this land. Earlier, he stated that our King's crown descends from the line of these conquerors. What could be more explicit in support of arbitrary government? It seems the Doctor was aware of what he had revealed and tries to cover it by saying, "I do not mean that the kings of this land may rule as conquerors." But that does not undo the damage.

The Doctor then turns to the matter of a capitulation, covenant, or oath that the prince takes to confirm what he has promised. He argues that some allege these to suggest that the breach of the prince's covenant constitutes a forfeiture of his power. He responds by saying that the terms "capitulation" and "covenant" are now used to make people believe that the king's admission to the crown is entirely conditional, whereas our King is already King before his coronation.

Answer: The Doctor misrepresents our position. While we acknowledge the existence of a covenant, we are not so naïve as to think that any breach of this covenant constitutes an automatic forfeiture of the King's power, for if that were the case, no ruler could hold the throne for long. First, we affirm the existence of a covenant. Although the kings of Israel were monarchs, immediately appointed by God to their office (one might think there would be no need for a covenant), even they took an oath and entered into a covenant with the people to protect their rights and persons, as seen in *1 Chronicles 11:3*.

Second, we argue that this mutual covenant between the King and the people binds both parties: it obligates the King to the people just as it obligates the people to the King. Therefore, it is as unlawful for a King to oppress his subjects by force and take up arms against them as it is for the subjects to take up arms against him.

Third, from this covenant, it follows that the King's power is limited.

Fourth, this covenant and capitulation demonstrate that the people entrust the King with certain responsibilities.

Fifth, if the King neglects his trust, he does not immediately forfeit his power, nor do the people forfeit their right to protect themselves in the meantime. Thus, the Doctor's assertion that we overemphasize the covenant to suggest that the King's reign is conditional is unfounded. His claim that the King is King before coronation is irrelevant to our argument, as we agree on this point.

We also state clearly that although our King's right to the crown originates from the people's delegation of power, he holds the throne by inheritance. He is not an elective King, chosen for a limited time or for life only on the condition that he rules well, with his right

ending upon his death. Instead, his right continues through his posterity. The people delegate their power in two ways: either they elect a man for life, contingent upon his good governance (which is not how our King's predecessors came to the crown), or they entrust the governance of the state to him, with that trust descending to his posterity. When his heirs assume the throne, they hold both a right of inheritance, passed down from their forefathers, and a right of election, in terms of the original source of that authority.

In this way, we establish our King more securely upon his throne than the doctrine of conquest does.

The Nature of the King's Covenant and Resistance

The Doctor asserts that even if the King breaks his covenant or fails to fulfil it, this does not result in the forfeiture of his power. He says that unless the covenant specifically included a clause allowing the States of the Kingdom to resist by force if the King failed in his duty, the argument for armed resistance would lack a firm foundation.

Answer: We do not argue that the King's power is forfeited by non-performance of his covenant. Rather, we say this: the King's trust, as expressed in his role, is to ensure the safety and well-being of the Kingdom. Although the covenant between the King and his people may not explicitly state that armed resistance is lawful if the King fails to discharge his trust, the very nature of his trust implies this. The purpose of the King's role is the safety of the Kingdom, and as the *ratio legis* (the reason of the law) forms the law itself, it must be understood that the people are permitted to secure their safety if the King fails them.

For example, in the covenant of marriage, when a man and woman marry, they do not explicitly state in their vows that adultery will

lead to divorce. Yet we know that such a condition is implicit in the marriage covenant. Similarly, the implicit understanding in the covenant between a King and his people is that if he neglects his duty, the people are entitled to act for their own safety.

What follows in this section is either a repetition of previous arguments or matters we have already addressed in substance.

Toward the end of this section, the Doctor raises the question: What should be done if the Prince takes more power than is his due, or fails to perform his duties? He answers that in such a case, the subjects may resort to lawful and fair means, such as crying out to God, petitioning the King, refusing to obey unlawful commands, or withholding subsidies, but that they have no right to compel by force or resistance.

Answer: Subjects may be viewed in two ways:

1. **Individually (severally):** As private individuals, it has long been accepted that when oppressed, subjects should resort only to tears and prayers, not arms. Before this Parliament, there were numerous oppressions upon the people, both in their estates and in matters of worship, by those who had unlawfully seized authority from the King. Yet, no forcible resistance was made; each person quietly submitted to their suffering.
2. **Collectively (socially):** When subjects act together, united as the representative body of the Kingdom, they are not limited to prayers and tears. We profess that we have not taken up arms as private individuals, but as subjects united in the collective body of the Kingdom. This posture of acting in unity as the representative body of the Kingdom has never been considered unlawful by any theologians, as I have demonstrated previously.

The Safety of the Kingdom and the Justification for Resistance

The Doctor addresses what he calls our final argument—namely, the safety of the Kingdom. He first asserts that we have sharpened many weapons for resistance at the Philistine’s forge, implying that our arguments are borrowed from the Roman Catholic schools.

Answer: There is a significant difference between our position and that of the Papists on this matter.

1. The Papists argue for the lawfulness of deposing kings, which we do not.
2. The Papists claim that it is permissible to depose a prince if he turns heretic, whereas we hold that even if a prince changes his religion, the subjects are not thereby excused from their allegiance.
3. The Papists believe not only in deposing their prince but also in killing him, even going so far as to permit a private individual invested with the Pope’s authority to commit such acts. We abhor these views entirely.

Therefore, why should the Doctor accuse us of supporting Popish doctrine and make the world believe that we favour such teachings? Just as the Parliament’s army is scandalised by its adversaries with accusations that many Papists have joined them, so too is our doctrine falsely scandalised with claims that we rely on Popish arguments. We leave it to the world to judge the truth of these accusations.

To support his claim, the Doctor further argues that the Pope claims the power to curb or depose kings, reasoning that if the Church does not have the authority to act when the civil magistrate fails to

discharge his duties, then the Church lacks the means to maintain the Catholic faith and ensure its own safety.

Answer: But what resemblance is there between the Papist argument and ours? The Papists claim that the Church has the power to preserve itself and that, therefore, the Pope may depose kings. We argue that the Kingdom has the power to preserve itself and that, if the King neglects his trust, the State must act in the meantime to safeguard its own interests.

As for matters concerning the Church, we can turn the Doctor's argument against him:

If the Church cannot preserve itself when its officer is a heretic unless it has the power to reject him after one or two admonitions, then a Kingdom also cannot preserve itself when its ruler is unfaithful, unless the Kingdom has the power either to depose him or to act in its own defence until things are better settled. Christ himself granted the Church the authority of excommunication for its preservation, and it is hard to see how a Church could safeguard itself from evils and errors without the power to cast out wicked officers. In the same way that a natural body preserves itself by expelling harmful burdens, so too must the Commonwealth have the power to protect itself by removing unfaithful rulers.

However, we do not argue that it is lawful for the Kingdom to depose an unfaithful officer outright. Rather, we claim that it may be lawful for the Kingdom, when considered socially and politically, to help itself in times of danger. Contrary to the Doctor's suggestion, this does not bring us close to the Romish doctrine. The Papists derive from this Church power a claim that the Pope, not the Church or its community, holds the authority to act.

Secondly, the Doctor poses this question in his second response: *If every State has the means to provide for its safety, what means of safety did the Christian religion have under the Roman Emperors during or after the Apostles' time? Or, what means did the people, enslaved by the Roman Emperors, have for their liberty? Did they have the right of resistance?* He cites Tertullian's *Apology*, which states that the Christians had the numbers and force to resist but lacked the warrant to do so.

Answer: The Doctor misstates the question. It should have been framed thus: *If any State has the means to provide for its safety, what means of safety did the Roman State have under the Roman Emperors?* Instead, the Doctor asks about the Christian religion under the Roman Emperors, but the Christian religion and the State are two different things.

The Christian's Power of Resistance and Trust in Governance

The Doctor first asserts that in primitive times, Christians had no power of resistance, nor any warrant for it, as Tertullian states, because the Roman state did not stand with them. However, he asks us to imagine that the Roman Senate or Parliament had supported the Christians—would they then have resisted for their own defence? He claims this situation does not reflect our current case.

Answer: In primitive times, indeed, the Christians had no power of resistance, as Tertullian points out, because the Roman state did not stand with them. However, if the Roman Senate or the representative body of the entire empire had supported the Christians, there is no doubt they would have resisted for their own defence, and they would have known that they had the warrant to do so. Anyone can see, even with limited understanding, the vast difference between the

condition of the early Christians and our current situation. The Christians of that time had no support from the state; they were not the representative body of the empire, as we now are. The situation is not comparable. Yet, this objection is repeated throughout the Doctor's book, though it is easily dismissed. There is no more similarity between our condition and that of the early Christians than there is between the condition of private individuals being opposed by the entire state and the condition of people who have the support of the state.

The Doctor continues by suggesting that even if the Senate of Rome had been against the Christians, if the people truly held the original right and all power came from them, then the people would have risen to resist because the Senate had not discharged its trust. He argues that if a King in our state were to rule arbitrarily, working around the two Houses and gaining the support of a majority, the people could claim that the members of Parliament had failed in their duty, leading the people to take up resistance.

Answer: Regarding the Roman Senate and the people of the Roman Empire, we assert that even if the Emperor and Senate had been bent on the destruction of Christians, if the whole body of the Empire had risen in support of them, many of those Christians who died would have resisted to save their own lives. However, since the Emperor and Senate were against them, and the body of the Empire did not rise to support them, they indeed had no warrant to resist, but had to suffer as they did. This is not our situation.

The Doctor goes on to claim that if, according to our reasoning, the King fails to discharge his duty, then the representative body of the people may step in. By this logic, he argues, the people may likewise claim that if the members of the two Houses fail to discharge their

trust, they too have failed in their duty, thus giving the people the right to reclaim their power.

First Answer: There is no valid comparison between the two situations. The people should not be quick to assume that Parliament is neglecting its trust because Parliament consists of many representatives, chosen from across the entire Kingdom for their faithfulness, wisdom, and goodness. By contrast, a Prince may ascend to the Crown by inheritance, even if he is known to be vicious. Moreover, it is widely accepted that the Kingdom ought to be governed by laws, and Parliament is better equipped to judge the law than the Prince. The people themselves elect and trust their members of Parliament to handle the present affairs of the Kingdom. Although the Prince is trusted by the Commonwealth, this trust was established by our forefathers, and though we consent to it now, the election and designation of Parliament members is a more direct, current trust for the Kingdom's immediate needs.

Consider this analogy: a congregation may trust a minister with all spiritual matters, but if a dispute arises between two parishioners and they appoint an arbitrator, they will rely more on the arbitrator's decision than on the minister's general trust. Similarly, although the King is entrusted with the general affairs of the Kingdom, the people have chosen Parliament for the specific, present affairs of the state, and thus feel more bound to follow Parliament's decisions.

Second Answer: There is not the same justification for the people to recall their power from Parliament in the case of unfaithfulness as there is for them to intervene if the King is misled. While both Parliament and the King derive their authority from the people, the delegation of power to the King is not the sole reason for resistance, as the Doctor suggests. The authority vested in Parliament comes

with a more specific, immediate trust. If the people, based on suspicion, were to recall their power from Parliament, they would effectively strip themselves of all authority, leaving them as private individuals. However, when the people act to protect themselves during a time of danger, and reclaim the power they originally delegated to the King, they do so under the guidance of authority.

Third Answer: The Doctor concludes by asserting that we cannot expect any absolute means of safety and security in a state.

The Three Estates and the Balance of Power

The Doctor begins by addressing the balance of power within the three Estates in Parliament. He argues that each Estate has a power of denial, preventing one or two of them from enacting laws without the third. He also points to the current issues in governance as evidence of the dangers that arise when the King and Lords act without the Commons, or when decisions are made without the King.

Answer: This question of the balance of power is best left to those who are experts in the laws, liberties, and privileges of all three Estates. Both the Doctor and I must defer to their judgment.

The Doctor then states that not only is the name "Parliament," which historically implied all three Estates, now commonly restricted to the two Houses, but also that this balance between the three Estates has been dissolved.

Answer: Firstly, the distinction between the King and Parliament in common speech has always existed. People commonly say "The King and his Parliament," and in such cases, "Parliament" refers to the two Houses alone. When the Parliament is mentioned on its own, it may include the King, just as "the body" may include both the head

and members. However, when the King and Parliament are mentioned together, the term "Parliament" refers only to the two Houses, much like how "the body" does not include the head when both are mentioned separately.

Secondly, the claim that the balance of trust between the three Estates has been dissolved seems to me a scandalous accusation, and I leave it to others to respond.

The Doctor next raises an objection, suggesting that it is unreasonable to believe that the smaller number of members remaining in the Commons or Lords could have better judgment than those who have withdrawn. He questions why one hundred members of the House of Commons should see more clearly than three hundred, or why twenty members of the Lords should have better judgment than sixty who hold a different view.

Answer: If three hundred members of the House of Commons have withdrawn, leaving only one hundred behind, and if sixty members of the Lords have likewise withdrawn, leaving only twenty, then why have these absent members not returned to vote and settle the matter? Had they done so, the controversy would have been resolved, and it could never have been claimed that Parliament was acting against the King. The three Estates would have been united, and the issue would have been settled without further dispute.

Secondly, the Doctor argues that the King, though just one person, sees with the eyes of many, as he has the benefit of counsel from Parliament. His Houses of Parliament serve as his advisors, presenting him with various perspectives and the reasoning behind them.

Answer: The Doctor's own words refute his argument. He acknowledges that the King sometimes disagrees with the majority in Parliament, and thus, though he benefits from their counsel, he can still arrive at a different conclusion. If the King may see with the eyes of others who disagree with him, then surely the Parliament, composed of many individuals, can also see with greater clarity, as they have access to the full range of perspectives and reasons.

The Doctor then moves on to discuss the merits of Monarchical government, asserting that it is the best form of governance. He claims that God consistently chose Monarchy, first with Moses, then with the Judges, and finally with the Kings.

Answer: How did we arrive at a discussion comparing Monarchy with Aristocracy? Does this follow from the statement that "many see more than one," and that there is greater safety in the judgment of many than in that of one? Since the Doctor has brought up the topic, let us now carefully examine the Monarchical government that God established. If Moses, the Judges, and the Kings were all Monarchs, and if Monarchy is the best form of government, then...

The Best Form of Government and the Power of Resistance

1. The best form of government is one in which the people have the free choice of their governor. This was the case during the time of the Judges, as seen in Judges 11:5. When the children of Ammon made war against Israel, the Elders of Israel went to fetch Jephthah from the land of Tob, saying to him, "Come and be our captain, that we may fight with the children of Ammon." Jephthah replied, "If you bring me home again to fight with the children of Ammon, and the Lord delivers them before me, shall I be your head?" The Elders of Gilead responded, "The Lord be witness between us, if we do not do according to your word."

Then Jephthah went with the Elders of Gilead, and the people made him head and captain over them (Judges 11:11). Thus, we see that the form of government that the Doctor calls the best, and which was set up by God, is one where the people have the choice of their ruler and the power derives from them. As I have argued in the Preface, this was true both for the Judges and the Kings of Israel.

2. The best government is one in which the King and the people make a covenant at the King's coronation. This covenant binds the King to his promises, and making such a covenant with the people does not negate his monarchy. For instance, David was a monarch, yet he made a covenant with the Elders of Israel, and they anointed him King over Israel (1 Chronicles 11:3).
3. The best government is also one in which the Prince consults with his people and elders, undertaking no significant matter of state or religion without their consent. David exemplified this in 1 Chronicles 13:1–4, where he consulted with the captains of thousands and hundreds, and every leader, before suggesting to the congregation of Israel that they bring back the Ark of God. The congregation agreed because the proposal was right in their eyes. Therefore, having the people participate in the Kingdom's major affairs is consistent with, and not contrary to, the Monarchical government ordained by God.
4. The best government appointed by God is also one that permits the subjects to take up arms and resist for their security and the safety of the commonwealth, when necessary, even against their monarchs. Did not the people of Israel sometimes take up arms against certain Judges? Did not David, while still a subject of Saul, take up arms and make forcible resistance? It is written in

1 Chronicles 12:18–19 that David received men and made them captains of his band. Some of the tribe of Manasseh also joined David when he went to battle against Saul with the Philistines. Although the Doctor previously argued that David only took up arms in his own defence, the text suggests otherwise. I use these words to show that there is a lawful precedent for people to take up arms in resistance to a king's command when danger is imminent. This is consistent with the form of government established by God himself, as even the Doctor acknowledges.

The Doctor then argues that this power of resistance will not ensure the safety of a state but will instead be a remedy worse than the disease. He refers to Romans 13 (which I have already addressed) and gives additional reasons. The first reason he provides is that this power of resistance, if admitted and maintained, may lead to a change in government.

Answer: In response, I argue that if various forms of government are human institutions (as the Doctor himself states), why should we believe that they are completely unchangeable, like the laws of the Medes and Persians?

Secondly, our principle does not lead to such an extreme outcome. We only argue that when a Prince neglects his trust, the people must intervene—not to depose the monarch, but to ensure that the trust is upheld.

Section V:

The Power of Resistance and Civil War

2. The Doctor states that this power of resistance is accompanied by the evils of civil war.

Answer: No, but civil war is brought about because some people are misled to take up arms against their own country. Civil war arises from its cause, and in this case, Parliament calls for arms only to defend the country. Those who oppose the country's defence are the ones who instigate civil war.

Thirdly, the Doctor claims there is a danger in this power of resistance, suggesting that if the people become discontented and gain power, they may accuse the Members of the two Houses of failing in their duties, seizing power for themselves, thus bringing rapine and confusion to the Kingdom.

Answer: No such conclusion can be drawn from this principle of ours. The people acknowledge that we are to be governed by laws and, as the Doctor says, Parliament is the judge of what the law is. The people acknowledge the truth that Parliament holds the declarative power—the supreme power to declare the law. The King himself admits he is no expert in the law, while Parliament does profess this expertise, and the people recognise it. Therefore, it stands to reason that the people would not attempt to seize power for themselves if Parliament neglected its duty. Parliament would simply inform them that it has acted according to the law, which the people already accept that the two Houses have the authority to declare. However, if the Prince neglects his trust and the people take action to defend themselves in times of danger through forcible resistance, the Prince cannot claim that the supreme power of declaring the law, represented by Parliament, agrees that his course is lawful. This highlights that the same reasoning does not apply to both situations.

The Doctor also states that, based on this reasoning, if Parliament were to neglect its trust, the people might recall their power. But how can the people believe that Parliament has acted contrary to the law when Parliament itself is the judge of the law, as even the people confess? Therefore, the Doctor need not fear this outcome.

Lastly, the Doctor argues that since someone must be trusted in every state, it is reasonable that the highest and final trust should reside with the highest authority, and that this authority, the King, should have the best security, as he is worth more than ten thousand subjects.

Answer: The people trust the King and his Parliament, who together form the highest power and court in the Kingdom. If the best security should reside with the King because he is worth more than ten thousand subjects, then surely the Kingdom itself should have the best security, as the King is ordained for the Kingdom's sake.

In conclusion, the Doctor invokes the Oath of Supremacy, Allegiance, and the last Protestation to challenge the power of resistance and the taking up of arms, claiming that such actions are contrary to these oaths, in which we swear to defend the King's person.

Answer: We indeed defend the King's person by taking up arms. Who, when considering the situation properly, cannot see that if the Popish party, which includes those around the King or within his armies, were to prevail, our King would either be forced to adopt their views or be killed? Who does not understand that if the Papists gain control, even though they currently champion the King's supremacy, they would either force him into another form of supremacy or quickly dispose of him? Their doctrine supports such actions. Therefore, what greater service can a true subject perform

for the King than to take up arms to deliver him from those who seek to destroy his soul? In the Oath of Supremacy, we swear to recognise the King as supreme in opposition to the Pope or any other individual. How does our doctrine or practice contradict this? In the Oath of Allegiance, we swear to be his liege subjects according to the law, and our actions align with the law. In our Protestation, we vow to uphold the King's person, the privileges of Parliament, the rights of the subjects, and our religion. If we fail to take up arms during this time of Popish insurrection, how can we, with clear conscience, claim that we are defending the King's person against the violence of the Papists, who (according to their own doctrine) we know will attack our King? How can we claim to protect the privileges of Parliament, whose authority includes summoning delinquents and using force to bring the accused to trial? How can we claim to uphold the rights of the subjects, who are naturally entitled to defend themselves? How can we protect the truth of our religion, which has already faced many assaults and now faces even greater peril from those who, under the guise of defending it, are its greatest threat?

Therefore, I trust that any righteous individual who considers these matters with conscience will not hesitate to support this public cause. Although the Doctor frequently invokes the threat of damnation in this section and elsewhere, claiming that resistance will lead to damnation, a well-informed conscience will not be more troubled by the Doctor's pronouncement of damnation than by the "God damn us" uttered by the Cavaliers.

Section VI:

Application of the Principles of Resistance

Now the Doctor comes to the application of all in these last two sections, in which I do not intend to trace him through every point he makes. The application of these principles can be left to what men see and know by experience; however, there are a few things I must address in these sections. In this sixth section, he tells us that we do not live according to our own principles, which he describes as being that our resistance must be *omnibus ordinibus regni consentientibus*, which he translates as “agreed upon and undertaken by the general and unanimous consent of all estates.”

Answer: But is this an accurate and fair translation of the words? The Doctor should know that when a matter comes to a vote in the Regent House, it passes with the consent of the Regents, non-Regents, and heads of the University. Though not every individual may unanimously agree as one, it can still be *omnibus ordinibus consentientibus*.

The Doctor then asks how a person’s conscience can be convinced that this resistance was agreed upon by the unanimous and free consent of the estates. He points out that the resistance chiefly began with the establishment of the Militia, which he says was introduced with considerable opposition, especially in the Lords' House, and eventually passed by a small margin. He argues that because these decisions were not made by large assemblies, they cannot be said to represent the unanimous and free consent of the whole Kingdom.

Answer: By this reasoning, no act of Parliament or law would be valid. The Doctor could challenge any law ever made, for when has there ever been a law passed with unanimous consent from everyone? According to the laws of the Kingdom, even if not all members of either House were present for recent affairs, it must still

be acknowledged as an act of Parliament and therefore represents the judgment of the entire Kingdom.

Secondly, the Doctor claims that we do not adhere to our second principle, which is that our resistance must be purely defensive. He asserts that those who are the first to take up arms cannot be acting in defense. He asks, "Who was first to bear arms?" Anyone who can count the months and weeks in an almanac, he says, will see that armed men were sent into Hull and the Militia was established first.

Answer: If those who are first in arms cannot be on the defensive, then David's act must not have been purely defensive, as the Doctor had earlier claimed. For in Scripture, we see that David and his men had taken up arms before Saul pursued him. Clearly, the Doctor's almanac is incomplete if he starts counting only at the events in Hull, while ignoring that the King had previously approached Parliament with hostile intent, raising forces around Windsor. Such facts should be left to the judgment of men's experience and knowledge.

The Doctor then (in a somewhat unclear manner) begins to inquire into the cause of these arms. After some rhetorical flourishes, he asks if anyone would have defended the revolt of the ten tribes if Rehoboam had promised to preserve their liberties. He goes on to question this present revolt from allegiance, which he claims has now taken hold of well over ten of the twelve tribes. Yet on page 21, he speaks of a vote passed by only a small number, claiming that this resistance does not have the general and unanimous consent of the people. How does he reconcile this with his statement that over ten of the twelve tribes support it?

When examining the causes of this war and resistance, the Doctor asserts that, to speak truthfully, religion and liberty are merely the pretexts for this war. He claims that the King has fortified these

causes with many acts of grace passed by Parliament, such that they cannot be in the danger pretended by those raising this war. The real contention, he says, must be over something the King indeed refuses: his control over the armed forces, his power of veto in Parliament, and his authority over the Church and its revenues, which he is bound by oath to maintain as established by law.

The Doctor asserts that it is a bold and scandalous claim to accuse Parliament, before the whole world, of hypocrisy. But how does this align with the Doctor's own principles, when he criticises others for not believing the King's protestations? Is it not equally uncharitable for him to accuse the Houses of Parliament of pretending one thing while intending another? Should not conscience, in the same way, be bound to believe the Parliament's protestations as much as it would the papers issued in the King's name? Have the Parliament and the Houses of Lords and Commons behaved so unworthily that, under the guise of religion, we should believe they merely seek the revenues of the Church? Where is the Doctor's charity in this?

If, as the Doctor claims, the King is bound by oath to maintain the government of the Church as established by law, he is no more bound to maintain that law than any other law of the Kingdom. If the King and Parliament agree to repeal any law, they may do so without breaching the King's oath. This applies to the governance of the Church as well.

The Doctor continues on page 25, where he more freely expresses his views on the governance of the Church by bishops. He claims that this form of government has existed since the introduction of Christianity in England and is, of all systems, the best. He argues that the King is justified in using the power of arms to prevent its abolition.

Answer: If the Doctor were to examine the history of Queen Mary's reign, he would find that the Protestant churches, which had to operate in secrecy due to persecution, were governed by elders and deacons. The best form of church government is that which is outlined in Scripture, as the Doctor himself would admit. If this governance model is scriptural, it is surprising that proponents of episcopacy argue that no particular form of church government is laid out in the Bible. They must either admit that other forms of church government are sinful and contrary to Scripture or concede that no such model is explicitly mandated in Scripture. It is worth noting that, historically, episcopal governance has not fared well. No church government in Christendom has led to more sects, schisms, and separations from the Church than that governed by bishops. In contrast, the Protestant churches in Switzerland, France, Holland, Germany, and Scotland have not experienced the same level of division over their forms of governance. The divisions that have occurred in these nations are more often due to doctrinal issues rather than church government.

If anyone argues that the divisions in England are due to the wickedness of the governors rather than the corruption of the system, we must ask why the governors of England should be considered more wicked than those in other Protestant churches. Could it not be that the governance itself provides opportunities for such wickedness? If the government by diocesan bishops is indeed the best, why did Christ and his apostles not establish it? Surely, they appointed some form of governance for the Church, and whatever they appointed would have been *Jure Divino* (by divine right) and therefore the best. Diocesan bishops, however, were never considered to hold office *Jure Divino* until relatively recently. If episcopacy is truly the best form of government, let it stand the test of scrutiny. However, to suggest that it is so vital that the King is

justified in using arms to defend it is astounding. Here, the Doctor reveals his preference for civil war rather than allowing the removal of episcopacy. He urges the King to start an unnatural civil war to preserve this order. But consider, O Englishmen, whether it is better to let this form of church government go or to see the whole kingdom bathed in blood.

At the conclusion of this section, the Doctor complains that the King's spear, cruse, and necessary ammunition and provisions have been taken away and not returned, even after repeated requests. He compares this to David's actions, who, after taking Saul's spear and cruse, restored them before Saul even asked, citing 1 Samuel 26.

Answer: While it is true that David returned Saul's spear before it was demanded, he only did so after Saul had humbled himself before him, saying, "I have sinned; return, my son David, for I will no longer harm you, because my life was precious in your sight this day. Behold, I have played the fool and erred exceedingly" (1 Samuel 26:21). Only then did David say, "Behold, the King's spear; let one of the young men come over and fetch it" (v. 22). Notably, no mention is made of the cruse being returned.

Some other points made by the Doctor in this section seem to contain more accusations than actual proof. However, common knowledge and understanding may be sufficient to respond to these charges.

Section VII

In this final section, the Doctor states that, even if conscience could be persuaded that it is lawful to make a defensive resistance, it could never be convinced that the King is as the people are led to believe: that he is a tyrant, a subverter of religion and laws, untrustworthy, or at least a man misled by wicked counsel, intent on bringing in Popery, and unwilling to keep his promises.

Answer: These are serious accusations, but how groundless they are, God and the world know. Who cannot see how careful the Parliament has been to uphold the King's honour? They have consistently hesitated to attribute the harmful declarations issued in his name to him directly. Instead, they blame his counsellors, not the King himself. In this, they mirror David's attitude toward Saul. Though Saul pursued him, David did not attribute the unjust war to Saul personally, but to those who surrounded him. David said to Saul, *"If the Lord has stirred you up against me, let Him accept an offering; but if it is the children of men, cursed be they before the Lord, for they have driven me out this day from sharing in the inheritance of the Lord"* (1 Samuel 26:19). In the same way, the Parliament, when writing anything that might reflect poorly on the King, has always done so only to defend themselves from accusations first levelled against them. And when they did speak, it was with the attitude of Shem and Japheth, who, with averted eyes, covered their father's nakedness, seeking to shield rather than expose the faults of our Sovereign. Woe to those who push the King into actions that reveal his weaknesses. However, I will not curse them as Cham was cursed.

The Doctor then examines the fears and suspicions that have taken hold of the people, which he says are based on reports of foreign powers being brought in, the Queen's religion, the gathering of

Papists around the King, and the interception of resources meant for the relief of Ireland.

First, regarding the fear of foreign invasion, which the Doctor claims was only a tactic to keep the people on edge and more easily drawn into a defensive posture, he argues that these fears were ultimately unfounded. He further asserts that if foreign aid were now being sent to the King (which he claims is justifiable, given that all Christian monarchs must see themselves as invested in this cause), it would be right for the King to use such aid against subjects who have taken up arms.

Answer: The fact that no foreign invasion has occurred does not prove that these fears were unfounded. It is more likely that foreign intervention was averted due to the Parliament's vigilance by both land and sea. But it is troubling to see the Doctor, in effect, inviting foreign forces into our land and encouraging foreign princes to send them, and our King to use them. Whether such encouragement is fitting for an English divine or subject, I leave for others to judge.

The Doctor also claims that the Queen's religion is not a new cause for concern.

Answer: I will leave this point to the judgment of those who have witnessed events firsthand. It is a matter of fact, and one can only ask: is there not more reason for concern now than there was at the Queen's first arrival?

Thirdly, concerning the gathering of Papists around the King, the Doctor tries to justify it by comparing it to the gathering of men around David during his distress. He notes that Ziba was rewarded, implying that those gathering around the King should be seen in a similar light.

Answer: How can the Doctor prove that the men who gathered around David were of a different religion from him, or that their religion was considered rebellious by the state and subject to disarmament, as the Papists are in this case? If he cannot prove this, then his comparison is irrelevant.

Lastly, concerning the situation in Ireland, I defer entirely to the Parliament's declarations. Without doubt, they are more informed about the proceedings there than this Doctor, and any enlightened conscience will surely trust the Parliament's statements over this Doctor's personal assertions in such matters.

The remaining matters in this section mostly involve factual issues, so I will leave those to men's judgment. However, I cannot help but observe how, in all things, the Doctor exonerates the King while casting blame upon the Parliament. He does this with a subtle tactic: after making his harshest accusations, he retracts by saying things like, "I speak not this to cast any blemish upon the wisdom of the great Council." Similarly, when he has argued extensively in favour of the King ruling by conquest, he follows it up with, "This I speak not as if the Kings of the land might rule as conquerors." This kind of rhetoric is a common device. When people have preached against purity and holiness with all the bitterness they can muster, they think they can absolve themselves by adding, "God forbid that I should speak against purity and holiness."

Let the Doctor, in God's name, defend the King as much as he can (as we are all bound to do as far as we can). But can he not vindicate His Majesty without casting such vile aspersions upon the Parliament? He says on page 30:

"Men are highly concerned to consider whether those who are the main directors of this resistance are discharging the trust they were

called to. Is stripping the King of the power of arms, and then using them, a defense of his person, rights, and dignity? Is forcing the subjects' property to fund this resistance, and imprisoning them for their refusal, maintaining the rights and privileges of the subjects? Is allowing so many sects to preach their doctrines, and commit such intolerable outrages upon the worship of God, with such licentiousness, a defense of religion and the established worship of this Church?"

Answer: These are severe accusations against the Parliament. How can the Doctor claim, "I enter not this discourse to cast the least blemish upon the Parliament"? Blessed is the man who does not condemn himself in the very thing he permits. The Doctor acknowledges that we must be subject to higher powers, and he admits that the Parliament is the highest court in the Kingdom, entrusted to judge what is lawful. If they have judged this resistance to be lawful, then in resisting their declarative power and calling it unlawful, while hurling such accusations against them, does the Doctor not condemn himself?

In the final section of his book, the Doctor calls upon conscience to answer upon pain of damnation. But after a serious examination of his work, I believe that conscience will reach the following verdict:

In the sight of God, I have reviewed this treatise, and I find it injurious to the King, the Parliament, the divines of this kingdom, the subjects, and the author himself.

- **To the King:** This work provokes the King against his Parliament and subjects, further entangling him in this war, and encouraging him to seek the aid of Papists. If the King prevails by their help, what Protestant subject will not tremble to think of the consequences?

- **To the Parliament:** The Doctor accuses them of the bloodshed in this war, the suffering in Ireland, the sects and divisions in this kingdom, and of hypocrisy, pretending one thing and intending another.
- **To the Divines:** He claims that all divines in this kingdom share his views, which is far from the truth.
- **To the Subjects:** He denies them the liberties granted by God, nature, and the fundamental laws of the kingdom, while inviting foreign powers against them.
- **To the Author Himself:** He has unnecessarily embroiled himself in a bad cause.
- **Lastly, to Scripture, God, and Conscience:** The Scriptures are twisted, God is dishonoured, and conscience is deceived.

Now may the Lord grant that while we speak of conscience, we truly make conscience of our ways. For many have a conscience that condemns, not remedies. Concerning the King, "Give the King thy judgments, O God, and thy righteousness unto the King's Son" (Psalm 72:1). Concerning the two Houses of Parliament, "Let the mountains bring peace to the people, and the little hills, by righteousness" (Psalm 72:3). Let the King, Queen, and all the people praise thee, O God; yes, let all of England praise thee.

FINIS

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ePub, .mobi & .pdf Editions October 2024. Requests for information should be addressed to: Monergism Books, PO Box 491, West Linn Or 97068